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Abstract 
 
 
The continuing difficulty of integrating immigrants, especially Muslims, has 
led many European political leaders to question the merits of multiculturalism and to 
promote more commitment towards national values and social cohesion. This thesis 
aims to examine how these national discourses are interconnected and why they 
have an exclusionary character. Starting from this point, I draw on a theoretical 
approach based on a model of mediatised convergence in the European public 
sphere. Secondly, I reconstruct through a critical discourse analysis, the national 
debates that have emerged across Europe. I then identify commonalities, by looking 
into the strategies through which these discourses are articulated. Thirdly, I 
investigate through content analysis, how press coverage has amplified and 
reinforced this debate. 
 
The cross-national comparison demonstrates a shared concern for how 
multicultural policies have passively tolerated and encouraged Muslim immigrants 
to live in self-segregated and isolated communities. This nexus between 
securitisation and multiculturalism targets first and second generation of Muslims 
who are assumed, because of their religious and cultural identity, to have 
authoritarian customs and illiberal values. Conversely, embracing those secular and 
liberal values that characterise the European ethos is exemplified as the best practice 
to deal with a correct and safe integration. However, this strategy to reduce 
integration towards a process of assimilation to majority norms and values risks 
creating further exclusion, rather than enhancing social cohesion and political 
belonging. 
 
The analysis of national press coverage confirms a shared way of thinking 
and talking about integration. Despite the political specificity of each national 
debate, simultaneous coverage across Europe develops reciprocal discursive 
references on how to achieve community cohesion and manage the migration of 
Muslims. It can be claimed, therefore, that the more discourses converge across 
national public spheres, the more they are perceived as stable and consensual. 
Hence, convergence is a crucial factor to be considered because it allows us to 
define the boundaries of the European public sphere. However, the study of this 
transnational debate is crucial not only for scholars of media and communication, 
but also of European policies and immigration, as this debate involves a larger 
discussion on how to manage the complexity of relationships between immigrant 
minorities and the majority in Europe. 
 
 
Keywords:  Muslims, Immigration, Identity, Integration, Political Speech, European 
Public Sphere, Discourse Analysis, Mediatisation, Convergence.   
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Chapter 1: Context, Background, and the Importance of the Thesis 
 
 
In November 2009, Switzerland voted in Europe's first referendum to add a 
provision to their Federal Constitution that bans the construction of new minarets. 
Despite criticism from the government and the churches in Switzerland, the 
proponents of the referendum argued that the prohibition of minarets would preserve 
Switzerland’s legal and political order because minarets are a symbol of a 
“religious-political force” that reflects an “attempt” to impose an “undemocratic 
hegemony” over non-Islamic people (Fraudiger, 2009: 1). 
 
What happened in Switzerland was not merely a temporary cyclic eruption of 
anti-immigrant sentiment that is randomly present in Europe (Westin, 2003; Merkl 
& Weinberg, 2003), but rather a symptom of a general cultural and social insecurity 
of a large part of Swiss voters (Mayer, 2011: 12) towards immigration, and above 
all, an expression of the problems of co-existence between the Swiss majority and 
its Muslim minority (Christmann & Danaci, 2012: 154-155). 
 
The outcome of the Swiss referendum represents a larger crisis in the 
European management of Muslim integration. Muslim immigration and increasing 
requests for political recognition of diversity have challenged an established sense of 
borders and loyalties to the cultural traditions and values of the national majority 
(Koopmans et al, 2005: 142) as Muslims often depend on identities (Aitchison et al 
2007: 26), which are not included within the cultural confines of national societies. 
 
In the specific case of Europe, the visibility of Islam has grown greater with 
the increasing establishment of Muslim immigrant communities in European 
countries (Göle, 2002). Today, Muslims are indeed the largest immigrant group in 
most of Western Europe, and this trend does not appear likely to change in the 
coming years (Leiken, 2012: 104). Consequently, European societies are facing an 
increasing level of cultural ‘differences’ due to the growing intensity of migrations 
from Muslim countries (Meer: 2010). Veils at schools, burqas in the streets, 
mosques in cities and minarets are the manifest visibility of Muslims’ diversity 
(Göle, 2002: 173). 
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In recent years, the view that Muslim populations in Western European 
countries are not well integrated into their host societies has led public debate to 
present multicultural policies as divisive (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2012) and 
undermining the solidarity inherent in national social models (Banting and 
Kymlicka 2006). These discussions sprung from the fear of radical Islamism and 
have fuelled the perception that Muslims are pretending to claim unreasonable 
cultural and political accommodations, which are alien upon European traditions 
(Modood 2012) 
 
In response to this multicultural crisis (Lentin 2012; Zapata-Barrero, 2008: 
6), political leaders across Europe have simultaneously questioned the actual merits 
of multicultural policies and have asked Muslim immigrants to make more vigorous 
efforts to confirm their loyalty to national communities and to avoid future conflict 
within religious and cultural traditions (Eliott & Turner 2012: 86, Mavelli 2012: 
140). 
 
For instance, French former President Nicolas Sarkozy [see appendix A, 
2009: line 27] defended the Swiss vote, because it did not discriminate against the 
freedoms of religious practice or conscience. Sarkozy claimed that the visibility and 
the open religious profession of Muslims are often considered disturbing or 
incompatible with the secular and Christian traditions of Europe [44]. According to 
Sarkozy, it is understandable for European people to worry about immigration and 
demand that Muslims adopt the political and cultural values of the European 
countries where they now live. 
 
This view on integration has become part of the political agenda for many 
leaders across Europe. In October 2010, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, 
claimed that Germany’s attempts to create a multicultural society have completely 
failed [see Appendix B, Merkel 2010: paragraph 31]. In February 2011, British 
Prime Minister David Cameron echoed Angela Merkel in a speech at the Munich 
Conference on Security Policy by claiming “state multiculturalism” has failed [see 
appendix C, Cameron 2011: paragraph 8]. He added that the state must oppose, 
rather than accommodate, the non-violent Muslim groups that are indifferent to 
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British values such as democracy, the rule of law, and equal rights for race, sex or 
sexuality [16]. A week after Cameron’s speech, Sarkozy, speaking on a French 
television program, directly quoted Merkel and Cameron, remarking 
“multiculturalism is a failure" (AFP, 2011). 
 
This debate across Europe is certainly not driven by an attempt to exclude 
Muslims, but rather by a normative assumption that it is possible to integrate 
Muslims through the imposition of those universal values, norms and cultural 
attributes that are shared by Europeans (Carrera and Wiesbrok 2009: 30). This 
discourse is supported in various policies in which the state is actively promoting the 
kind of subjectivity that a liberal society requires: tests of values and pledges of 
allegiance for migrants and citizens, the enrolment of moderate Muslim 
organisations and community leaders in state-sponsored councils, state training 
programs for imams, and formal and informal restrictions of freedom of expression 
to ban extremist views (Kundnani, 2012: 191). 
 
Integration is therefore conceived through the ability of states to promote a 
set of civic policies in which Muslim immigrants can be integrated only through the 
assimilation of a normative identity that is more appropriate to the European ethos. 
However, the attempt to conform Muslim immigrants to European values raises 
questions about the nature of this debate and the practical political limits of civic 
integration policies. In fact, a continuing emphasis on the need to integrate 
immigrants could confirm a political vision, in which cultural diversity is seen as a 
threat rather than a potential opportunity for Europe. In addition, this emergent 
political consensus does not seem to be aimed at creating policies that fight the 
conditions of social exclusion, but rather at pushing Muslim immigrants into 
wanting to be more integrated into European culture (Mavelli, 2012: 139). 
 
The first section of this chapter reviews the present literature on the debate 
on civic integration. The debate on integration of Muslim immigrants can be seen as 
a discursive structure that organises the complexity of social relationships between 
minority and majority. In particular, the discussion assesses how the anxiety for the 
lack of integration can be politically manipulated with the intent to objectify a 
collective fear of social disunity and produce a loss of cohesion. Thus, civic 
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integration can be considered as a normative answer aimed at defining what values 
and identities belong to that community and perhaps more crucially, those that do 
not belong. 
 
Section Two focuses on the gaps and controversies in the literature that have 
investigated the existence of a common discourse on integration that goes beyond 
national models and philosophies of integration. Specifically, many theoretical and 
empirical studies have confirmed a convergence toward a universalistic discourse 
about admission and integration, which have presented multiculturalism as divisive 
and illiberal. The implication for Muslims is that integration is conceived only 
through the universal norms of the hosting community, and Muslim identity can 
only exist, therefore, if it corresponds to the normative identity of the majority. 
However, these studies fail to distinguish how, at the base of the convergence 
towards civic integration, there is an interactive process of communication across 
Europe. This is why, in addition to the political background that explains the 
institutional processes by which civic integration policies are created and 
maintained, it is necessary to identify the interactive discursive process through 
which political actors deliberate, and legitimise “civic integration” following a 
specific communicative logic of transnational convergence. 
 
In Section Three, the aims, research questions and hypotheses of the present 
research project are formulated and evaluated. The main assumption is that the 
debate on Muslim integration is developed through an interactive discursive process 
between the national and transnational political spheres in which norms are debated 
and accommodated within a national political context. The analysis of convergence 
offers an understanding of the connections the European public sphere establishes 
between countries and how simultaneous debates on integration might have a critical 
impact on how the national public sphere recontextualises transnational discourses 
on migration and integration, and how these relationships contribute to the 
construction of a shared normative discourse about integration. 
 
Section Four offers a summary of the research methodology. Here the 
analytical framework is based on a comparative analysis of three national case 
studies based on major institutional statements by governmental actors, which are 
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then considered a point of entry for reconstructing the public debate on Muslim 
integration. The research methodology combines content analysis - to identify how 
the press frames this debate — and critical discourse analysis to scrutinise in detail, 
the national discourses on integration and to compare similar discursive strategies 
and structures. Hence, this methodology facilitates an interdisciplinary approach to 
the study of political debate across Europe and a validation of evidence through 
cross verification from different sources without being constrained to the field of 
discourse analysis. 
 
Section Five explains my personal interest in this research topic and the 
attempt to emphasise self-reflexivity, thus revealing my own position in the research 
process. Finally, Section Six offers an overview of the thesis structure, wherein each 
chapter is summarised. 
 
1. A Critical Review of the Literature on Civic Integration 	  
The debate on civic integration can be seen as a dispute over how much 
difference is acceptable and safe within European society. Unlike multicultural 
integration, civic integration presupposes homogeneity and seeks to maintain social 
cohesion through a common identity and related values and beliefs (Jackson-Preece 
2005: 6). Accordingly, civic integration is assumed as a “one-way process” in which 
migrants should “integrate into the existing culture and society without any 
reciprocal accommodation” (Lacroix, 2010: 8). In fact, civic integration policies 
require newcomers to assimilate to specific cultural and political characteristics in 
order to fit in with a national identity and become part of the economic and social 
structure of the receiving society. 
 
Civic integration refers to specific state programs aimed at promoting 
integration within immigrants through the strengthening and inculcation of a set of 
civic values, cohesion, homogeneity and culture (Mouritsen, 2009: 24). Instead 
multicultural integration promotes a large diversity of values, beliefs and identities 
as legitimate or even desirable within the nation. However, the multicultural 
approach does not only suggest respect for the role of ethnic communities but also 
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implies a “two-way process of adaptation” concerning changes in “values, norms 
and behaviour” for both immigrants and members of the hosting society (Castles et 
al., 2002: 115). 
 
According to the advocates of civic integration, Muslim immigrants are 
encouraged by multicultural approaches to close themselves off from mainstream 
society (Flood et al, 2012: 145). Specifically, multiculturalism is depicted as leading 
Muslims to develop unwillingness to participate in social and political life, which 
certainly brings self-exclusion and the development of urban ghettoes (AlSayyad & 
Castells 2002: 142). However, multicultural diversity does not encourage “men to 
beat their wives, parents to abuse their children, and communities to erupt in racial 
violence” (Philips, 2009: 45). Multiculturalism criticises homogeneous and mono-
cultural national communities, supports the rights of minorities to maintain their 
cultural specificity and addresses those inequalities that can be experienced in the 
process of integration by promoting social equality (Castles, 2000: 5). 
 
The rejection of multiculturalism does not imply that it is impossible to 
integrate Muslims due to incompatibility with European values. On the contrary, the 
opponents of multiculturalism tend to emphasise the state’s ability to promote 
immigrants’ adherence to liberal-democratic values through civic policies. 
Integration policies are thus used to lead immigrants towards a form of identity more 
appropriate to the European societies (Geddes 2005: 116). At the same time, the 
historical process of nation-building in Europe has been profoundly devoted to 
adopting “a single, homogeneous identity with a shared sense of history, values and 
traditions” (Smith 2010: 127). 
 
The main stake of civic integration centres therefore, on how historical 
notions of the nation can be adapted to include new, culturally distinct immigrants, 
and conversely, how these immigrants must change or adapt to become integrated in 
the nation (Joppke, 2007, 2010; Mouritsen, 2006; Favell, 2001, 2003). As a 
consequence, an important challenge to integration is the close relationship between 
discourse linked to the integration of newcomers, and the long-standing social 
imaginary of nation building (Anderson 1991), which forms the basis of national 
identity and provides the background for policymaking. 
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Several studies reveal how civic integration policies assume that specific 
categories of immigrants, particularly Muslims, do not conform to liberal and 
democratic values of Europe (Cesari, 2013). Thus, the paradoxical liberal state 
prerogative to integrate immigrants through tests, reveals an extreme attempt to 
realise a politically and culturally homogenous identity (Nachmani 2010: 246), in 
which Muslim immigrants are identified as the Other to assimilate, according to the 
values and norms of the dominant majority (Joppke 2010: 139). According to 
Horner and Weber (2011: 142), the difference between the colonial and the late 
modern system of integration is that the latter is no longer based on the absolute 
exercise of power, but on the results of a test supposedly providing an “objective” or 
“scientific” basis for the decision. Nowadays, the “good ones” are those who 
successfully pass the test on civic duties, whereas the “bad ones” are those who fail 
(Horner and Weber 2011: 142).  
 
Civic integration policies are thus not based on an exclusionary political 
process, but are justified and legitimised through an ambiguous liberal concept of 
integration (Joppke 2007; Carrera 2009; Kundnani, 2012), which it assumes as being 
a “non-negotiable and non-questionable” (Mavelli, 2012: 107) universal morality of 
Europeans. However, this attempt to integrate immigrants through the imposition of 
supposed universal values raises questions about the normative nature and the 
practical political limits of these policies, as the process of civic integration involves 
immigrants having to support these European values even when they find 
themselves opposed to them (Esposito & Kalin 2011:7).  
 
In summary, the main point of this review is to recognise the importance of 
studying the debate on civic integration, because it could reveal prevailing 
discourses on integration including both who belongs, and crucially also, who does 
not belong, as civic integration policies are bound to the core values of the nation 
states and requires immigrants to accept the collective identity and cultural values of 
the host nation. 
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2. Controversy and Gaps in the Study of Civic Integration of Muslims 
 
Traditionally, the literature on migration and minorities has considered the 
topic of integration to be bound to the main characteristics of the national 
community, which can be defined by the territorial, ethnic, or cultural markers of the 
nation-state (Balibar 1991; Smith 2010; Jackson-Preece 2005, 2006). Indeed, each 
state considers in a different way which rights should be granted to which groups 
according to the national “philosophy of integration” (Favel 2001). As a 
consequence, there are different national factors, which could exclude a common 
discourse on civic integration of Muslims. 
 
Firstly, national, cultural and historical contexts within Europe remain very 
different. For example, European countries have significant differences in terms of 
prejudice or engagement toward Islam “depending on the colonial histories, the 
geographical location, and the composition of the immigrant community” (Halliday 
2002: 125). Secondly, many comparative studies on integration are highly doubtful 
about a process of convergence within Europe (Bauböck et al., 2006), as the decisive 
institution in regulating and managing migration remains the nation-state. The 
nation-state continues to define the rules based on which non-natives are allowed to 
move to a country and gain access to employment and citizenship status. 
 
For this reason, Favell is critical of the view that the European political 
system will eventually “challenge the predominance of the nation state in policy 
making on immigration and integration” (2001: 242). In fact, there is no 
supranational authority higher than a state itself to decide on immigration or 
integration policies. The institutions of the EU have no formal competences 
concerning the very core of state sovereignty (Maatsch, 2011: 150). For example, 
the European Commission and the Council of Europe can only exercise a limited 
influence over national legal provisions on citizenship, immigration and integration 
policies. In addition, these norms are not automatically legally binding. 
Nevertheless, several authors have underscored how civic integration policies adopt 
the language of EU institutions in regards to immigration (Mulcahy, 2008; Carrera 
& Weilsbrock, 2009). In particular, the European Commission Immigration Law and 
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the EU Framework on Integration conceive civic integration through a political 
agenda, whereby immigrants are asked to accept core liberal values and are 
guaranteed in return, a gradual granting of a set of rights, including social, civic and 
political rights, comparable to those of EU citizens (Mulcahy, 2008: 118). 
 
Increasingly, the argument is made is that it is possible to observe in Europe, 
a civic turn in immigrant policies (Joppke 2007; Mulcahy, 2008; Carrera & 
Weilsbrock, 2009). According to Mulcahy (2008: 118), this civic turn is taking place 
not through a vertical policy convergence from the EU to the member states, but 
rather through a horizontal convergence voluntarily and informally led by informal 
policy networks among member states. However, Mulcahy (2008) and Carrera & 
Weilsbrock (2009) point to the fact that EU member states have responded in 
different ways in adopting their policies, and offer several explanations for why 
countries have adapted, rejected or ignored the EU civic integration norms. In 
particular, some authors offer evidence that some EU states have introduced policies 
based on a distorted version of the original EU model of civic integration, which is 
more analogous to acculturation or even assimilation policies, rather than granting 
rights to immigrants (Kundnani 2007; Joppke, 2007; De Leew & van Wichelen 
2012; Lentin 2012). 
 
Joppke (2007) makes a persuasive case that, in a core group of EU countries 
- France, the Netherlands and Germany - traditional policies of national integration 
are losing relevance today through a twofold convergence, which emphasise 
equality and individual rights, but they also demand the immigrants’ political 
conformity with European norms (Joppke, 2007: 1-2). This trend is apparently 
shaped by the neoliberal tenet to coerce "individuals, as well as communities they 
are part of, to release their self-producing and -regulating capacities, as an 
alternative to redistribution and public welfare that fiscally diminished states can no 
longer deliver" (Joppke, 2007: 16). However, an implicit limit in Joppke’s 
comparative analysis is to focus only on a small sample of countries - though very 
influential - which provides a partial representation as to the extent of convergence. 
For this reason, although there is agreement on the fact that a major pattern seems to 
exist, especially in a core group of EU states, to adopt a coercive model of civic 
integration, it could still be early to declare that this ‘civic turn’ has become 
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convergent across Europe (Mulcahy, 2008: 117). The resulting trend could not be 
one of convergence, but of a differential adaptation through horizontal interactions 
among EU states. 
 
The merit of the pro-convergence literature is to recognise that European 
countries are developing common responses to immigrant integration through the 
emergence of civic integration policies based on common norms. However, this 
literature does not provide an analysis of the debate underlining this convergence 
towards a coercive model of civic integration, to see which norms and arguments are 
more influential. What is further missing is a conceptualisation of the discursive 
interactions among national public spheres, in order to consider whether this ‘civic 
turn’ follows not just from political national interests, but also from the reciprocal 
influence that those national debates can have. The question then, with regard to the 
explanatory role of civic integration discourse and its causal influence in political 
debate, is how simultaneous national debates on integration might have a mutual 
impact on legitimising and reinforcing a coercive discourse on Muslims. 
 
3. Aims, Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 
The present research project proposes to examine the public debate 
concerning the integration of Muslim immigrants that has emerged across Europe in 
response to the “multicultural crisis” (Lentin, 2012). The goal is to demonstrate how 
national political debates have a reciprocal impact on legitimising and reinforcing a 
similar discourse on integration. For this reason, it is crucial to acknowledge the 
discursive sources of mutual influence and the motives that go with these national 
debates.  
 
The assumption of a reciprocal influence implies the existence of a shared 
understanding across European countries. As a consequence, it is central to 
investigate when and how the discourse of civic integration has been structured and 
recontextualised along different national public spheres. At the same time, in 
addition to the political background that explains how this discourse has entered into 
the national policy agenda, there is a need for critical analysis to be applied to show 
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how the transnational mediatisation of politics performs a political legitimating 
function, which aims at creating consensus towards a civic integration of Muslims, 
when these policies are blatantly discriminatory. 
 
Taking this point of departure and moving forward, there are two central sets 
of questions to answer: 
 
First, what kind of convergence can be observed in comparing national 
public debates on Muslim civic integration after the Swiss referendum? How is this 
convergence on integration constituted at the national level? Furthermore, in order to 
better understand the role of transnational convergence, the question can be 
reformulated in this way: How important are the differences between the national 
debates studied? Can national discourses explain these differences in public debate? 
 
Second, what are the communicative practices and discursive dynamics, 
which confer the legitimacy to public debate? What arguments are advanced? How 
are these arguments structured, linked and then recontextualised along different 
national levels? What themes are discussed under a common discursive regime? 
Why is a politics of identity reproduced in the discursive regime of integration 
(definitions of Europe, the relevance of values, and in particular, the construction of 
and reference to those values)? This last question also involves consideration over 
how much difference can be acceptable in the name of cohesion. 
 
Research Hypothesis 1 (RH1) assumes that European public debate on 
Muslim integration has become engaged, not simply in parallel single debates, but it 
has also entangled a shared discourse to legitimate a policy of civic integration. In 
particular, it can be argued that a transnational process of mediatising political 
communication supports this convergence towards a common discourse. However, it 
is assumed that this convergence is redefined at the national level as a national 
particularism through a specific political interest. 
 
Research Hypothesis 2 (RH2) assumes that the current debate on integration 
shares a common discourse on a universal idea of a European community of values, 
which is recontextualised along national identities and also along particular national 
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political interests. In other words, the politicisation of national identity could be 
predicated on an attempt to create a shared common sense of European moral 
community. In this way, what becomes relevant is the strategic use that political 
debate makes of the concept of ‘European values’ in order to advance and legitimise 
civic integration of the Muslim Other. 
 
To summarise, this project aims to look into the cross-national convergence 
of the debate on integration and seeks to reveal shared strategies of discourse 
through which Muslim integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and 
political particularities of their national contexts. At the same time, I assume that 
this convergence within European debate on integration refers to a discourse on 
European common values and traditions, which presents multiculturalism as divisive 
and illiberal. 
 
4.  Synopsis of the Research Method  	  
The purpose of this synopsis is to give an overview of the methodological 
approach, which is applied in the empirical analysis. My goal is to provide a 
comparative analysis of national public debates on Muslim immigration to 
investigate to what extent a normative discourse on civic integration is articulated 
across Europe and whether or not it reflects the cultural and political particularities 
of national public spheres.  
 
By using the concept of discourse, I indicate both the semiotic process 
concerning the representation of a discourse and the social practice referring to the 
interactive processes in which a discourse is conveyed (Fairclough, 2003: 19). 
Therefore, discourse is not only what we say and how it is represented but it 
includes to whom we say it, how and why in the public sphere (Schmidt, 2008: 309). 
Furthermore, Schmidt suggests that social practice is the communicative process 
that coordinates norms and values across the public sphere (Schmidt, 2008: 311). In 
other words, public actors generate and communicate discourses within a given 
semiotic context in order to deliberate, legitimate and reproduce a discourse through 
the public sphere. Accordingly, both the semiotic as well as the social process need 
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to be analysed in order to explain the explanatory role of discourse and its causal 
influence in political debate. 
 
What is interesting in this transnational debate is to observe how the 
discourse operates to define political strategic interests and legitimation also, when 
civic integration policies have been already approved. The discourse thus performs a 
function of consensus building towards decisions in matters of immigration. As a 
consequence, in addition to the examination of discursive process in which policies 
have been approved, there is need of a critical analysis on how a coercive version of 
the discourse of civic integration is maintained and legitimised, when these policies 
are blatantly discriminatory towards some immigrants like Muslims. 
 
To analyse this public debate, its discursive articulations, interconnections 
and its convergence, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), in combination with 
content analysis are applied. CDA is a valued method to systematically explore 
discursive practices in broader social and political structures (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough 1999; Fairclough, Jessop, & Sayer 2003; Fairclough 2001). Content 
analysis is instead used to illustrate in detail, the differences between national and 
transnational public debates and the relationships between discursive practices and 
the process of the mediatisation of the debate. 
 
The focus for RH1 is on how this discourse is actually undertaken and 
covered across Europe. The aim here is to verify the level of interaction between 
national debates, instead of focusing only on “the diffusion of coherent and 
persuasive discourse” at national level, the process of transnational convergence 
points to a “more complex and selective” process through which discourses interact 
in the public sphere (Crespy 2012: 10). This realisation, in turn, leads to a clearer 
analysis of how different national discourses draw inter-textually on one another 
offering similarity in terms of their discursive strategies across Europe. 
 
The focus for RH2 rests on the articulation of the discourse on civic 
integration and how it is actually linked to the debate on the integration of Muslims. 
As a consequence, the discourse analysis is aimed at revealing any normative 
construction, which attaches values to political action and serves to maintain 
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consensus over policies of integration. Specifically, normative constructions clarify 
how a discourse recontextualises a set of values and norms embedded in the 
discourse of civic integration. 
 
The first step of this research design is the definition of the comparative 
framework. Specifically, I have decided to select three national case studies: UK, 
France and Germany, which are commonly seen as having divergent models and 
philosophies of policy integration (Favell 2001, Joppke 2004), as well as different 
approaches to European integration (Diez Medrano 2003). At the same time, these 
three countries have faced the same difficulties of integrating Muslim immigrants, 
which have recently led their political leaders to debate simultaneously: 1) the 
failure of multiculturalism and 2) how to promote better integration through the 
strengthening and inculcating of a more general set of civic duties related to a 
collective European identity. 
 
The second step of the analysis is the reconstruction of the national public 
debate. Each case study will be based on a national nodal point, which is considered 
the point of entry for reconstructing the various discourses present in the policy 
debate on Muslims’ integration. Thus a nodal point is a master text, which offers a 
privileged point of entry into the political debate and allows for the reconstruction of 
a government’s strategy about the development of civic immigration practices and 
policies. Moreover, the analysis of the nodal point permits a clearer understanding of 
the discursive practice, how the nodal point links to other discourses, the rules 
according to which these discourses are tied together and how they are re-inscribed 
into the political debate (Diez 2005: 628). 
 
The third step of the data analysis combines content analysis with critical 
discourse analysis - to identify relevant discourses in the public debate and to 
evaluate to what extent debate is convergent. Hence, this twofold standpoint 
facilitates an interdisciplinary approach to the study of political debate without being 
constrained to the field of discourse analysis and allows us to compare the media 
debate across Europe. 
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Relevant to the CDA, the nodal points are provided by political statements as 
a specific genre. My interest is not in those statements delivered by opinion makers 
or extremist politicians, but rather, in those delivered by national governmental 
actors – who represent a decision-making elite, who have the political authority both 
to constrain and enable policy choices. 
 
The time frame for the data collection covers the period after the Swiss 
referendum on minarets. The ban represents a “moment of crisis” (Fairclough 1992: 
230), which pressed European politicians to debate openly how to integrate Islam 
and Muslim immigrants in order to avoid conflict with the values and traditions of 
Europeans. Therefore, this crisis of the minarets has made “more visible and 
apparent” (Marston 2000: 353) any condition of power in this public debate. 
 
Relevant to the content analysis, the analytical corpus comes from the 
national daily press coverage of the nodal point for seven days in the three countries 
under analysis. In addition, these political statements have to be highly disseminated 
through European broadsheets and simultaneously debated by European public 
opinion. In line with the agenda-setting approach, I am concerned with how the 
press recontextualises political statements by mediatising a list of themes, which 
become part of the public agenda (McCombs 2005). Thus the focus is on the role of 
the press as a mediator of the nodal points. 
 
The following are the three cases studies and their entry point to the national 
public debate on the civic integration of Muslims. 
 
In Case Study 1(Chapter 4), the French public debate is reconstructed around 
the nodal point of Sarkozy’s editorial published in the Le Monde newspaper on 8 
December 2009. In this article, Sarkozy defended the Swiss vote and calls upon 
Muslims to refrain from provocative attitudes, but also urges them not to forget that 
Europe has Christian values as its foundation. This nodal point highlights how 
Muslim immigrants’ visibility and their claims for places of worship or wearing the 
veil in public put to the test the republican character of France. 
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Case Study 2 (Chapter 5) investigates the public debate generated by Merkel 
during the Young Christian Democrats Convention. The German Chancellor did not 
merely state that Germany’s attempt to create a multicultural society had "utterly 
failed." At the same time, Merkel pointed to successful examples of civil integration 
programs that integrated new immigrants. Merkel also claimed it was a necessity to 
defend “German Identity” as a major justification by asking for more social 
cohesion. 
 
In Case Study 3 (Chapter 6), the analysis examines the debate caused by 
Cameron delivered on the occasion of the Munich Security Council. The British 
Prime Minister delivered a provocative speech on the failings of state 
multiculturalism by suggesting that Britain can produce a “muscular” integration by 
imposing liberal values codified within British identity. Moreover, this nodal point 
offers the opportunity to analyse how Islam can be constructed to become a security 
issue in Europe. 
 
In conclusion, my analytical framework focuses on a comparative analysis of 
three national case studies, based on political statements by governmental actors, 
which are then considered a point of entry for reconstructing the public debate on 
Muslim integration. Firstly, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is selected to 
analyse these statements, their articulations, and interconnections within the public 
debate. Secondly, the content analysis of the nodal points coverage allows an 
identification of what perspectives and topics are disseminated, how often and by 
which actors. The combination of both methods guarantees a more complete 
analysis of which national factors were central in the convergence and 
recontextualisation of discourses on Muslim civic integration across Europe. 	  
5. Personal Interest in the Topic  	  
Much of the inspiration for this project has arisen from my own experience 
as an immigrant and a member of a minority group. Like many students, I became 
interested during university study in contextualising my life within broader social 
and theoretical paradigms to make better sense of it. In doing so, my personal 
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interest is only incidentally about Islam, and is focussed primarily on the 
relationship between minorities and the majority. 
 
This thesis is thus more an account and an exploration of the limits and 
problems that relate to the formation of political debate in Europe at large on issues 
such as the tolerance and respect for cultural differences and how the rejection of 
these issues occurs. My concern is to understand precisely why the Other is still 
such an issue today in Europe.  Specifically, why is a different identity perceived as 
a menace and at what point does this fear become the primary source for a concrete, 
supported political program that aims at limiting or even normalising the diversity of 
a minority? 
 
I am convinced that European public debate on Muslims is an important 
example that reveals that not only is the tolerance of diversity always under siege, 
but also how the fear of the Other continues to dominate the lexicon of the political 
debate. As Christopher Caldwell wrote to attack multicultural integration: “If you 
understand how immigration, Islam and native European culture interact in any 
Western European country, you can predict roughly how they will interact in any 
other” (2009: 19). Consequently, what is relevant in my work is to explore and 
understand the complexity of the debate and its process on the integration of Islam, 
but as Jackson-Preece argues, when homogeneity is fully accepted as the ideal basis 
of political organisation, the freedom of minority groups becomes all the more 
precarious (2005: 8).   
 
I began this research project in New York in late 2005, when public opinion 
was already shaped by world-shaking events that directly involved Muslims after 
9/11, the attack on Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq and the bombings in Madrid 
and London. In that year, I still remember reading a shocking interview with the 
Italian journalist, Oriana Fallacci, in the Wall Street Journal: “Europe is no longer 
Europe, it is 'Eurabia,' a colony of Islam, where the Islamic invasion does not 
proceed only in a physical sense, but also in a mental and cultural sense. Servility to 
the invaders has poisoned democracy, with obvious consequences for the freedom of 
thought, and for the concept itself of liberty" (Wall Street Journal, Varadarajan, 
2005: 7).  
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That interview was nothing new, as in 2001, during the aftermath of the 
global anxiety about terrorism, Fallacci attacked Islam from the front page of the 
most important Italian daily newspaper on the basis of an easy equation and a 
dangerous one: All Arabs are Muslim, all Muslims are Islamists, all Islamists are 
terrorists; thus the Arab-Muslim civilization, which is embedded in religious 
fanaticism, is the major enemy of Western civilization whose superiority does not 
need to be proven any longer. It was a deliberate case of anti-Islamic upsurge, based 
on the same processes of stigmatisation and dehumanisation that characterised many 
ideologies of the twentieth century. 
 
However, what was worse in terms of this re-emergence of intolerance was 
how the media quickly echoed the many public calls for discrimination against all 
Muslims in many Western countries. In this context of growing media concern, 
some opinion-makers have presented Europe as a socially weak society and 
predicted that Europe was condemned to become an Islamic colony called 
“Eurabia.” According to Carr (2006: 4), the worst case of the “Islamicisation” 
prophecy describes the Europe of the future as a place where “Christians and Jews 
will become the oppressed minorities in a sea of Islam.” Thus, what began as a 
bizarre conspiracy theory soaked by dangerous political fantasies has become 
intellectually respectable through the media making visible the discourses elaborated 
by an elite of intellectuals and well-known newspaper columnists (see Ye’or 2001; 
Lewis 1995, 2003; Fallacci, 2006; Huntigton 1991, 1996).  
 
In the aftermath of  9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings, Europe 
faced a threshold in its radicalisation against Islam. A fear of Muslims and 
resentment toward them increased to an extremely alarming level. What was initially 
only the aggressive prejudice of a circle of journalists, scholars and religious leaders 
became the widespread opinion of many Europeans.  
 
Today, almost ten years after Fallacci’s pamphlet, the situation has changed 
but paradoxically Fallacci was right in writing that Europe was changing. The post-
war goal of a European political and social community based on tolerance and 
multicultural policies is steadily dissolving
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Europe will be normalised, but it is not clear yet how this process of integration of 
Muslim diversity is operating and what effects it will have on the relationship 
between the majority and minorities at large.  
 
The integration of immigrants is a source of constant controversy as the rise 
of xenophobic parties across Europe can attest. There is anxiety about national 
culture being diluted and changing the current way of life; increased perceptions of a 
burden on national social systems; ideas of value incompatibility between Islam and 
European society.  But these controversies are also fed by frequent political appeals 
from public authorities to renounce the road to multiculturalism, in favour of a more 
homogenous collective identity based on common values of a long idolised 
Christian and Western culture. 
 
Therefore, what is more fascinating in this context is not observing 
unscrupulous opinion makers and populist politicians, but rather scrutinising 
national leaders, such as Merkel, Sarkozy and Cameron, who have chosen to talk of 
integration through generic appeals to security, integration and an idealised 
European identity.   
 
My interest in this project is not hinged on describing this public debate as 
merely a process of misrepresentation. In fact, arguing once more that the media 
reproduce stereotypes does not make an original contribution to research. For this 
reason, I have focussed on a critical analysis of the integration debate to examine 
how the civic integration discourse aims at regulating and controlling Muslim 
newcomers, which are considered hostile to society because of their cultural and 
religious diversity.  
 
Overview of the Thesis Structure 	  
Chapter 1 has introduced the problems surrounding the assimilation of Islam 
in Europe and the aims of the research project. Chapter 2 begins with some 
conceptual clarifications about integration, collective identity and public sphere. It 
also offers the chapter offers a theoretical approach to explaining transnational 
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convergence as an interactive process of communication among national 
governmental players, who are central actors of a process of production and 
recontextualisation of discourses on civic integration. In Chapter 3, the research 
design is explained. The analytical framework is based on a comparative analysis of 
three national case studies based on major institutional statements by governmental 
actors, which are then considered a point of entry for reconstructing the public 
debate on Muslim integration. Specifically, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is 
selected to investigate the nodal points, their articulations and interconnections 
within the public debate; while Content Analysis is applied to explore the process of 
mediatisation of the nodal points across the European public sphere. In Chapter 4, 
the first case study focuses on the French debate and aims at investigating how 
discourse on Muslim integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and 
political particularities of the French model of integration. In Chapter 5, the second 
case investigates the German public debate; specifically, analysis focuses on how 
this debate is characterised by 1) a political and cultural rationale that focuses on the 
“crisis of multiculturalism;” 2) a necessity to redefine German identity in a more 
cohesive way through an epistemological shift in the definition of a German national 
identity. In Chapter 6, the third case looks at the British debate, which focuses on 
the failings of multicultural integration and promotes a new model of integration 
calling for a policy of "muscular liberalism" in order to guarantee that Muslims 
respect those values that characterize the national British identity such as 
democracy, equality before the law and human rights. In Chapter 7, the conclusion 
provides a comparative analysis of national debates to reflect on the extent to which 
a discursive process of convergence is emerging towards Muslim integration and 
how these relationships arguably contribute to the construction of a shared 
normative discourse about integration across Europe. 	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Chapter 2: The Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of the 
European Public Debate  
 
 
 
Chapter Overview 	  
In chapter 1, I underline how in the aftermath of the Swiss vote on the 
Minarets, political leaders across Europe simultaneously debated on how Muslims 
should make more vigorous efforts to participate in European society, confirming 
their loyalties to national communities, and working to avoid future conflict within 
European societies characterised by specific religious, political and cultural 
traditions. I also introduce some clarifications about civic integration as a one-way 
policy in which immigrants are expected to embrace a set of civic duties. 
Furthermore, I explain how immigrant flows and settlements have created an 
uncertain gap between collective national identity and cultural or religious diversity. 
In particular, the increasing presence of Muslim immigrants raises concern as their 
diversity is seen as hostile to the liberal values and cultural traditions shared by 
Europeans. 
 
The tension between immigrant diversity and uniformity echoes the 
“diversity dilemma” (Jackson-Preece, 2005: 3), namely, should a State require 
belonging or rather recognise a freedom to diversity? On the one hand, integration is 
manifested as being more diverse, and on the other, national states need uniformity. 
Thus the collision of these two terms, “diversity” and “uniformity” (Jackson-Preece 
2005: 5) is at the basis of the debate on integration. The dispute over how much 
difference is acceptable in the name of integration on the one hand, mirrors the 
contradiction between an imaginary self-collective (Anderson 1991) and the 
collective identity of other minorities; on the other hand, it reflects prevailing 
normative constructions of community including both who does and, crucially also, 
who does not belong to the national community. 
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The answer to the diversity dilemma can be coercive when the national 
community decides to limit diversity, consolidate categories of collective 
identification, and mobilise political support in defence of social and political 
cohesion. An example of this process is the politicisation of European identity 
(Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009), which has become an important discursive element 
of the European public debate in reaction to Muslim presence and Islamic visibility. 
Specifically, one of the most radical cases of re-identification is the rhetorical appeal 
of politicians to a European identity based on a supposed Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Stefano Allievi defines it as “reactive identity” (2012: 379), in other words, an 
ethnocentric process of self-identification, which works as the reaction to Muslim 
threatening identities. 
 
In this chapter, I discuss briefly the theoretical framework on which the 
thesis rests in order to clarify those concepts related to the discourse of civic 
integration that will be taken up in the empirical investigation. The chapter proceeds 
through the following steps. First, it starts with some conceptual clarifications of the 
notion of identity and presents a brief overview of how civic integration is 
connected to the process of identity formation in Europe. The close association 
between the principles of integration and identity makes it possible to observe how 
identity is constructed through political discourse. Second, the chapter offers some 
relevant clarification about the concepts of collective identity, in addition to 
European and national identities. Third, it introduces some clarification on how 
integration can be securitised in order to protect the community from the threat of 
diversity and justifies a range of policies to control and assimilate national 
minorities and immigrant groups. Fourth, it is explored why the development of 
secularism plays a significant role in the problematic interaction between European 
identity and Muslims. Fifth, the chapter presents a conceptual explanation of the 
European public sphere and explores how this transnational arena is central in the 
process of the renegotiation of national identities. Fifth, the last section concludes 
with a theoretical approach to the analysis of the convergence of the discourse on 
integration within the European public sphere. 	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1. Civic Integration and Identity Formation in Europe 	  
Discourse on civic integration determines not only what ‘we’ are, but also 
who can ‘belong’ to ‘our’ identity. For this reason, in this section, it is functional to 
offer a brief overview of how civic integration is connected to the process of identity 
formation in Europe and how the concept of European identity is linked to the 
emergence of a European public sphere, in which national identities are renegotiated 
and revised. 
 
The present public debate on the integration of Muslim immigrants has been 
characterised by recurrent appeals to a common European civilisation, which 
emphasise Europe's cultural heritage and history through an “organic link” between 
common past and present values (Mavelli, 2012: 101). Kundani (2012: 160) 
underlines that it is not only conservative discourse that is keen to stress identity as a 
cultural basis of European society. Liberal discourse also repurposes the same 
mechanism of identification, when it emphasises the legacy of Enlightenment: 
“secularism, individualism and freedom of expression” as key characteristics of 
European identity (Kundani 2012: 160). 
 
This process of self-identification aims at creating common political values 
(Muller, 2007c), which can confer legitimacy to social cohesion and political unity 
in the European project (Mavelli 2012: 101; Risse 2010). In this context, the 
construction of a European identity exceeds the differences that exist between 
nations through two distinctive relationships at work, which challenge conventional 
conceptions of collective identity. First, European identity does not coincide with a 
national identity, but rather it coexists as a sum of national identities. Second, in 
contrast to national identities, which are based upon a national imaginary (Anderson 
1991), European identity is defined as resting upon shared political and moral 
values, rather than a national culture, history or language. 
 
This European collective self is often defined through a common belief in 
liberal and democratic values, which are developed and shared by European nations 
and within the EU. Therefore, the European identity finds its distinctiveness to a 
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common concern with morality, civic perspective and political values (Muller 2006: 
287). However, European identity is not simply a shared set of values; it is a 
normative discourse aimed at defining the borders of Europe as a distinct civic and 
political entity through a complex web of political, moral and legal discourses. 
 
The European collective self does not imply that national identities are 
replaced by a new identity. Rather, these national differences are interpreted in the 
light of European universalism that have been realised as basic rights and 
constitutional norms (Muller, 2007a). In this manner, European citizens are solicited 
to reflect upon their particular values in the name of shared universal values (Muller 
2006: 287). 
 
In more detail, the European collective self can be defined as a “post-
conventional” European identity (Lacroix 2002), which operates according to the 
moral nature of universal laws, which defines the European post-national 
community. Habermas’ “constitutional patriotism” (1998) presupposes that 
universal norms codified in the constitution of a post-national Europe (2001) may 
generate a sense of identification and belonging which goes beyond traditional 
forms of national loyalty based on ethnic origins, culture or religion (Mavelli, 2012: 
98). 
 
This universal validity of post-conventional identity that the political 
community attributes to the modern European social imaginary (Taylor, 2004; 
Calhoun, 2003) can create a dangerous moral superiority (Mavelli: 2012: 98) 
because it implies that immigrants have to support these universal values even when 
they find themselves opposed to them. This tension between European universalism 
and the inclusion of immigrants goes beyond Habermas’ theory of constitutional 
patriotism (1998, 2001). Constitutional patriotism, in its original formulation, was 
never intended as a particularly “inclusive form of membership” but rather a form of 
“political attachment” to the community (Muller 2006: 293). 
 
According to Habermas, constitutional patriotism cannot take form in “social 
practices” or become “the driving force” for “creating an association of free and 
equal persons until they are situated in the historical context of a nation of citizens in 
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a way that they link up with those citizens’ motives and attitudes” (Habermas, 1996: 
499). Therefore, Habermas never supports a universal blanket of rules to integrate 
the Other, but rather the national subject has to be integrated into “the universal 
principles of reason and rationality” and to renounce the divisiveness and the 
exclusion caused by forms of national identity and loyalty (Mavelli 2012:96). 
 
A sense of attachment is thus formed through the general character of society 
that emerges from a collective learning process that “make collective reflection and 
contestation possible” (Muller 2006: 287) as a continuous project of the redefinition 
of the boundaries between a European collective self and the Other, beyond any 
national, cultural and religious particularistic specificities. However, what happens 
is that, unlike Habermas’ constitutional patriotism, this universal attempt to 
transcend differences postulates Europe in a dimension of exceptionality and 
excludes the Muslim Other (Mavelli 2012: 116), unless the Muslim accepts to be 
assimilated. 
 
In this manner, an analysis of the debate on integration could clarify from a 
critical perspective, how European identity might be conceived as a desirable and 
normative form of inclusion, which excludes Muslim newcomers. In this manner, 
newcomers are solicited to reflect upon their dissonant values in the name of 
universal values. Its comprehensive rules rest on the superiority of a universal 
morality, which arguably prevents self-reflection that every encounter with the 
Other should accompany, whilst at the same time, this universal codification leaves 
a sense of apprehension about values and identities that this civic Europe should 
accommodate. 
 
 Accordingly, attention should be given to how public debate describes the 
European self to support the necessity to implement new policies “dealing with 
admission and integration” of the newcomers (Muller 2007a: 287). In this respect, 
collective identity is an essential analytical category to understand any discourses 
and political strategies of inclusion. However, before discussing such an analytical 
framework, it is necessary to clarify some of the assumptions in the conflict between 
the European identity and the Muslim Other. 	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2. The Construction of Collective Identity  	  
The concept of collective identity applied in this theoretical framework 
draws on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979). This theory was originally 
developed in psychology as an attempt to unify an individualistic approach and an 
interactionist approach to social cognition and behaviour (Haslam, 2001; Postmes & 
Branscombe, 2010). The main assumption is that people divide their social world 
into them/us based on a process of social grouping also known as in-groups (us) and 
out-groups (them) (Stangor, 2000: 12). Moreover, Tajfel proposes that groups, 
which people belong to, are an important source of self-esteem.  
 
As a consequence, social identity theory explains how people are driven to 
enhance their self-image by keeping or developing a positive sense of social identity 
with their in-group discriminating against the out-group (Stets & Burke 2000: 226). 
The desire for a positive social identity is explained through the manifestation of 
three different strategies, namely individual mobility, social competition and social 
creativity. In each case, these strategies result from an intergroup struggle for power, 
prestige and status (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) developed through positive strategies 
aimed to strengthen the legitimacy and stability of in-groups versus out-groups 
(McAndrew & Milenkovic, 2002). Thus, the process of identity formation of a 
political community always includes the construction of the Other as an out-group. 
 
Social identity theory can also explain a wide range of political processes 
based on different collective identifications and it is very useful to explain prejudice, 
discrimination and those circumstances under which social groups move from social 
solidarity to overt conflict. Notable examples include the use of the political identity 
approach as a basis for understanding nationalism (Calhoun, 2001: 15) and the 
process of European integration (Neumann & Welsh 1991, Neumann 1996). 
 
The construction of collective identity can be directly developed through a 
political discourse aimed at defining membership, or indirectly through the use of 
political symbols (Marcussen et al, 1999: 615). Castells explains that those “who 
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construct a collective identity … largely determines the symbolic content of this 
identity, and its meaning for whose identifying with it or placing themselves outside 
of it” (Castells, 1997: 7). However, when realistic or symbolic threats undermine the 
process of positive social identification, inter-group anxiety plays a significant role 
in creating prejudice and fear. Thus, in order to resolve positive social identity, the 
group at risk actives a mechanism of ethnocentrism (Stets & Burke 2000: 232). 
 
According to Bruter (2005: 12), there are two different perspectives to 
describe the process of collective identification. The first is based on a cultural 
perspective and analyses political identity and the sense of belonging that an 
individual citizen feels towards a political group. The features of the group can be 
defined by culture, social similarities, values, religion, ethics or even ethnicity. In 
this way, cultural identification refers to the semiotic system used to legitimise and 
justify social norms and values and acts as the framework for orientating the 
members of the community. Specifically, Eder and Giesen argue “Europe is also a 
symbolic space where projections and memories, the collective experiences and 
identifications of the people of Europe are represented” (2001: 245). In this way, the 
process of cultural identification is a process of adaptation around conceptions of 
Europe and what it means to be European. 
 
The second perspective implies a civic perspective in which political identity 
defines the process of identification with a political structure through a set of rights, 
rules and institutions. Thus, a civic-identity emphasises the difference between in-
groups and out-groups. However, according to Bruter (2005: 13), civic identity is 
not aimed at exclusionary processes. The Other is present as a difference, which is 
not regarded as inferior, but rather as being problematic for political cohesion. Civic 
identity indeed consists of norms and rules that define the social group and its 
membership, its goals and social purposes, as well as the collective worldviews 
shared by the group. Collective identities convey a sense of an imagined community 
(Anderson 1991), usually based on social discourses about a common fate, a 
common history or a common culture (Fonderman 2006: 24; Irving Lichbach & 
Zuckerman 1997: 47). 
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The concept of collective identity implies a collective identity in which civic 
integration defines the process of identification with a political structure through a 
set of rights, rules and institutions. Therefore, the debate on the integration of 
Muslims is a challenging opportunity to observe whether and to what extent 
discourses on European identity, integration to European civic values and the 
emergence of a European public sphere can be entangled. 
 
It is also necessary to understand how and why this discomfort for the Other 
may be perceived as a danger to the stability and cohesion of a particular dominant 
group’s way of life. The Other offers thus a more flexible conceptualisation of the 
causes of the perceived incompatibility between European liberal democratic 
societies and Muslims, because it is based on the features that characterise the 
dominant group (Taguieff, 2001). When the Other is confronted with the most 
established values and traditions of a community, it becomes an increasing source of 
conflict or what Giddens labels as “ontological insecurity” (1984: 63). For this 
reason, after having clarified the concept of collective identity, it is necessary to 
clarify how both the discourses of securitisation and secularism play an important 
role in reinforcing the assumption that Muslim identity is hostile to Europe. 
 
3. The Securitisation of Europe 
 
In sharp contrast to the liberal and tolerant image of Europe that the 
European Union likes to convey, it is possible to observe a different vision of 
collective identity implied in the discourse of “Fortress Europe” (Checkel and 
Katzenstein 2008), namely the process of border security adopted by the EU against 
illegal immigration. The fortification of Europe does not refer to its foreign relations 
but depends on the internal problems, which always dominate Europe's relationship 
with the Other (Christiansen et al 1999: 541). 
 
This constant fear of the Other has thus deep implications for the public 
debate on Muslim integration, because it represents diversity as an issue threatening 
the social cohesion of a particular community, and it is “intricately linked up with 
the question of what it is to be European, and which cultural requirements are 
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necessary to attain that status” (Neumann and Welsh 1991: 347). For this reason, 
Kymlicka describes the recent anxiety towards Muslims, which has been manifested 
in Europe, as a “deeper and persisting … anxiety about the other” and “a nostalgia 
for a time when everyone was assumed to share thick bonds of common history and 
identity” (2007: 124). In this way, the fortification of Europe can be considered as a 
traditional process of self-defence that any homogenous society develops when it 
feels threatened by a minority perceived as incompatible with its own values, norms, 
and beliefs. When a dominant group perceives a challenge to its own position as 
“occupiers of the centre of national space” and culture (Ghassan Hage 1998: 19), the 
Other becomes a source of anxiety. 
 
This line of thought is clearly explained by the process of securitisation of 
community (Williams 2003 518), where a process of threat construction is based on 
a symbiotic relation between a dominant majority and an out-group (Coskun 2012: 
39). In this sense, the process of securitisation aims at underlining the existence of 
the Other as a threat. It is impossible to speak of the security of a community 
without recognising a source of threat (Wæver 1998: 353). Conversely, in the 
absence of the Other, we cannot speak about security (Coskun 2012: 39). Therefore, 
the process of securitisation requires the construction of an enemy-other (Fierke 
2007:112) in order to consolidate the stability and security of a society. 
 
Fenton has identified three factors that may transform diversity into conflict. 
The first of these is when a dominant majority perceives a loss of internal power and 
reacts to secure its status, the second concerns the erosion of state sovereignty as a 
result of increasing regional or global movements, and the third involves the 
collapse of state authority or institutions (Fenton 2004: 189). Accordingly, 
conflicting differences are seen not as an issue that matters to democratic debate and 
negotiation in the public sphere, but rather as a question of national security, in 
which the government can decide to reduce the “democratic process” to protect the 
state (Kymlicka, 2007: 589; 2010: 106). This development is best explained by the 
theory of securitisation (Fekete, 2004; Coskun, 2012) developed by the Copenhagen 
School during the 1990s. 	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In the securitisation model, security is understood as a discursive process in 
which actors construct issues as threats to safety. Thus, the contemporary security 
environment is profoundly related to the politicisation of a question as a threat 
through a discursive articulation that moves a particular issue beyond the realm of 
ordinary politics to that of emergency politics, where extraordinary measures are 
justified (Buzan and Weaver 2003: 491). As a consequence, security politics is not 
just about underlining pre-existing threats; it is also a discursive “activity that makes 
certain issues visible as a threat” (Coskun 2010: 81). Within this context, “security 
refers to a concept that is more about how a society or any group of people” (Coskun 
2010: 81) come to describe, or not describe, something as a menace. Securitisation is 
thus about the process by which fear is constructed through a political discourse. 
 
In this manner, securitisation legitimises the state in its role of protecting the 
community from external threats (Bigo 2002; Boswell 2007). Under conditions of 
securitisation, ethnic minorities can be marginalised or severely disciplined through 
strict regulation of their civil and political rights. Securitisation then, erodes both the 
political space for minorities and the democratic space (Vertovec & Vessendorf 
2011: 44). In other words, securitisation justifies the state enacting a range of 
policies to regulate and control minorities as well as immigrant groups that 
otherwise could not be considered legitimate (Buzan et al. 1993: 24). The concept of 
securitisation is applied then when political actors or policymakers propose 
exceptional actions against minorities, because public opinion perceives them as a 
threat to collective belonging even when there is limited evidence of any real 
menace (Kymlicka 2009: 126). 
 
The Muslim threat can thus be used to legitimate political action, which 
might not otherwise appear as reasonable. However, it is necessary to distinguish 
securitising moves, in which an actor discursively presents something as an 
existential threat from successful securitisation policies; the latter will only exist if 
and when public opinion accepts the securitising move (Buzan, Weaver and de 
Wilde, 1998: 25). Therefore, any political consensus that favours securitisation has 
important consequences for the public debate on immigration and its 
implementation in civic integration policies. At the same time, it has to be reminded 
that today, securitisation cannot be based on blatant exclusionary policies; such 
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practice would normally be rejected at an institutional level, because it would run 
into liberal democratic constitutions (Joppke, 2005: 49) and European anti-
discriminatory policies (Schain 2009: 97). 
 
In brief, securitisation is an important theoretical and analytical concept to 
study integration, as immigrants can contradict the principles that legitimise a 
national community because it undermines the building of a cohesive political 
community with a uniform cultural identity (Jackson-Preece, 2006). Thus 
recognition of diversity, especially of politically organised ethno-cultural groups, 
can be perceived as a serious menace to national identity as it could destabilise the 
social and political unity realised after a historic process of political struggles 
(Kymlicka 1995: 9). 
 
In the next section, it is relevant to analyse how the secular conceptualisation 
affects European capacity to connect with or exclude the Other and how Muslim 
diversity has been constructed through the contraposition between Islam with 
secular Europe. This supposed contraposition has recently enabled political leaders 
like Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy to play the role of champions for Europe’s 
secular identity against the threat represented by Islam. 	  
4. Islam as the Incompatible Other 	  
Islam is increasingly visible in Europe, as large numbers of people of 
Muslim faith have settled permanently in Europe and are in fact, or at least aspire to 
become, ‘European citizens’. At the same time, the increasing visibility of their 
religious identity has sparked a reflection for the future of European values, 
democracy and secular-driven notions of tolerance (Silvestri, 2010: 46). As a 
consequence, the problem related to integration of Muslims is often formulated in 
reference to religion, and Islam has thus become a politically, culturally and 
symbolically important dimension of difference that often overshadows ethnicity. 
 
This shift from ethnicity to religion has been reinforced by a problematic 
interaction between the secular and religious spheres in Europe transforming secular 
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thinkers into the fiercest opponents to Muslim integration. Following 9/11, the 
Muslim presence in Europe has been increasingly perceived in political debate as 
aggressive and opposed to European culture and Western traditions. In addition, the 
media everyday amplify the perception that some Islamic practices “such as forced 
marriages, female genital mutilations” (Meer 2010: 19) or Sharia Law are spreading 
across Europe due to the excessive tolerance and relativism introduced by 
multicultural policies. 
 
The importance of religion in this discussion is that it poses an unavoidable 
challenge to European secularism, raising the question of whether European 
societies are truly secular or, indeed, of how secular they are. Rich analytical 
discussions on secularism have developed recently (Bader 2007; Jakobsen & 
Pellegrini 2008; Taylor, 2007; Mavelli 2012; Habermas 2010, Butler et al 2011), 
casting light on the dilemmas faced by contemporary liberal democracies in dealing 
with religious diversity. Mavelli (2012) offers a compelling argument by suggesting 
that the present debate on Muslim integration is led on the one hand by Europe’s 
incapacity to perceive Islam as an opportunity rather than a threat (Mavelli: 143) and 
that this debate has its roots in a tension at the heart of the secular episteme (Mavelli 
2012: 25), and on the other hand by the attempt to integrate the Muslim Other 
through the imposition of universal narratives, which do not offer any perspective 
for who does not comply with the image of the European self (Mavelli 2012: 99). 
 
According to Mavelli, the secular mode of knowledge has become the 
epistemic framework that has marked the progressive withdrawal from the 
transcendent Other/God by contributing to a parallel, progressive withdrawal from 
the Other (Mavelli 2012: 36). In other words, the secular subject is not required to 
embrace ‘alterity’ as a condition of knowledge of the Other, but can rely solely on 
his own rational faculties (Mavelli 2012: 20). As a consequence, this secular 
condition is no longer a political limitation of religious influence that empowers 
critical autonomy, but a ‘constraint’ that limits the European subjects’ possibilities 
of being, becoming, knowing and connecting with the Other (Mavelli 2012: 8). 
 
Despite the fact that Mavelli offers an epistemic conceptualisation of the 
secular that exceeds the differences that exist between European nation-states in 
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terms of secular traditions (2012: 7), from an empirical point of view, national 
cultural and political interpretations of secularism remain very different because of 
different national histories. For this reason, secularism cannot be assumed as an 
unchanging and universal transformative process, as the national dynamics of 
secularism are not linear and did not move in the same direction. At the same time, 
by focusing on recent divisive national public debates, such as the French decision 
to ban the integral veil or the publication of the Mohamed cartoons in Denmark, 
Mavelli shows how these controversies are an integral part of the same process of 
the reproduction of secular life (2012: 87). In other words, the European Self needs 
the Other to preserve its image of a superior civilisation. 
 
Therefore, it could be more reasonable to assume that secular discourse 
affects the prejudice or engagement toward Islam through two analytical levels: an 
ontological development at the national level and a more recent epistemological 
development at the European level. Both levels have very concrete political 
implications for how the presence of Islam could be debated in the European public 
sphere and how the secular understanding contributes to strengthening the 
exclusionary character of the European collective self. 
 
The next section focuses on how the European public sphere is a central 
category to analyse the transnational present debate on Muslim integration and how 
the collective self is constantly reconstructed through the interaction between the 
national public spheres. 
 
5. European Public Sphere and Identity Formation 
 
Today, the increased number of transnational networks of communication 
associated with globalisation (Fraser 2007: 8) have questioned the national 
dimension of the public sphere and led to a reconsideration of the concept within a 
transnational frame (Conway & Singh 2009; Castells 2008). Accordingly, the public 
sphere has been used to understand the potential of those transnational debates that 
are now emerging beyond the national territorial state. 
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Theoretical debate on the characteristics of the public sphere is generally 
developed by referring to features of national identity such as language, territory and 
political authority. Habermas (1989: 24–39) implicitly supposes a national public 
sphere is contained by a national state, or in Fraser’s words a “Westphalian state” 
(2007). When the public sphere presumes a specific national political context, which 
bounds a “political community with its own territorial state” (Fraser, 2007: 8), then 
the public sphere appears to be restricted to a distinctive space (Trenz, 2008: 273) in 
which political and social issues are debated, but only with reference to specific 
national features included within linguistic and geographical boundaries. 
 
At the same time, Fraser points out that the contemporary public sphere is 
increasingly transnational because the constitutive elements of communication are 
no longer directed towards the national public. Thus, the debates and opinions 
generated by “dispersed interlocutors” no longer represent the common interest and 
the general motivation of any national demos (Fraser 2007: 19). Habermas himself, 
responding to numerous criticisms made about The Structural Transformation, 
revised his notion of national sphere and considered a globalised post-national 
public sphere made up of numerous simultaneous debating publics that are less 
burdened by the constraints of national identities (1992, 2006). 
 
Scholars have drawn attention to the emergence of a European public sphere, 
which animates the current transnational public debate within and between European 
states (Bee & Bozzini 2010, Risse 2010, Diez & Medrano 2003, 2009). The 
legitimacy of transnational and supranational systems of governance in the European 
Union (EU) partly depends on the degree to which the boundaries of national public 
spheres are expanded so as to correspond with the transnational scope of 
governance. The relevance of this scholarship is to understand whether the public 
sphere is shifting from the national arena to new institutional venues at a 
supranational level. 
 
The recent crisis of the EU project generated numerous theoretical 
discussions about the necessity of creating a stronger European public sphere in 
order to fix the democratic deficit of the European institutions by linking the EU 
institutions with their citizens. This could imply an extension of the media arena 
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itself, leading to a pan-European media system with a pan-European audience. In 
this context, two crucial empirical questions regarding the potential of a European 
public sphere have been posed: Do the various nationally consolidated public 
spheres constitute the EPS? And to what extent can and does this transnational 
public sphere transgress these national public spheres? In other words, is the 
European public sphere more than the sum of its national parts? (Triandafyllidou, 
Wodak & Krzyżanowski 2012: 19) 
 
Other authors have presented a more pessimistic opinion on the emergence 
of a transnational public sphere (Bee & Bozzini 2010, Risse 2010) by underlining 
the gap between the idealisations of a European public sphere and the prevailing 
communicative practices in those cultures that are still based on national 
characterisations. These authors point out that public debate in Europe is still 
considered a very nationalistic process because 1) national media tend to stay 
contained within national or linguistic audiences; 2) news is still tied to national 
interests in terms of international events; and 3) there is no specific European public 
sphere because Europe lacks a singular, common identity. 
 
Much of this literature on the transnational public sphere is still embryonic 
and more efforts have emerged to provide a more comprehensive analysis; at the 
same time, different studies have shown the existence of a multitude of 
communication networks covering European themes simultaneously (Trenz & Eder 
2004) despite the fact that Europeans do not speak a common language and a 
common European-wide media does not exist. Here, the concept of ‘network’ 
occupies a central position because it refers to the interaction between different 
national media, institutions and social actors. In fact, according to Eder and Kantner, 
as long as the media communicates “the same issues at the same time using the same 
criteria of relevance” (2000: 315), there is indeed a common public sphere that may 
be shared by Europeans. 
 
A European public sphere can thus be formed through the dissemination of 
media networks as long as the same topics are discussed simultaneously within all 
different national media (Risse 2010: 4). Although, at the most basic empirical level, 
this last conceptualisation follows Habermas’ notion of a public sphere as being “a 
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theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the 
medium of talk” (Fraser 1990: 57, 1993), citizens do not need to become fully 
engaged in a direct discursive exchange within this transnational environment. 
Therefore this approach refers to a conceptualisation of the transnational public 
sphere as a realm of shared understanding and common identification, rather than an 
open arena for public deliberation (Ferree et al. 2002: 290-291). 
 
This conceptualisation of the European public sphere has to be understood as 
a social construct through which Europeans engage one another and debate issues of 
common European concern across borders. For this reason, Risse claims that it is 
possible to observe a process of the Europeanisation of public spheres when the 
same “themes are debated, at the same time, at similar levels of attention across 
national public spheres” (Risse 2010: 11). However, Risse finds empirical evidence 
that controversial debates have more chance of being interpreted through more 
“similar frames of reference, meaning structures across national public spheres” and 
media (Risse 2010: 127). This conceptualisation is concerned with a constructionist 
approach that focuses on the ability of language to frame the terms of debate, 
thereby creating a discursive context in which social identities and political 
institutions emerge (Risse, 2009: 147). This line of thought implies that public 
debate on European issues leads to collective identification processes and creates a 
community of communication, rather than pre-assuming it as a requisite of the 
European public sphere. 
 
This constructionist concept of the European public sphere is more helpful in 
explaining the debate on integration than traditional institutional analysis, which is 
pitched between neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism (Corner, 2010: 11). 
These two broad approaches are concerned with the relative agency of states and 
institutions in the European public sphere, and their concern is with the transfer of 
policy-making beyond the State to EU level. Neo-functionalist schools of thought 
have sought to understand whether European integration has been driven by the 
preferences of national governments (Wiener & Diez 2009: 45); whereas 
intergovementalism focuses on European institutions as being the dominant actors 
responsible for pushing the European process of integration (Wiener & Diez: 2009: 
67). 
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The public sphere is the communicative arena in which the community is 
identified as a political entity. The members of the community can, through a public 
sphere, identify themselves on the basis of what forms their common views. 
However, the role of citizens as necessary active agents in the debate is not central 
in this definition of European public sphere; rather their agency is seen as part of a 
more abstract process of identity formation. The concept of a European public 
sphere thus implies the formation of a “community of communication” that 
“presupposes some degree of collective identification” with a European perspective 
(Risse 2010: 157). 
 
The European public sphere becomes, in this way, both a communicative 
community that arises through public debate beyond national borders and the 
communicative arena in which identities develop and gain significance for citizens. 
The existence of communicative exchanges between countries is, in fact, the 
necessary condition for the formation of a European identity, in which the European 
collective-self is constantly reconstructed in interaction with the surrounding out-
groups, through the mediation of cultural and political discourses on security and 
secularism. 
 
An example of this process can be found during the cartoons affair in 2006, 
when the European press largely agreed on the necessity to defend press 
independence and freedom of opinion against Muslim protests (Triandafyllidou, 
Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2010: 266). The simultaneous debate across Europe 
challenged a differentiation of the public sphere on a purely national basis and 
revealed a common discourse centred on the contraposition between Europe and 
Islam, which represented Islam as conflicting with European common values of 
secularism and freedom of opinion. 
 
The debate on Muslim immigration in the aftermath of the Swiss referendum 
is certainly a challenging example to observe the transnational construction of a 
specific discourse on integration through an interactive process of negotiation, 
influence and national recontextualisation of a normative European identity. As a 
consequence, the use of the European national public sphere as an analytical 
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category is strategic to observe the interaction among the national debates, but also a 
valid approach to study the discursive articulation of new boundaries between the 
external and the internal, including the definition of a common Other within Europe 
(Delanty and Rumford 2005).  	  
6. Transnational Convergence as Recontextualisation of a Discourse 
 
In an interesting analysis of the Danish public debate on Muslim 
immigration, Mouritsen (2006: 73) notes how the institutional debate has been 
characterised by a politicisation of European common values and culture, predicated 
on discourses that present cultural homogeneity, in terms of it being a political and 
functional necessity for Denmark to guarantee the continuity of the nation in a 
transnational system. Thus, the national particularism that immigrants and ethnic 
minorities are asked to accept in Denmark are local versions of a normative 
European debate on immigration, characterised by abstract universalism, state 
neutrality in matters of religion, and individual and gender equality (Mouritsen, 
2010: 52). Therefore, the interactive processes of communication and coordination 
across national public spheres introduced norms and values into the Danish political 
debate. 
 
Thus the question is not only whether or not states adopt common norms, but 
also how and why a process of interactive communication between national public 
spheres is activated. The theoretical and empirical implications that arise from these 
questions are particularly salient in seeking to understand the European public 
sphere’s communicative dynamics. 
 
The increasing complexity of political relations in Europe, the transfer of 
competences up to intergovernmental arenas in which decision-making is shared 
with other European polities, sets important challenges for national public spheres. 
In the forms that the transnational public sphere may take, there are two general 
trajectories that correspond to different forms of convergence: vertical, between the 
national polity and European-supranational levels, and horizontal between different 
national polities in Europe (Koopmans & Erbe 2004). The extent of convergence 
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along these two trajectories indicates the degree of openness or closure of a national 
public sphere, up to EU level (vertical) or across to other European countries 
(horizontal). In this way, the analysis of these two forms of convergence provides 
insight into the degree, form and shape of the emerging European public sphere 
(Paraskevopoulos, 2001). 	  
Most scholars assume a top-down convergence in their empirical studies, 
whereby norms are disseminated from above and member states either resist or 
comply therewith (Checkel 2001, Dell’Olio 2005). In this manner, only the 
implementation of supranational rules and norms are identified as the source of 
convergence. This vertical approach can become problematic, as it implies that 
domestic policy change is solely attributed to international actors, processes and 
institutions (Busch and Jörgens 2005). 	  
Limited attention has been paid to horizontal convergence, defined as norm 
diffusion and interaction from one public sphere to another. Paradoxically, 
horizontal processes of convergence are purely transnational, when compared to the 
vertical variants, because they build direct communicative links and exchanges 
between polities across national borders. Moreover, horizontal convergence is likely 
to be reinforced by the increasing interdependence of national public spheres when 
they “face [the] same challenge and come up with the same conclusion without 
coordinating it with each other” (Maatsch, 2011: 150). 
 
To understand, therefore, the recent debate on civic integration of Muslims, 
it seems to be particularly useful to refer to the horizontal exchanges between 
national spheres. First of all, the state remains central in regulating and managing 
many aspects of citizenship and immigrant integration, often justifying policies and 
actions in terms of national priorities and sensibilities and defining the boundaries of 
the in-group, and who is in and who is out (Neumann 1996). The state also remains, 
in fact, the primary institutional apparatus for legitimising national discourse on 
identity, through systems of education, law, finance, territorial control and so on. 
 
As a consequence, the role of the national political sphere cannot be ignored 
in the study of a transnational debate. However, “cross-national policy convergence” 
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(Knill 2005) could be merely the result of similar solutions adopted by different 
countries to “parallel problem” pressure such as immigration, securitisation, 
integration and citizenship (Bennett 1991: 231). For this reason, it is important to 
compare each national public debate in order to consider to what extent convergence 
is a real process of communication characterised by the same causal relationship, 
which enables a “communicative exchange” aimed at sharing the same political 
discourse (Bulmer & Radaelli 2004:7). 
 
Second, Trenz notes (2008: 274) that the national public sphere remains the 
central focus in the global arena “for the re-interpretation of issues” concerning 
transnational processes “within contextualised systems of meaning and particular 
cultures.” In fact, through the efforts of the media, global debates, such as the “war 
on terrorism”, are recontextualised into national debates. Recontextualisation is a 
process that extracts a discourse from its original context in order to introduce it into 
another context (Fariclough, 2003: 222). Since the political implications of a 
discourse depend on its context, recontextualisation implies also a national adaption 
of purpose and of the communicative process (Schmidt 2008: 305). 
 
In this manner, the process of adaption of an international debate produces 
two simultaneous effects for the national public sphere: 1) the ability of a 
transnational debate to influence and shape a national discussion and 2) the agency 
of the national public sphere in recontextualising transnational discourses. For this 
reason, mutual links and reciprocal communicative exchanges between countries are 
central in understanding the dynamics of the European public sphere. 
 
This approach on national agency has several advantages. It does not take for 
granted vertical pressure in various national states. Looking specifically at the 
national level allows better to capture the specificity of each national case and to see 
if, when and how a transnational debate has entered into the national political 
agenda (Triandafyllidou, Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2010). Furthermore, national 
agency does not assume a priori, that Europe has had an effect on national debate on 
integration. The EU level should be counted alongside many other constraints at 
work at a national level. 
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It seems simplistic to assume that the EU or other international actors are the 
most likely the main source of policy convergence, but perhaps they should be 
considered among the many determinants of national debate. Therefore, rather than 
focusing only on a vertical convergence, horizontal convergence points to the 
mutual influence through which discourses interact through across national contexts, 
or what we also may call “interdiscursive context” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 
45-46). The process of convergence can then be explained “in terms of the 
reciprocal resonance of public communication” between the various national public 
spheres (Trenz 2005: 176). 
 
The process of recontextualisation can be instead used to illustrate the 
specific role of the media in translating a discourse in a national context 
(Triandafyllidou, Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2010). Therefore, there is no expectation 
that the media can recontextualise a transnational discourse in national contexts in 
its entirety, but rather “bits and pieces” (Lynggaard, 2012: 97). Specifically, the 
filter of the national media is central to the recontextualisation of any discourse on 
cohesion, belonging and membership of the polity. 
 
Gramsci's definition of hegemony provides further critical insight on how the 
public sphere legitimates and recontextualises discourses (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 
1999: 24) through the media. The national media can be considered as a social agent 
in the public sphere, which reproduces and organises discourses and helps neutralise 
the different alternatives giving shape to a prevailing hegemony. Thus when the 
media coverage authorises only a specific set of discourses within the public sphere, 
opposition tends to be marginalised or domesticated (Block 2013). 
 
As a result, the efforts of the media are not only aimed at developing and 
recontextualising discourse, but also at shrinking oppositional agency. For this very 
reason, it is important to analyse how the media actually articulate discourse in the 
public sphere and which particular interests mark and direct their distinct purposes. 
The articulation of discourse indeed defines the boundaries of public sphere 
interaction and the level of deliberation (Dahlberg, 2013: 29). 
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In conclusion, the European public sphere could be identified as a forum 
facilitating horizontal communicative exchanges between national debates. 
However, the national sphere maintains its agency and capacity to recontextualise 
transnational discourses through the national media. As a consequence, the 
transnationalisation of the debate implies the existence of a mediatised arena for 
disseminating a shared understanding across European countries and allows the 
specificity of each national case to be captured and investigated. 	  
The Theoretical Framework in Brief 	  
In this theoretical chapter, my aim was to clarify concepts that will be taken 
up in the empirical investigation. 
 
First, I present a brief overview of how civic integration is connected to the 
process of identity formation in Europe. The close association between the concepts 
of identity and integration leads to interesting questions about how European 
identity might be regarded as a desirable and normative kind of collective identity to 
regulate the Muslim Other. 
 
Second, I offer some relevant clarifications about the concepts of secularism 
and securitisation. In particular, I explore how these two concepts are entangled in a 
discursive articulation that tends to reinforce collective representations of a shared 
community; furthermore I underline how this articulation represents a normative 
framework in which the Muslim Other has to fit into. 
 
Third, I explain the conceptual relevance of the European public sphere to 
explore the transnational debate on integration and how debate is central to the 
process of renegotiating national identities. I have underlined how the 
Europeanisation of national public debates is leading to a transnational network of 
communication (Trenz & Eder 2004), which reinforces the process of collective 
European self-identification in the course of controversial debates about European 
issues of common concern to Europeans (Risse, 2010: 11). 
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Fourth, I draw on a theoretical approach based on the model of convergence 
to apply an analysis of the public debate on civic integration. The level of 
convergence invites an analysis of the connections that the European public sphere 
establishes between national countries and how simultaneous debates on integration 
might have a critical impact on how the national media recontextualise transnational 
discourses on immigration and integration. 
 
In this respect, the next chapter frames the methodology to assess how 
political debate has emerged across Europe in response to the problems concerning 
the integration of Muslims. Specifically, the aim is to critically explore in what ways 
the discourse of integration is positioned between 1) the process to obtain the 
necessary social cohesion at the level of the nation-state and 2) the acceptance of 
normative assumptions regarding the civic nature of European identity. 
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Chapter 3: Outline of the Methodology,  
Social and Political Analysis of the Debate 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter aims at defining a methodology to investigate the transnational 
convergence of the debate on integration and to reveal the shared strategies of 
discourse through which Muslim integration is articulated, depending on the cultural 
and political particularities of their national contexts. The research design is based 
on a comparative analysis of national debates in order to understand how networks 
and dialogic relationships develop between different national public spheres and 
how these relationships contribute to the construction of a shared normative 
discourse about integration. 
 
In chapter 1, I underline how immigrant flows and settlements have created 
concern about cultural, religious and ethnic diversity. In particular, the increasing 
presence of Muslims raises concern, as their diversity is seen as hostile to the values 
and traditions shared by Europeans. In the aftermath of the Swiss vote on the 
Minarets, political leaders across Europe simultaneously asked Muslims to confirm 
their loyalty to national communities and to avoid future conflict within the 
religious, political and cultural traditions of Europe. For this reason, it is crucial to 
acknowledge the substantive content of this public debate on integration, to see 
which norms and arguments were more influential, but also of the discursive 
interactions within the European public sphere. 
 
In chapter 2, I clarify the theoretical framework by explaining the conceptual 
relevance of the European public sphere to explore the public debate on integration 
and how this debate is central in the process of renegotiating national identities. In 
addition, the concept of recontextualisation analyses the connections that the 
European public sphere establishes between national contexts and how simultaneous 
debates on integration might have a critical impact on how national public spheres 
interact reciprocally to legitimate civic integration policies. 
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In section 1 of this chapter, I offer an overview of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA), its strengths and its limits, and I explain why this method in 
combination with Content Analysis is useful to answer my research. In section 2, the 
key concepts discussed in the earlier theoretical framework are reintroduced, 
together with a detailed view of the contributions empirical analysis can make to the 
development of this research design. In section 3, I discuss the specifics of the 
research design, and specifically why I have opted for a comparative framework 
based on national case studies. I also introduce the analytical category of nodal 
point, which corresponds to the entry level for the reconstruction of public debate. I 
then present the criteria applied to the selection of case studies, nodal points and 
analytical corpus. Lastly, I present the full comparative framework, which consists 
of three national public debates: France, Germany and the UK. In section 4, I 
explain the analytical process of data analysis, which is based on a three-
dimensional model elaborated by Fairclough (1992): discursive practice, textual 
practice and socio-cultural explanation. Finally, I summarise the research design in a 
conclusive overview of the chapter. 
 
1. Overview of the Method: Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
The way in which I use discourse as an analytical category focuses on a 
twofold conceptualisation based on 1) a process of meaning production allowing for 
certain interpretations of integration while excluding others; 2) a social practice 
through which integration establishes and maintains political relationships 
(Fairclough, 1992). Therefore, discourse can be defined as “a specific ensemble of 
ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed 
in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and 
social realities” (Hajer 1995: 44). This definition of discourse points to Habermas’ 
conceptualisation of language as a “medium of domination and social force, as it 
serves to legitimise the accepted relations of organised power” (Habermas, 1977: 
360). 
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What is interesting to observe in the semiotic content of the discourse is how 
discourse serves to define actors’ strategic interests or normative values and also to 
present the inevitability and pertinence of a given policy change. For example, the 
analysis of discourse on civic integration may help to establish a dialectical 
relationship in order to explain what possible political effects discourse creates in 
reproducing stereotypes, norms or values. However, discourse is not only shaped by 
the semiotic elements of text but also by its non-semiotic conditions such as its 
social practice. 
 
Schmidt suggests that social practice is the communicative process that 
coordinates norms and values across the public sphere (Schmidt, 2008: 311). In 
other words, public actors generate and communicate discourses within a given 
semiotic context in order to deliberate, legitimate and reproduce a discourse through 
the public sphere. Accordingly, both the semiotic as well as the social process need 
to be analysed in order to explain the explanatory role of discourse and its causal 
influence in political debate. 
 
As a consequence of this conceptualisation, I selected Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) because it aims at investigating the relationships between discourse, 
structure and the influential role that language plays in legitimising power relations. 
Instead, traditional Discourse Analysis (DA) often ignores the social relations and 
practices of language by focusing only on text and disregarding how meaning is 
conditioned by social structures (Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2002: 4). 
 
CDA is a critical interpretative method (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Wodak, 
2001; Fairclough 2005; van Dijkb, 1993), which rejects positivist conceptions of 
knowledge based on scientific laws or empirical generalisations (Howarth et al, 
2000: 7). According to Wodak, “critical” has to be understood as an attempt to 
reveal the social forces that underlie a discursive regime (Wodak, 2001: 9) or in 
other words, the exercise of power and the relations between different social groups 
(Howarth et al, 2000: 3-4) through the empirical investigation of the use of 
language. 
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Specifically, CDA recognises language (Wodak & Meyer 2002: 10) as one 
of the crucial spheres of human activity. Language is shaped by society, but society 
is also shaped by language. Language is thus an important element of inquiry for 
achieving political understanding (Gramsci 1996: 378-9) of how social relations are 
established and maintained through the discursive work of elite. This method is also 
a highly normative form of social inquiry and philosophical investigation “aimed at 
demonstrating what is problematic with a text and discourse based on an 
emancipative standpoint” (Van Dijk, 1993a: 352). For this reason, Luke suggests the 
role of the CDA practitioner is to take exact steps as a “Gramscian transformative 
intellectual in the task[s] of unveiling, countering and consciousness-raising” around 
dominant discourses (Luke, 2002: 106). 
 
As a ‘social critical theory’, CDA has the goal of showing relations and 
causes that are hidden and highlight their structural inequalities by promoting further 
questions of social justice and increasing a general consciousness about the 
manipulation of the political process of decision-making. This point explains why 
this method focuses on interdisciplinary research in order to understand how 
language functions in organising and transmitting knowledge, in establishing social 
institutions and in implementing power across social contexts (Wodak & Meyer, 
2002: 11). 
 
In my analysis I refer to a more specific orientation of CDA, the Dialectical-
Relational Approach (DRA), which focuses on the analysis of the extra-discursive 
domain. The main characteristic of DRA is thus to study discourse as processes of 
signification, which are dialectically interconnected with elements of social practices 
related to non-semiotic elements (Fairclough, 2003: 19-20) such as economic 
systems, social relations and institutions. 
 
According to Fairclough, DRA is defined by a dialectical relationship 
between discourse (as a broadly semiotic category) and the institution or social 
structure that frames it (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). This dialectical 
approach reflects the influence of structuralism on social theory, such as political 
economy and social conflict illustrated in the Marxist tradition (see Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough 1999, Fairclough 2003, Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2002). As a 
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consequence, discourses “embed,” “translate” and “condense” (Fairclough 2006: 18) 
economic and political relations into relatively stable structures of meaning that 
reflect and reproduce these relations. To put it another way, DRA traces the social, 
political and economic relations, which inform the constituting discursive practice. 
The advantage of this approach is that it will provide precise epistemic descriptions 
of the social life and on-going specific changes, by focusing on languages and on the 
relations of discursive production. 
 
Considerable criticism has been raised toward the validity and objectives of 
CDA analysis. The main point of critique is based on methodological 
considerations: Henderson (2005) highlights how several researchers have criticised 
CDA as a valid scientific practice for its lack of objectivity. Other scholars have 
argued that CDA does not apply a critical stand on its own analytical process 
(Toolan, 1997). Widdowson (1998: 137), for example, criticises CDA analysts of “a 
kind of ad hoc bricolage which takes from theory whatever concept comes usefully 
to hand”. Additionally, Widdowson (1998: 150) argues that some CDA studies tend 
to support the validity of arguments through appeals to “moral conscience” and 
“social justice”, rather than through reliable empirical evidence. Similar objections 
to the CDA paradigm have been made by Schegloff (1997), who studied the 
possibility of partiality in linguistic analysis based on critical and political 
approaches, while Maussen (2006: 102) criticised CDA because researchers often 
analyse their texts by seeking illustrations, which confirm the hypotheses developed 
in their theoretical frameworks. 
 
Several arguments have been made in response to these criticisms. First, with 
regard to the objectivity, I relate my epistemological position to a Gramscian 
standpoint. According to Gramsci, scientific objectivity and its universal validity, 
which are present in positivist social sciences, are inherited by a “semi-religious 
view of a human subjectivity separated from non-human (natural or divined created) 
objectivity” (Gramsci 1975: 1437). Scientists in attempting to uncover truths about 
the social world always apply a degree of interpretation, thus knowledge is always 
investigated through the subjectivity of the researcher. Therefore, for Gramsci, 
objectivity always means ‘human subjectivity’ and cannot correspond to the sense of 
positivist objectivity, because human subjectivity is always entangled to social 
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relations. This does not mean that Gramsci is against the practice of science or does 
not believe the knowledge it produces. But from a sociological perspective, a 
researcher is always a “socialised member of a speech community” and knowledge 
is always investigated through the subjectivity of the researcher (Chilton 2004: 59). 
Therefore, what becomes methodologically relevant is not just an idealistic 
assumption of objectivity, but how to ‘translate’ the researcher’s subjectivity into 
objectivity. 
 
Self-reflexivity in social sciences requires declaring the stand of the 
researcher, such as a commitment to emancipation, and also acknowledges how any 
interpretation of results is obviously constructed from and based on its particular 
position. As a consequence, “CDA, like other critical social sciences, needs to be 
reflexive and self-critical about its own institutional position and all that goes with 
it” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 9). Accordingly, only a fully scrupulous 
documentation of the analyst’s position in the analytical process can contribute to an 
advanced process of the analysis (Bauer & Gaskell 2004: 348). 
 
For this reason, it is central as part of my analysis, to elaborate my explicit 
epistemic standpoint by placing my assumptions, questions and results in a 
dialectical tension with my data, and elaborate them through reflexivity (Bauer & 
Gaskell 2004: 348) and self-criticism (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 9). In this 
manner, the value of CDA lies, therefore, in being able to integrate both the critical 
and the reflexive points of view that are involved in the social sciences and 
knowledge production. 
 
Second, concerning the roles of reliability and validity, Fairclough and 
Wodak (1997: 259) emphasise that CDA applies the same criteria of “careful, 
rigorous and systematic analysis” as any other hermeneutic and empirical approach 
within the social sciences. Certainly, researchers can sample text and analyse just 
those linguistic features to validate selectively their own hypotheses, but this limit 
concerns any form of empirical investigation, whether qualitative or quantitative; in 
fact, the adoption of a specific methodology is no guarantee of research quality 
(Bauer & Gaskell, 2004: 384). Thus the reliability and the validity of any findings 
depend on the logic and quality of the research design. 
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In order to preserve the reliability, it is crucial to provide a detailed 
description of the analytical steps applied - including the selection of sources, the 
representativeness of the sample, and the rigorous systematisation used for the 
analysis of that data - can avoid possible distortions via a self-validation of findings. 
Concerning the validity, this research design combines content analysis with CDA 
in order to have a second method to gather data and validate findings. Specifically, 
CDA is useful to understand how discourse on civic integration works toward 
particular political interests and content analysis will be used to identify relevant 
‘themes’ in the press coverage and to compare similar discursive strategies and 
structures across Europe. Hence, this triangulation technique facilitates an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of political debate without being constrained 
to the field of discourse analysis. 
 
To sum up, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an interpretative method, 
which views language as a field of inquiry in critical-social research and focuses on 
the production of political relationships of power through discursive practices. 
Moreover, CDA is a critical social theory, which can allow me to analyse how new 
discourses on integration emerge and how rules, norms and practices are established. 
As a consequence, the analytical task is not focused only on the semiotic analysis of 
the negative view of Islam, but also on the analysis of a normative attempt to 
reproduce a discourse on European identity based on universal values, standards and 
cultural attributes of the majority. However, in order to cope with the criticism about 
reliability and validity, the research design combines content analysis with CDA in 
order to triangulate data analysis. 
 
2. The Research Design 
 
The purpose of this research design is to examine in detail how the 
transnational debate on Muslim integration recontextualises a discourse about 
European identity and thereby, persuasively contributes to the legitimisation of a 
specific consensus on civic integration, in and through the European public sphere. 
In order to analyse this debate across Europe, two key points have been formulated 
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to offer a general view of how the research questions elaborated in chapter 1 are 
developed in the research design. 
 
The first research question (H1) focuses on the transnational convergence of 
the debate, or in other words, how different national debates draw inter-textually on 
one another offering similarity in terms of their discursive articulation. For this 
reason, it is assumed that this debate is not only observable through the 
characteristics of the specific national sphere, but is also likely to be taken up and 
reconfigured through the filter of the national media. This point implies that the 
influence the European public sphere exercises on national debates is not based on a 
vertical communicative exchange, through a top-down dynamic between the EU 
institutions and state members, but rather through horizontal and reciprocal links 
across national public spheres. 
 
Specifically, the emphasis is on understanding how controversial political 
statements are actually undertaken by the media and covered across Europe. The 
research design needs thus to focus on how a political statement generated in a 
European country is then recontextualised through press coverage in another 
country. This analysis of the inter-textuality should thus track the “reciprocal 
resonance” within the various national public spheres (Trenz 2005: 176). This 
realisation, in turn, leads to a clearer analysis of how political statements are 
selectively incorporated into existing national debates. This process of simultaneous 
coverage is expected to reveal to what extent convergence contributes to a mutual 
legitimation of norms concerning civic integration. 
 
The second research question (H2) rests on the existence of a shared 
discourse of integration, which assumes a universal idea of a European community 
of values. In this way, what becomes relevant is to analyse the strategic use that 
political debate makes of the concept of ‘collective identity’ in order to advance and 
legitimise the civic integration of Muslims. For example, Europe can be registered 
as a collective we (for example, ‘European communal’ or ‘the Western 
civilization’), while the Muslim Other can be seen as non- European, non-secular or 
as a threat. In this manner, the specific usage of European identity becomes a 
discursive resource for social and political cohesion. 
61	  	  
 
This normative use of identity should shed light on the contentious and 
contradictory discourse of integration and its limits to consider Muslim diversity as 
part of the European self. In more detail, discourse analysis should question the 
normative nature and the practical political limits of this debate, as the process of 
civic integration involves that Muslim immigrants have to adopt values and duties 
even when they find themselves opposed to them. 
 
The research design aims also to investigate other normative strategies 
through which the discourse of Muslim integration is articulated. There are two 
critical considerations which can lead to discourse analysis: 1) the debate on the 
integration of Muslims is a crucial part of the process of governmentality (Miller et 
al 1991) and 2) the frequent appeals to integration from ruling leaders could hide 
dominant social and economic rationalities, which provide the real background for 
framing this debate on identity and power (Horner and Weber, 2011). Therefore, the 
analysis of the discourse should question any attempts to legitimate specific social 
relations across the European public sphere. 
 
In order to clarify how the research design respects the quality criteria of 
public accountability (Bauer & Gaskell 2004: 348), the next section offers an 
overview of why I have opted for an analysis based on case studies and how I 
selected each case study. I subsequently introduce the analytical category of the 
nodal point as an entry level for reconstructing the public debate and the adopted 
criteria for selecting them. Then I illustrate how I developed the analytical corpus to 
use in the content analysis. Finally, I sum up the complete comparative framework 
that consists of the three case studies, consisting of three national public debates and 
three nodal points. 
 
The Case Studies: differences and commonalities 
 
The research design investigates how the discourse on integration is 
disseminated through the European public sphere (Trenz, 2005; Eriksen, 2005). As a 
consequence, the present research design proposes a comparative investigation of 
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the debate on the integration of Muslims using three national cases: France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. This comparison between the various public 
debates will allow for the disentanglement of similarities in these discourses relative 
to policies on immigration, multiculturalism and civic integration. These similarities 
may then be explained in terms of convergence among national public spheres. 
 
As a whole, France, Germany and the United Kingdom are particularly 
relevant as case studies for this comparison, given their status as the highest 
immigrant-receiving countries in Europe (Lacroix, 2010: 3). Moreover, the 
specificity of their national debates on immigration has been shaped by a number of 
factors, the most important of which include their respective histories with 
immigration, national political structures (Favell 2001) and shifting perceptions of 
immigration (Chebel d’Appolonia, 2008: 206). 
 
Briefly, French republicanism considers individuals as the only subject 
entitled of rights and rejects any form of peculiarity on ethnic or racial lines. The 
French model of integration is based on the following premises 1) integration of 
individuals rather than groups and 3) integration implies rights and duties in accord 
with the republican and secular French traditions (Jennings 2000). 
 
In Germany, the integration of immigrants is linked to the problem of the 
definition of national identity (Joppke 1999: 95). As a consequence, after the 
experience of Second World War, politicians have avoided speaking in negative 
terms of a culturally mixed society, aware of the legacy of racist aberrations under 
Nazism. After reunification, “concepts of political identity and national culture 
underwent significant redefinition”, this process is still ongoing and affecting the 
definition of ‘foreigners’ in Germany (Stehle 2012: 168). 
 
The British model of integration reflects the experience of a multiracial 
empire and its consequent racial problems (Hansen, 2000). According to Bertossi, 
British integration policies “came out of the imperial legacy and postcolonial 
immigration” and have been defined by “an approach based on the importance of 
minority groups and […] placed an emphasis on integration, not as a process of 
acculturation to the nation and civic values,” and on “fighting racial discrimination” 
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by offering “social and political influence to members of ethno-cultural minorities” 
(2007: 4). 
 
Despite these countries responding in different ways in adopting their 
policies of civic integration, the political discourse of Muslim integration remains 
justified and legitimised through an ambiguous liberal concept of integration 
(Joppke 2007; Carrera 2008; Kundani, 2012). For example, the state prerogative to 
integrate immigrants through value tests reveal an extreme attempt to realise a 
politically and culturally homogenous identity (Nachmani 2010: 246), in which 
Muslim immigrants are identified as the Other to assimilate according to the values 
and norms of the dominant majority (Joppke 2010: 139). 
 
In brief, the present research design proposes a comparative investigation of 
the debate on the integration of Muslims. The first step of the empirical analysis is 
thus a reconstruction of each national public debate on Muslim integration starting 
from a nodal point. The next section explains what a nodal point is and the criteria 
adopted to select them. 
 
Criteria for Selection of the Nodal Points 
 
Each national case study focuses on a nodal point (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), 
which is considered the point of entry of the public debate. The utility of Laclau and 
Mouffe's concept is to emphasise the main textual reference that draws different 
discourses into a coherent frame, from which it is possible to reconstruct the various 
discourses present in the national political debate. In other words, the nodal point 
allows for a clearer understanding of the interactive logic of the public debate, how 
the discourses link to one another, and the rules according to which discourses are 
tied together and how they are recontextualised into the political debate (Diez, 1999; 
Fairclough, 1993). 
 
A nodal point is not a closed system, but rather an open system of inter-
connected discourses that allow for the possibility of reconstructing a public debate. 
For this reason, a nodal point cannot be a text that has been ignored by public 
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opinion or irrelevant for political debate. In this research design, the nodal points 
must be representative of the public debate and the actual way in which the political 
elite deals with the problematisation of the integration of Muslims. 
 
Nodal points have to be fully representative of respective government 
positions and are an integral part of a political program about the development of 
new immigration practices and policies. Thus, they have the shared functions of 
indicating a government’s thinking and desire to influence popular thinking, of 
promoting similar concepts, and of dealing with a common wish to promote 
economic growth in the face of a shrinking workforce and increasing challenges 
from globalisation (Jung 1996). In detail, the applied criteria are: 
 
1. Time Frame: After the Swiss ban on Minarets; 
2. Genre: Political statements  
 
At Point 1, the timeframe defines a major limitation for the selection of the 
debate concerning Islam. The timeframe runs from December 2009 to December 
2011, a very short time period when compared to the longevity of the public debate 
on immigration. Nonetheless, the Swiss referendum represents a moment of political 
crisis that moved beyond the borders of Switzerland to address the multi-faceted 
issue of Muslin immigration. According to Fairclough, a moment of crisis occurs 
when “social practices, which under normal conditions are hidden, became visibly 
exposed, as communication becomes further problematized” (Fairclough 1992: 230). 
Thus, during any “crisis”, it is more possible to observe new social and political 
conditions struggling for hegemony (Fairclough, 2005: 55) that under normal 
conditions would be difficult to observe (Fairclough, 1992: 230). Thus, the 
referendum became a unique “moment of crisis,” which urged European politicians 
to debate openly how to assimilate Muslim immigrants and Islamic culture in order 
to avoid conflict with the values and traditions of Europeans. 
 
At Point 2, the selected genre is the political statement. Three aspects 
characterise this genre: 1) it is related to the field of politics; 2) it includes different 
sub-genres and modalities (written, such as an article or an interview published in a 
newspaper, or oral such as a speech or a radio interview; and 3) it has to be 
65	  	  
considered as an expression of views and not an official institutional act. For 
example, a political speech given during a conference is not an institutional text 
because it lacks the prescriptive power of a law; it only has the authoritative power 
to address political debate and decision-making. Thus these political statements can 
influence public debate and legitimise policies (Maatsch: 2011: 33-34, 37-38) 
through the authoritative influence of the author. 
 
What characterises this specific type of genre is the authoritative authorship. 
The author has to be a top political leader with key institutional roles in national and 
international affairs. For this reason, only Heads of State or Prime Ministers were 
considered because they hold the legitimacy of political power and are the major 
representatives of national sovereignty. Secondly, the author has to be recognised by 
public opinion across Europe. Briefly, the author has to have the political authority 
to shape the legislative process and the capacity to interact with transnational debate 
and political consensus for their political agenda across Europe. 
 
A second aspect to characterise the genre is controversy. I consider those 
statements that raise strong controversy, both in national public debates and 
European public debate. According to Risse, a “transnational sphere transcending 
national perspectives is being created through social practice and contestation” 
(2010: 152). Indeed, the European public sphere emerges in the process in which the 
public debates controversial issues. The more people debate, the more they engage 
each other in political debate and the more they “actually create political 
communities” in which they can identify themselves (Risse 2010: 152). 
 
Authority and controversy are thus both essential conditions for the 
emergence of a European public debate. The more authoritative and contentious a 
political statement becomes, the more media coverage occurs across Europe. In this 
specific case, statements had to be highly disseminated through European 
broadsheets, news agencies and TV broadcasts and simultaneously debated by 
public opinion. 
 
Briefly, a nodal point is a relevant text considered the point of entry for 
investigating each national debate. Specifically, the analysis of a nodal point allows 
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the reconstruction of the public debate. For this reason, I define two main criteria to 
select a nodal point: as specified, one is related to the timeframe, and I considered 
the aftermath of the Swiss Referendum because it represents a moment of crisis, in 
which governmental leaders started openly debating the problems concerning the 
integration of Muslims. The second criterion is the genre. Here, I specified political 
statements from authorities because they are texts (written or oral) aimed at 
orienting political controversy and public debate. 
 
The Comparative Framework 
 
The comparative framework consists of the three different national case 
studies, representing three nodal points and their surrounding public debates, which 
have been analysed to reconstruct the European debate on Islam integration. 
 
In Case Study 1, (Chapter 4), the articulation of the debate on the integration 
of Islam in the aftermath of the Swiss ban on minarets is reconstructed by focusing 
on Sarkozy’s editorial published in Le Monde and The Guardian. In this article, the 
former French President launched a common public debate aimed at giving political 
form to the ways in which “national identity” can be defined and supported through 
the support for liberal and civic integration, rather than the exclusion of Islam. 
Through this debate and despite national and European criticism, Sarkozy was able 
to create a powerful political consensus within the European public sphere, which 
urged for many months, the discussion of the political agenda regarding Islam, 
giving even greater visibility to Sarkozy’s speeches, ideas and thoughts about Islam 
and specifically, the Burqa ban across the rest of Europe. 
 
Nodal Point: ‘Respecter ceux qui arrivent, respecter ceux qui accueillent’ 
[Respecting those who arrive, respecting those who host] 
Text, December 9, 2009 published by Le Monde and The Guardian 
Sampling and Coding: Whole text – 1400 words 
 
In Case Study 2, (Chapter 5), the debate generated by Angela Merkel during 
the Young Christian Democrats Convention is investigated. The German Chancellor 
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did not merely state that Germany’s attempt to create a multicultural society had 
"utterly failed." At the same time, Merkel pointed to successful examples of civil 
integration programs that had integrated new immigrants. Merkel also claimed a 
necessity to defend “German Identity” as a major justification for asking for more 
social cohesion. Moreover, she addressed the issue of Islam belonging to Christian 
Germany. It is important to analyse if the debate on Islam has generated a “return” 
to a discourse on national religious identity or is simply a secular attempt to redefine 
and transcend German representation of an ideal citizenship. 
 
Nodal Point: ‘Multikulti has failed, utterly failed’ 
Merkel’s Speech at the conference of “Junge Union Deutschlands” (CDU), 
Potsdam – Transcript, Oct 16, 2010 
Sampling and Coding: The whole transcript counts 8000 words but different 
parts were not directly relevant to the debate on Islam, thus only the section on 
multiculturalism (2000 words) was sampled, which includes also the part that was 
highly disseminated by both the broadcast networks and YouTube. The rest of the 
transcript has been coded through a general summary of arguments and themes. 
Despite the fact that not all parts of a text were relevant, the coding was strategic to 
understand the context and the assumptions that were made to support the civic 
integration of Islam. 
 
In Case Study 3, (Chapter 6), the debate generated by David Cameron at the 
meeting of the Munich Security Council is examined. The aim here is to analyse 
how Islam can be constructed to become a security issue in Europe. The British 
Prime Minister delivered a provocative speech on the failings of state 
multiculturalism by echoing German Chancellor Merkel. However, Cameron did not 
reject immigrant integration; he appears to have suggested that Britain can produce a 
“muscular” integration by imposing liberal values codified within British identity. 
 
Nodal Point: ‘Multiculturalism has failed’ 
Speech given at the Munich Security Conference 
Video and Transcript, February 5, 2011  
Sampling and Coding: Whole text - 2600 words 
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Having defined the case studies and the nodal points, it is necessary to 
introduce the criteria to develop the analytical corpus regarding the content analysis. 
 
Criteria for the definition of the Analytical Corpus  
 
Concerning the content analysis, the analytical corpus focuses on the role of 
the media in disseminating and recontextualising the nodal points. The corpus for 
each case study includes one week of daily press coverage following the delivery of 
the political statement linked to the nodal point. The articles analysed have been 
collected through the Nexis and Factiva Databases and includes articles from the 
leading broadsheets in France, Germany and United Kingdom, which have national 
circulation. In a few cases, I have included also some articles from newspapers with 
a high regional circulation such as Le Parisienne and tabloids such as The Daily 
Mail. For the database search, I used the category: Immigration & Citizenship and I 
also added the following keywords: Islam or Muslims. In doing so, a total of 162 
articles (see Table 3.1) have been collected and stored in a Microsoft Access 
database. The indexing scheme (see Appendix 4) systematises what has turned out 
to be a medium corpus of data. 
 
Table 3.1 – Distribution of the articles analysed per country 
 
Nodal	  Point	   France	   Germany	   UK	   Total	  
Sarkozy	   19	   10	   12	   41	  
Merkel	   13	   27	   19	   59	  
Cameron	   11	   7	   *44	   62	  
Total	   44	   44	   75	   162	  
 
 
3. The Data Analysis 
 
According to Fairclough, CDA cannot be reduced to a simple analysis of 
text, but must focus on the process of production and interpretation (2003: 21). The 
analytical usefulness of CDA (Fairclough, 1992, 2003; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) 
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is thus to offer an examination of the condition of the production of texts and their 
political implications, as the “relationship between text and social structures is an 
indirect one, mediated by discourse and social context” (Fairclough, 2003: 21). 
 
The description of the textual features should thus be combined to two more 
dimensions of analysis: 1) interpretation, which focuses on the “relationship 
between text and interaction”; and 2) explanation, which focuses on “the 
relationship between interaction and sociocultural contexts” (Fairclough, 2001: 21). 
These three levels of analysis form Fairclough’s three-dimensional model 
(Fairclough, 2001), one of the most common analytical strategies adopted in CDA, 
because it systematically explores the relationship between text and its social 
context. This model can be described as follows: 
 
! Description is the level of analysis for the formal features of the text; 
! Interpretation concerns the text as a creation of a social process; 
! Explanation explores the relationship between the social context, the 
production of text, and the reading of its potential political effects. 
 
In discourse theory, these three dimensions inevitably overlap (Fairclough 
1992: 231). For example, an analysis of the data could begin with some sense of the 
social and political context that the discourse is embedded in by problematising the 
boundaries of the text and also defining the implicit or explicit relations that this 
discourse has to other discourses. This approach implies that the analysis should 
start by including social and political concepts that lie outside the pure categories of 
textual analysis. Beginning with the description of the traditional characteristics of a 
text would not be particularly productive for an analysis aimed at examining the 
social implication of a text. In this manner, the analysis of text can undertake the 
following progression: 
 
! Interpretation of discursive practice, which focuses on the social and 
political conditions of the text, and identifies the intertextuality and 
interdiscursivity of the discourse; 
! Description of textual practice, which examines the textual strategies, by 
focusing on the process of justification, Othering and legitimisation; 
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! Explanation of the socio-political context, which illustrates the 
implications and the political consequences of the discourse on civic 
integration. 
 
In his last works, Fairclough has reformulated this framework by developing 
a new analytical model based on Bhaskar’s explanatory critique (see Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough 2010), which places more emphasis on the 
dialectical structure of the discourse. However, the three dimensional model is more 
explicit in framing the relation between discourse and social context, because it is 
based on more understandable conceptualisation of the semiotic, discursive and 
social levels. In the next section, these three stages are further described by 
providing a set of sub-categories to apply to the empirical investigation. 
 
Interpretation of Discursive Practice 
 
The first step of the empirical analysis is the reconstruction of the 
discoursive context related to the debate on Muslim integration. Starting from a 
nodal point, the analysis evaluates the conditions and practices involved in the 
enactment and reproduction of the discourses developed in the debate. Specifically, 
the analysis pays close attention to interdiscursive and intertextual analysis so as to 
offer a bigger picture of the text in terms of how it mutually relates to other texts and 
discourses held in the public sphere and how these other texts and discourses are 
actually interconnected to the nodal point. 
 
Interdiscursivity: The objective is to specify how the nodal point is 
established and articulated with discourses of membership, secularism and 
securitisation. Furthermore, it is central to observe how the nodal point is translated 
into concrete policies and institutional arrangements. This step is important, as it can 
verify to what extent the discursive articulation has been implemented into a 
concrete political program. 
 
Intertextual Chain: The objective here is to analyse the simultaneous press 
coverage of the nodal point in France, Germany and the UK. The key question is to 
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investigate to what extent the deliberative function of the political statements is 
accurately replicated by the media. The assumption is that the press tends to 
reinforce convergence by recontextualising only some aspects of the political 
debate. Based on a preliminary analysis of the corpus, I have identified the most 
recurrent themes employed by the press. These categories refer to the main line of 
argumentation employed by the press and reveal to what extent the national press 
can have a specific role in selecting and disseminating a nodal point. I regrouped 
these recurrent themes in seven categories and I expect to code more than one 
category for each article. 
 
First, the citizenship category includes references to membership, civic 
duties, naturalisation and human rights. Second, the category of Muslim diversity is 
debated along an inclusive and liberal line. Third, the cultural tradition, which 
covers references to those values that define the country under analysis as a 
monocultural society, based on a common past, common traditions and a 
homogeneous and coherent cultural system. The fourth category relates to the 
national identity dimension and refers to feelings of belonging to a national 
community. Fifth, the theme category of Europe includes references to the EU, but 
also to a European civilisation and the country’s position in relation to them. Sixth, 
the securitisation of ethnic relations includes the risks concerning urban segregation, 
the highest level of delinquency, but also political violence and religious radicalism. 
Conversely, social justice refers to social and economic inequalities, which can 
explain the problems faced by Muslim immigrants in their process of integration. 
 
These categories have the scope to provide a basis for indexing and 
quantitatively analysing the degree of convergence in the press coverage. 
 
Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimation  	  
This level of analysis is aimed at analysing particular textual strategies used 
in the nodal point. Specifically, textual practice examines the aspects of discourse 
practice through the understanding of the meanings of texts. In order to assess these 
textual strategies, I have considered some micro-textual features that can be useful 
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for evaluating what type of political effects are possibly evoked through coherent 
textual property. This list does not need to be exhaustive (for a more complete 
model see Fairclough, 1989: 110-2), but rather it is an outline of possible directions 
to undertake and investigate further such as:  
 
! keywords 
! clusters (a series of words related to each other in meaning) 
! oppositions (e.g. negative/positive; near/distant; familiar/alien) 
! use of key symbols, slogans, stereotypes; 
! patterns of identification and solidarity; 
! the specific use of personal pronouns (I, we, you, object: us, them); 
 
Regarding the language source, for the analysis of the French nodal point, I 
used the English translation of Sarkozy’s editorial published by the Guardian. For 
the German nodal point, I transcribed the Merkel’s speech (Appendix 2) from a 
video on YouTube and translated it from German to English. Therefore, I preferred 
to use English for the textual analysis, because I had the necessity to use a 
homogenous linguistic corpus for comparative purposes. This choice can be easily 
criticised or considered partial as some textual strategies can be missed in the course 
of any translation, but the aim of the textual analysis is to focus on the relation 
between text and social structure, rather than simply prioritising the microtextual 
effects of political rhetoric. 
 
Othering: Civic integration is an active form of regulation and the drawing of 
boundaries between identities, and thus, discourse on integration presupposes a set 
of collective identities, social relations and cultural values inculcated in discourses 
aimed at justifying the necessity of Muslims’ integration. Indeed, Othering is about 
distance and keeping the ‘different’ a stage apart, and preserving the Self as a 
constructed difference between identities. Here, I have identified three sub-
categories to apply to the analysis by Diez (2005: 628): 
 
What Makes "Us" Superior? 
! Representation of the European Self as having superior values to 
those of the Other.  
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Where Do “We” End?  
! Representation of Muslim identity as opposing universal values. 
Hence, the self is not simply represented as a superior, but through 
universal principles, as a consequence the Other should accept the 
principles of the self. 
 
Are They a Menace for Our Security? 
! Representation of Muslim identity as an existential threat 
(‘securitisation’). Muslim values are turned into a security threat. 
 
In this way, the process of Othering involves the construction of the Other 
through those textual features that emphasise social identities and collective values. 
This textual strategy of construction and definition of identities are thus central to 
the development of legitimation strategies. 
 
Legitimation: the aim is to identify and research different strategies of 
legitimation through references to how a particular social structuring of discourse 
can become universal and part of the legitimising system that sustains the 
implementation of policies to integrate Muslims. In detail, the dimension of 
universalising the particular is relevant to four legitimisation strategies: 
 
• Legitimisation of universal values through culture (identity, history, religion) 
• Legitimisation of universal values through procedure (participation, 
democracy, efficiency) 
• Legitimisation of universal values through “standardisation” (political 
belonging, social standards, economic standards) 
• Legitimisation of universal values through membership (insiders vs. 
outsiders) 
 
Therefore, an analysis of legitimation strategies aims at revealing any textual 
construction, which attaches value to political action and serves to legitimate 
policies of integration. In particular, it is the use of features related to a European 
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identity in order to advance and legitimise civic integration and its relations with the 
Other. The goal is to find those attempts to universalise some of the values 
embedded in a broader social, cultural and political European framework, in which 
the relations between different social identities are defined as elements of the 
reproduction of civic integration. 
 
Explanation of the Socio-Cultural Practice   
 
Central to this level of analysis are the social and political implications of the 
discursive structure. Specifically, the discourse on civic integration includes three 
critical considerations: a) the limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the 
European self; 2) civic integration as a process of Othering and 3) the elite’s attempt 
to hide social and economic disparities as an explanation for the lack of integration 
(Joppke 2007). As a consequence, I have defined three key sub-categories to 
analyse: 
 
• Normative: As discursive strategy, integration can be normative and encloses 
prejudices and limits affirmation from going beyond what is prescribed as 
“correct” identity. Thus, how does civic integration engender a normative 
discourse providing universal norms to belong to a common community 
(European, Western, National)? 
 
• Moral right: Integration can assume a moral right on behalf of the local 
resident majority to determine the limits and obligations of other identities. 
Thus, how does civic integration presuppose an effective power determining 
the acceptable and unequal relation between self and other? 
 
• Exclusion: What alternative causes could explain the lack of integration? 
Does the debate on civic integration ignore social inequalities? 
 
The last part clarifies not just how discourse on civic integration 
recontextualises a deeper core of values and norms, but it is also an opportunity to 
provide a clear analysis of the limits of the “articulation of universal” within this 
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discourse (Chouliaraki, 2003: 279). Therefore, my goal is to consider the political 
implications of this discourse by pointing to why civic integration can contribute to 
further marginalisation of Muslim immigrants, rather than representing a process of 
effective inclusion, which can lead to social equality and membership. 
 
The Research Design in Brief 
 
In this chapter, I propose a comparative investigation of the public debates 
on the integration of Muslims based on three national cases. The research design 
aims to systematically explore the discursive articulation of civic integration by 
focusing on the social and political structures embedded in the European public 
sphere. 
 
The first goal of the present analytical framework is a reconstruction of each 
national public debate starting from a nodal point. A nodal point corresponds to a 
specific political statement, which is considered a point of entry for reconstructing 
the broader public debate on integration of Muslim immigrants. The second 
objective is to investigate the press coverage across Europe. Indeed, the aim of this 
step is not merely an attempt to describe how the European public sphere works, but 
rather to draw on evidence that tentatively shows a degree of political convergence 
toward a universalistic discourse regarding the obligations that Muslims have to 
accept. 
 
The third goal aims also to examine in detail, how the ruling elite speaks 
about Europe and its identity and thereby, persuasively contributing to the creation 
of a consensus on civic integration among European public opinion at large. Given 
its political role, the ruling elite has a privileged access to the media and its authority 
legitimates the reproduction of any discourse in the public sphere. 
 
What is central in this methodology is the combination of critical discourse 
analysis with content analysis in order to underline how transnational debate can 
affect the national public spheres through mutual observation between international 
political actors and national spheres. In addition, the comparison of these debates 
76	  	  
also allows an illustrating in detail of: 1) any differences between national and 
transnational public debate and 2) how the assumption of a European identity and its 
underlining values might be recontextualised into national debates along different 
national political interests. 
 
In conclusion, in section 1 of this chapter, I explain the methodological 
choices and evaluate the specific questions concerning the issues of validity and 
reliability and how to overcome the limitations of CDA. In section 2, I re-introduce 
the research questions and the theoretical framework. In section 3, I discuss the 
specifics of the research design and how I develop the comparative framework based 
on national case studies. In section 4, I describe the analytical process based on a 
three-dimensional model elaborated by Fairclough (1992): discursive practice, 
textual practice and socio-cultural explanation and how I combine content analysis 
with CDA. 
 
In the following chapter, the present research design is applied to the first 
case: the French public debate on Islamic integration. In particular, Chapter 4 aims 
at reconstructing the French debate by focusing on Sarkozy’s article published in the 
Le Monde newspaper, in which the former French President defended the Swiss 
vote and argues for the necessity of a debate on national identity in order to protect 
the ‘Republican’ values of France. 
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Chapter 4: French National Identity and Integration 	  
Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter offers an account of the public debate on integration that was 
originated by former French President Nicholas Sarkozy after the Swiss 
constitutional referendum, which voted to ban the construction of new minarets in 
November 2009. The debate is reconstructed by taking as a nodal point Sarkozy’s 
editorial published in the Le Monde newspaper on 8 December 2009. In this article, 
Sarkozy defends the Swiss vote and calls upon Muslims to refrain from provocative 
attitudes, and urges them not to forget that Europe has Christian values at its 
foundation. 
 
Sarkozy's intervention came not only in response to concerns about the Swiss 
referendum, but as a consequence of the broader debate over integration. Since the 
beginning of his presidential mandate, Sarkozy promoted a public debate to discuss 
the features of immigration and national identity. The Republican approach to 
integration rejects any public recognition of ethnic, religious and cultural identities 
as antithetical to the French national identity. However, the recurrent riots in the 
suburbs and the requests to wear the veil at school reveal the incapacity of French 
policy to integrate the second generation of Muslim immigrants through the 
Republican model. 
 
This debate on national identity has been quite innovative for French public 
debate, because for decades, the commitment to a universal Republican conception 
of citizenship excluded discussion of any form of identity-based instance. Therefore, 
Sarkozy’s editorial reflects this tension between Republican citizenship and 
pluralism and aims at discussing whether immigration is indeed slumping France's 
social and cultural identity. 
 
The analysis is structured in four sections: i) the first section is an overview 
of the contemporary political debate around the integration of ethnic and cultural 
diversity within French society; ii) the second section focuses on the reconstruction 
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of the discourses related to the French debate on Muslim integration and evaluates 
the discursive practice involved in the enactment of the debate; iii) the third section 
is concerned with the textual strategy found in the nodal point; iv) the last section 
offers an explanation of socio-cultural practice and specifically aims at investigating 
the normative ambivalence in the French politics of identity and its limits to 
consider Muslim diversity and any hidden political or economic rationalities 
underlining the discourse of civic integration. 
 
1. The Political Context of the Debate 
 
This section places Sarkozy’s editorial within the context of the French 
debate on integration in order to sum up the main problems of immigration and 
capture the critical points of the French integration model. According to Sala Pala 
and Simon “the central pillar of French integration policy has traditionally been 
nationality legislation” (2007: 3). As a consequence, naturalisation is encouraged 
and citizenship is granted with relatively few requirements. In obtaining the French 
nationality, immigrants grant the same rights and obligations of any French citizens. 
Viewed in this way, citizenship and nationality are inseparably intertwined. Despite 
the fact that the Nationality Law, adopted in the early 1980s, stresses the need for 
immigrants to become an integral part of French society as citizens, this goal has 
remained being more of a part of the Republican rhetoric, rather than being 
implemented in effective political strategies to overcome socio-economic and 
cultural inequalities of Muslim population. 
 
The social and urban exclusion of Muslims is particularly apparent in 
suburban areas, the so-called banlieu (Wacquant 2008: 19). In these areas, Muslim 
communities suffer a higher rate of unemployment than non-Muslims with the same 
level of education. Moreover, Muslims are generally forced into “less-skilled 
employment categories, which are usually unstable and poorly paid” (Leiken, 2012: 
72). For many Muslims, the appropriate response to social marginalisation is to 
create their own communities based on a “common identity” shaped by Islam 
(Maayan, 2007: 5).  
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The creation of this “ethno-familial culture” (Cesari 2004: 25) makes the 
reality of these closed realities acceptable and even desirable, as these suburbs are 
subsequently perceived as Muslim enclaves. This self-segregation reinforces the 
Muslim population's identification with traditional practices and makes Islam a 
cultural mobilising force: “Forming a community becomes one way to define a 
collective identity that is a basis for action and public self-assertion” (Kastoryano 
2006: paragraph 15). 
 
A general frustration over the lack of concrete opportunities became evident 
in 2005 when violent confrontations (Emerson 2009: 6) between youths and the 
police took place in several suburbs surrounding France's major cities after the 
accidental death of two youths of Malian and Tunisian descent in the Parisian 
suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. Certainly, these riots did not have any religious 
character, but the disappointment of the Muslim second generation highlighted the 
inequality of treatment, and the feeling that their community was marginalised by 
the state (Kokoref 2009: 147). 
 
The breakdown of public order in suburban areas offered the chance for 
some political leaders to take advantage of voters’ concern over security and 
immigration. At the 2002 Presidential Elections, Jean Marie Le Pen – the leader of 
the radical right wing party Fronte Nationale - scored a surprise electoral result with 
a xenophobic and anti-Muslim agenda, coming in 2nd place behind President Chirac. 
The result was shocking not only for France but also for Europe, and it was the 
turning point for reconsidering immigration and integration policies. 
 
As a first step, the new right-wing government elected in 2003 approved 
strict anti-immigration policies sponsored by Sarkozy as Interior Minister. 
Furthermore, Sarkozy gained notable visibility (Leiken 2012: 271) when during the 
2005 riots, he referred to the rioters as racaille [scum]. This term in French is more 
pejorative than the translation to "scum" in English- it characterises an entire group 
of people as subhuman, inherently evil and criminal, and in effect, useless. Sarkozy 
used the riots as an excuse to launch his own political response to social distress 
from suburban areas for a militarisation of the banlieu to prevent urban crime and 
terrorism. The potential exploitation of public order offered Sarkozy an opportunity 
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to launch his presidential electoral campaign in 2007 focusing on both the issues of 
urban security and the negative perceptions of the integration problems of Muslims 
to gain an electoral consensus. After the election, his presidential mandate was 
characterised by a more moderate view aimed at encouraging a national debate 
about what it means to be French and the erosion of national identity and culture. 
 
A second problem concerning the integration of Muslim people is related to 
the accommodation of religious needs. The initial controversy concerning the 
accommodation of Muslims’ needs was engendered by the construction of the 
Mosque in Lyon. The idea of building a grand mosque in Lyon was first broached in 
1980 by the President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing during the electoral campaign and 
prompted a heated debate (Bowen, 2007: 68), because Islam was seen as a foreign 
religion and inclined to fanaticism. In addition, the government’s intention to use 
public funding was strongly rejected by opponents because it violated the principles 
of separation between religion and the state. In this debate, Le Pen's National Front 
gained a large consensus by fiercely opposing the project (Tlemçani, 1997: 33) and 
the accommodation of any Muslim religious needs. 
 
The Mosque of Lyon was only officially inaugurated in 1994. During the 
speech at the inauguration, the Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, praised 
efforts to build a moderate Islam compatible with the French Republican tradition 
(Hargreaves 1995, 206–208). This recognition of Islam was certainly important as it 
represents an attempt to override the inflexibility of Republicanism. At the same 
time, the precondition of creating a moderate Islam, compatible with French values, 
it has been seen as a state’s attempt to control the influence of religious 
intermediaries to enhance social control among immigrants and French citizens of 
Muslim heritage (Prugl & Thiel, 2011: 44). 
 
Another controversy related to the accommodation of religious needs was the 
question of the Islamic scarf (hijab). French political elites and public opinion have 
always favoured forbidding Muslim women from wearing a veil in public1, because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Public debate surrounding this issue exploded in October 1989, when three female students in a 
secondary school in Creil, a Paris suburb, were suspended for refusing to remove their scarves in 
class. Despite the fact that the Conseil d'État (Council of State) ruled in November 1989 that the scarf 
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the veil represents how Islam oppresses women and it is also a symbol of belonging 
to the Muslim community. Women who wear the veil display their religious and 
community affiliation by challenging the national unity goal assumed by French 
Republicanism. As a consequence, the veil and later the burqua2, are examples of 
difficulties the French have had in integrating Islamic culture through a strict 
application of French universalism. 
 
French public debate on integration reveals three different major 
controversies, which have framed the public opinion’s concerns towards Muslim 
integration: 1) the recurrent urban riots; 2) the radicalisation of Muslim identity in 
segregated urban enclaves and 3) the accommodation of Muslim religious needs. 
These controversies have helped fuel anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant resentment in 
national public opinion due to a general concern for the lack of integration of the 
Muslim population. 
 
In regards to the adoption of civic policies, Sarkozy, since when he was 
Minister of Interior, was certainly one of the most active politicians advocating for 
Muslim integration. After several years of struggling to formalise relations between 
the government and Muslims, in 2003 Sarkozy supported the creation of the French 
Council of the Muslim Faith [Conseil Français du Culte Musulman] as an official 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was compatible with the secular tradition of the public schools (Klaussen, 2005: 174), President 
Chirac supported a law banning the use of any visible signs of religious affiliation in order to 
preserve French secularism in public schools. The law, sometimes referred to as "the veil law", was 
approved by the French Parliament in March 2004 and forbade the wearing of any religious symbol, 
including the Islamic veil, the Jewish kippah and ‘large’ Christian crosses (Scott, 2010: 1; Joppke, 
2009: 45). Although the law affects only Muslims, its legislative consequences have mainly targeted 
female students practicing the Islamic faith. 
 
2 The last act of the veil war was in June 2009, when Sarkozy as President was addressing both 
houses of Parliament [Congrès] in a special session at Versailles. On that occasion he condemned the 
burqa, an extreme “a sign of subjugation and debasement” that was “not welcome.” One day after a 
speech to both houses, a Parliamentary commission, led by Communist M.P., André Gerin, was 
created to investigate “the practice of wearing the burqa and the niqab by certain Muslim 
women…on the national territory”, with the aim to “better understand the problem and to find ways 
to fight against this affront to individual liberties” (Assemblée Nationale 2009a).  After six months of 
deliberation and testimony from 180 experts (Assemblée Nationale 2009b), what became known as 
the “Burqa Commission” stated that the "wearing of the full veil is a challenge to our republic. This 
[practice of wearing a full veil] is unacceptable" (BBC News, 2010) and recommended a “general 
and absolute prohibition of the integral veil in public space” (Assemblée Nationale 2010a: 187). As a 
consequence, the National Assembly in July 2010 passed a law that prohibited “la dissimulation du 
visage dans l'espace public” [the dissimulation of the face in public space] (Assemblée Nationale 
2010b: 9, 11). 
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forum to dialogue with the French state. The council is a national elected body 
representing the Muslim community similar to the Jewish Council (CRIF). The 
creation of the council was criticised as, in the virtue of secular and republican 
values of France, there is not a necessity to officially recognise a religious group. 
Conversely, some Muslim organisations not represented in the council denounced 
Sarkozy’s attempt to encourage a state-led, liberal version of Islam. 
 
In the same year, Sarkozy introduced the Welcome and Integration Contract 
[Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration, CAI] as a first attempt to implement the 
Directive 2003/109/EC into the French legal system. The CAI institutionalised and 
formalised a contractual relation between the state and immigrants, in order to grant 
admission and security of residence. In Sarkozy’s CAI, the permanent settlement of 
immigrants is reserved for those who have chosen to respect French values, and one 
of the main purposes of this conditionality is to reinforce the Republican integration 
“intégration républicaine” of immigrants (Carrera & Weisbrock 2009: 14). 
Originally, the CAI had a semi-facultative nature but it had become mandatory in 
2006 with the approval of the new Immigration Law [Loi relative à l’immigration et 
à l’intégration], also called Sarkozy Law II. 
 
Sarkozy’s Immigration and Integration Law evaluates three main elements of 
an immigrant’s integration: 1) integration in accordance with the secularism of the 
state; 2) the subject to integrate is an individual rather than a collective, and 3) 
integration presupposes rights and duties (Bertossi 2007: 26). Therefore, the French 
state does not accept any ethnic or race difference with immigrants and public 
support is granted only for individual merit and advancement (Schain, 2009). The 
main purpose of these conditions is to reinforce the Republican integration 
[intégration républicaine] of immigrants and to maintain citizenship as a key aspect 
of the process of integration into the French Nation (Sala Pala and Simon 2007: 3). 
 
2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice 
 
This section looks at the immediate communicative processes of Sarkozy’s 
editorial, in other words, the conditions of social reproduction found in the text. It 
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offers two levels of analysis, namely, interdiscursivity and the intertextual chain. 
Across these two levels, the analysis pays close attention to interdiscursive and 
intertextual analysis, so as to offer a bigger picture of the text in terms of how it 
mutually relates to other discourses held in the public sphere and how other 
discourses actually framed Sarkozy’s article.  
 
Interdiscursivity 
 
This analytical level aims at investigating how Sarkozy’s speech is 
established in a specific discursive context and how it can be articulated with other 
discourses. It is very important to underline that Sarkozy's editorial came not only in 
answer to the concern about the Swiss referendum and French opposition to the 
construction of Mosques, but also in the midst of a broader debate over French 
national identity that was launched by his government in October 2009 (Marquand, 
2009). This debate was aimed at discussing two central questions: "what it means to 
be French today" and “what immigration contributes to French national identity” 
(Cosgrove, 2010). In his contribution to Le Monde, Sarkozy offers a definition of 
what it means to be French by focusing on two intertwined discourses: 1) the 
discourse of Republicanism which assumes the principle of undifferentiated 
citizenship and 2) the discourse of secularism based on the separation between 
religion and the State. 
 
The French model of integration is built over the Republican discourse born 
out of the French revolution. Republicanism is based on the idea that the French 
nation is imbued with Enlightenment values (Scott, 2004: 32) and unique in regards 
to the rights of individual citizens, which are laid down in the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man. This view sees the state as being constituted by the will and 
consent of free citizens, who can exercise their rights. But no one can invoke the 
status of belonging to a minority, immigrants included, because the Republic is one 
and indivisible. 
 
The French Republicanism assumes thus that the population living within the 
national boundaries can be defined only by legal-political criteria (Feldlum 1999: 
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75). The existence of any racial, ethnic, or linguistic minority is not recognised 
because all citizens are formally part of the nation. This is also the reason why 
France does not recognize Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Bullard 2008: 59), which protects the rights of minorities to 
practice their own culture and religion and use their own language. In terms of 
policy integration, allowing the formation of minorities or granting specific minority 
rights would be seen as the failure of Republican integration. The centrality of 
discourse of Republicanism in French society explains why pluralism remains 
difficult to achieve and creates strong limitation on the expression of any cultural 
diversity. 
 
The core aspects of the French Republicanism are the universalistic 
aspirations of the Enlightenment (Feldlum 1999: 73), the revolutionary mythology 
that created a unique historical identity (Ichijo, 2011: 41) and the preservation of the 
national unity (Sudlow, 2012: 169). These Republican values are not confined to 
small academic circles but they are always at the very centre of any public debate 
from the Parliament to the pages of daily newspapers. Therefore, these Republican 
values of the French state are shared by the whole civil society. At the same time, 
Republicanism reflects the liberal and conservative standpoints. 
 
These two Republican standpoints share a universalistic conception of the 
state, which is based on the expression of a universal culture, but for the 
‘conservatives’ if French citizens hold other cultural values alongside the universal 
ones, it is a private affair and not that of the French state. The ‘liberals’ share this 
universalistic conception, but they have a more society-oriented viewpoint, thus they 
may encourage different cultures and subcultures coexisting in the state. The only 
difference involves the amount of cultural diversity that both sides are willing to 
acknowledge and appreciate. At the same time, both liberals and conservatives reject 
multiculturalism at integration policy level, as the existence of structured ethnic 
communities -what is known as communautarisme in the French political debate- is 
considered as a major threat to the universalistic aspirations of the Republic (Sala 
Pala and Simon 2007: 4). 
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The second discourse that Sarkozy points to is secularism. The principle of 
Laïcité, which permits state neutrality, strictly calls for 1) a rigid separation between 
state and religion (similar to Jefferson’s wall) and 2) an absence of any religious 
expression in the public sphere. This last point implies a containment of religion into 
the individual private sphere (Casanova, 1994: 35). At the same time, Sarkozy 
rejects a traditional concept of secularisation in which religion is considered as a 
matter for the private sphere only and claims instead that religion should play a 
positive role in the public sphere. 
 
Sarkozy explains his interpretation of Laïcité in his own book published in 
October 2004, titled La République, les religions, l’espérance. Within it, he 
describes his desire to return to an “open and serene” secularism, in which each 
person can practice his faith and contribute in strengthening democratic institutions. 
But this requires, in his words, a return to a more “positive secularism” rather than a 
tolerant one (Sarkozy, 2005). Therefore, Sarkozy can be defined as a reformer of the 
strict tradition of French secularism because he recognises a public role for religions 
and a positive influence on society. 
 
Sarkozy’s idea of “positive secularism” is based on the argument that 
religions are the keepers of ethos that are necessary to maintain liberal values. In his 
Swiss referendum intervention, Sarkozy underlines how secularism “is not the 
rejection of religion, but [a] respect for all faiths” [line 40] and recalls that when he 
was Interior Minister, he created the French Council of the Muslim Faith [line 41] 
putting Islam on the same level as the other “major religions” [line 42]. This line of 
thinking was also exposed during Pope Benedict XVI’s visit to France, when 
Sarkozy said that it was "legitimate for democracy and respectful of secularism to 
have a dialogue with religions" (Donaido, 2008). 
 
The discourse on “positive secularism” re-contextualises those arguments 
elaborated by Habermas (2010) in a definition of post-secularism as an attempt to 
reconceive the significance of both religion and the secular in the context of 
contemporary politics. According to Sarkozy, the “old conception of state 
secularism must evolve because the State cannot remain indifferent to the public role 
of religion” (2005: 185). His discourse for a different secularism has an important 
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consequence in terms of reintroducing the classic debate on ‘faith and reason’ and in 
readdressing relations between religion and the state without, however, challenging 
the secularised nature of French political institutions. 
 
In brief, the principles of equality and political citizenship in Republicanism 
define culture as a private matter and thus Muslims cannot claim any special cultural 
rights. At that same time, a recognition of Islam with any accompanying benefits 
and rights is restricted by the secular tradition of the French constitution, which 
establishes a rigid separation between religion and state. Both secular and 
Republican discourses have a clear, difficult relationship with the cultural diversity 
of Muslims because of 1) the persistent influence of secularism on the reclusion of 
the faith in a private sphere and 2) the central role of the state over civil society and 
its unifying mission. As a consequence, the unity of the state is more important than 
the manifestation of any particular minority’s expression of identity, culture or 
religion. 
 
Intertextual Chain  
 
The objective of the present section is to analyse how the nodal point is 
disseminated and contested across Europe through a content analysis of the press 
coverage. Sarkozy delivered his reaction to the recent Swiss referendum through an 
editorial first published on 8 December 2009 by Le Monde, a traditionally leftist 
newspaper. The same article was translated into English and published the day after 
by The Guardian with the title “France and the Swiss minaret vote” (Appendix 1) in 
the Comment is Free section. 
 
I have collected 40 articles, related to Sarkozy’s editorial, from leading 
newspapers in France, Germany and the United Kingdom by searching Nexis and 
Factiva databases in the period from Monday 8th to Sunday 15th December 2009. 
The distribution (table 4.1) of articles shows that the French sample is 
overrepresented (19 articles) with a ratio of 4.75. However, the non-local 
distribution appears homogenous with a differential margin in the ratio of 0.37. 
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Table 4.1 
Sarkozy	   France	   Germany	   UK	  
Articles	   19	   10	   11	  
Sources	   4	   8	   7	  
Ratio	   4.75	   1.25	   1.57	  
 
By following the model proposed in chapter 3, I have considered seven 
thematic categories: first, the membership, which includes references to the 
Constitution, civic duties and citizenship. Second, the issue of religious diversity is 
debated as a difference to tolerate rather than a pluralist encounter. Third, the 
cultural tradition dimension, which covers references to ‘our traditions’ and ‘our 
values’ that define the French as a monocultural society, based on a common past, 
common traditions and an apparently homogeneous and coherent value system. The 
fourth category relates to the national identity dimension and refers to a political 
discourse of belonging to the national political community. Fifth, the thematic 
dimension of Europe includes references to the EU, but also to a European moral 
community and France’s position in relation to it. Sixth, the securitisation of ethnic 
relations includes the risks concerning urban segregation, the highest level of 
delinquency, but also political violence and religious radicalism. While social justice 
refers to social and economic inequalities, which can explain the problems faced by 
Muslim immigrants in their process of integration. 
 
Table 4.2 – Thematic Categories 
Thematic	  Category	   France	   Germany	   UK	   Avg.	  
1.	  Membership	   10	   6	   5	   7.0	  
2.	  Religious	  diversity	   14	   7	   9	   10.0	  
3.	  Cultural	  tradition	   15	   8	   8	   10.3	  
4.	  National	  identity	   17	   7	   6	   10.0	  
5.	  European	  perspective	   14	   8	   7	   9.6	  
6.	  Securitization	   15	   7	   8	   10.0	  
7.	  Social	  Justice	   4	   3	   4	   3.6	  
 
 
These categories refer to the main line of argumentation employed by the 
press and reveal how the press tend to mediatise a nodal point and to what extent a 
transnational convergence can be recognised. I coded more than one thematic 
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category (TC) for each article. The distribution (table 4.2) is consistently high in the 
three countries for the TC n. 2, 3, 5, 6; while low for TC6 and dissimilar for TC n. 4. 
In more detail, the European press in disseminating Sarkozy’s arguments agree on 
four main points. 
 
a) Sarkozy declares understanding for Switzerland's controversial vote to ban 
the construction of Muslim minarets. The press also accentuated that according to 
Sarkozy, the referendum banning minarets was a reaction to the complex problem of 
immigration. In particular, the Swiss were concerned of the effects that immigration 
had over their national identity. This argument covers thematic category n 4, 5, 6. 
 
b) Sarkozy calls on Muslim practitioners to avoid ostentation and 
provocation for fear of upsetting the Christian majority. In particular, it is 
emphasised that Sarkozy asked to practice religion in “humble discretion". This 
argument covers the thematic category n 2, 3. 
 
c) Sarkozy’s concern regarding the question of national identity as the 
solution to promote civic integration in France as well as Europe. In particular, it is 
reported that Sarkozy claims national identity is the antidote to separatism and that 
Muslims have to support the development of a moderate Islam in France. This 
argument covers thematic dimension n 4, 5 and 6. 
 
d) Sarkozy mentions the necessity to combat discrimination and ensure that 
Muslims can feel to being full citizens. However, an important condition is noticed 
that Sarkozy imposes regarding the process of integration: anything that could 
change France's Christian roots and Republican values would be firmly rejected. 
This argument covers thematic category n 2 and 3. 
 
Commentators generally criticised Sarkozy for his dangerously simplistic 
views on the issue of minarets and Muslim integration and also denounced 
Sarkozy’s call to debate national identity as risking degeneration into a populist 
dispute on immigration to gain support within the far right electorate (Appendix 4 – 
FR #8, DE #3 #4, UK #7). Sarkozy is also accused of promoting anti-immigrant 
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sentiment simply to divert the public from the country’s economic problems in a 
time of deep social crisis (FR #2, DE #1, UK #4 #7). 
 
Despite this widespread criticism, it has to be noted that French reporters 
agree with Sarkozy’s calls for strengthening national identity. However, there are 
few modest differences as to what extent Muslim cultural and religious diversity 
should be accepted (FR #14 #16). Some opinions tend to be more willing in 
considering a certain degree of flexibility in the Republican interpretation of 
integration (FR #2, #7), in order to accommodate some needs of Muslims, whenever 
they are compatible with French secular values. 
 
It has to be noted that this point of view does not automatically reflect a 
traditional division between the Left and the Right, which see conservatives as being 
more closed towards the accommodation of cultural and religious diversity. In 
French public debate, this polarization does not seem to have been respected as I 
could find divergent opinions on both sides (FR #4, #5, #7). However, despite 
different points of views, French commentators do not defy the republican 
conception of integration (FR #11, #7, #6), which remains shared not only by 
conservatives and socialists, but also surprisingly by a large number of Muslims 
leaders (FR #4).  
 
German and British press tends to criticise a model of integration based on 
an intransigent interpretation of secularism (DE #10, #; UK #2 #7 #11) and also 
underline the risk that Sarkozy’s speech could support a strong nationalism against 
immigrants (DE #4, #5; UK #7, #11). Although commentators focus on the problem 
concerning religious and cultural diversity, they recognise that Sarkozy is right in 
pointing out that in Europe, there is an emergence of suffering towards immigration, 
especially Muslims (DE #5, #6, #7; UK #10, #2), which could degenerate into 
blatant xenophobia if European countries fail to integrate Muslims. 
 
The outcome of the content analysis shows an important degree of 
convergence in the mediatisation of Sarkozy’s editorial. The press, in all three 
countries under analysis reported the main arguments adopted by Sarkozy in 
reaction to the Swiss ban of minarets. Despite the wide criticism that Sarkozy 
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received, the press agreed with him that the referendum was the symptom of a deep 
distress towards the complex problem of immigration.  
 
In the aftermath of the Swiss referendum, Sarkozy was the only European 
leader to not condemn the vote and to raise concern of the effects that immigration 
could have over the attachment that European nations have towards their religious 
and cultural traditions. The visibility obtained through the transnational press 
coverage represented for Sarkozy, a great political opportunity to use the European 
public sphere to communicate his political agenda on immigration and national 
identity. For months, journalists had been called to discuss Sarkozy’s speeches, 
ideas and thoughts about integration of Muslims. This ability of leading the 
European public debate was clearly manifested along the debate on the Burqua Law. 
 
3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimisation 
 
This section examines the textual aspects of discourse practice. Textual 
features can be a useful empirical terrain to explore and interpret throughout the 
dialectical tension that occurs between the actual text and its social context.  The 
analytical model proposed in this section offers a general overview about the textual 
features, and a second stage that focuses on the political effects of that textual 
practice, through an assessment of the Othering and legitimation strategies on which 
the text is based and can thus be interpreted.  
 
At the general level, this textual analysis is conducted on an English 
translation of Sarkozy’s editorial, which appeared in Le Monde and translated into 
English by The Guardian on 9 December 2009 (Appendix 1). As a consequence, 
some micro-textual features are lost in the present analysis, due to translation. 
However, this analysis is not aimed at investigating linguistic features, but rather to 
understand the arguments and the logic behind the French discourse on integration 
as presented by Sarkozy in his editorial. 
 
The text shows elements of style and enunciation that mark the rhetorical 
articulation of a political speech. It is possible, thus, to identify the genre of the 
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political speech despite the fact that the contribution was a written editorial. For 
example, Sarkozy favours short words and phrases over long phrases, and each 
sentence averages 10/12 words, both in the original French version and the English 
translation. In the text, there are no connectors between sentences, and the use of 
subordination is rare. This strategy is unusual in a written text since subordinate 
relationships between sentences are necessary to establish more complex 
relationship between arguments. Thus, Sarkozy’s editorial prefers the immediacy of 
coordinated connections and avoids any subordination between sentences.  
 
A vivid and descriptive language, typical of the political speech, 
characterizes the wording of the text. Words like “convictions”, “beliefs”, 
“astonishing”, and “unhappiness” from the two opening paragraphs are a small 
sample of the tone that the author wants to evoke. In doing so, Sakorzy prefers 
creating a cause-and-effect relationship through emotional and personal meaning; 
for this reason words are chosen for their emotional emphasis in order to point to 
readers’ feelings rather than to structured arguments, which are more typical in a 
written text. 
 
In order to explore the role of identities, I focus on the construction of the 
Other through those textual strategies that emphasise social identities and collective 
values. The construction and definition of identities and it is indispensable to 
support the development of any legitimation strategy of the discourse of civic 
integration. It is in that sense, for example, that Sarkozy advocates that people’s fear 
of losing their identity cannot be ignored or undervalued [31-32]. In his view, the 
Swiss people felt their identity was being threatened by immigration [32-33].  
 
It is also possible to observe how the textual practice affects the manner in 
which the Other is articulated as someone who is separated. Sarkozy writes: “I also 
want to tell them [Muslims] that in our country” [49]. In another sentence, he wishes 
“the creation of the kind of French Islam that … shares our social and civic 
contract” [54]. Here, the author establishes a concrete separation between “us” and 
the Muslim-Other through the identification and recognition of both symbolic 
identities.  
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In different passages, Sarkozy evokes also stereotypes and prejudices toward 
Muslims. He writes that “we do not respect people by forcing them” – which is 
already an interesting construction based on the classical dichotomy of Us vs. Them 
analysed above – “to practice their religion in cellars or warehouses”. Also, 
surprisingly, he argues that respect for Muslims and all newcomers means 
“endorsing the equality of men and women, Laïcité, and the separation of the 
temporal from the spiritual,” which strongly limits at homogenization of cultures 
and belonging rather than simply choosing to respect newcomers. 
 
The collective identity of the in-group is based on the expression of a “we” 
identification referring to all the French people. These constitute the public space in 
which the enunciation operates. It is the sense of "we" at the beginning of the speech 
or the reference to "the Republic", which is in and of itself performative, in that it is 
the manner used whereby the speech establishes actors and confers identity and 
political status, as opposed to simply addressing those who do not belong to France. 
Sarkozy does not speak directly to Muslims:  “I want also to tell them that in our 
country” [49]; rather, he is talking to the French people, saying that Muslims have to 
assume their own identity, but he also refers to “our country,” implying the country 
belongs to the French people. 
 
  A confirmation of this claim is Line 35, which reads: “National identity is 
the antidote to tribalism and sectarianism”. Here “national identity” evokes the value 
of nationalism as a secular characterisation of both self-determination and respect of 
the individual and personality. At the same time, “tribalism” and “sectarianism” 
evoke the negative values of backwardness and are attributed to Muslim 
communities. Tactically, these negative characteristics are opposed to a “national 
identity” to give more prestige to the supposed European secular values of tolerance 
and rationality recalled by Sarkozy.  
 
In claiming European values are “welcoming” and “tolerant” [29-30] 
Sarkozy absolves any responsibility of Europeans in contemporary history. Sarkozy 
proposes a one-sided European heritage, which drawn from the values of the 
Enlightenment and is characterised by universal values of reason and tolerance as 
opposed to Islam as an Other with different values. Colonialism and the more recent 
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instances of ethnic cleansing including the holocaust cannot be defined as a 
manifestation of the welcoming and tolerant character of Europeans (Judt 2008). 
Moreover, Europe and Islam are described as two separate essences that can be 
resolved only through the belonging of Muslims to Enlightenment, democracy, 
secularism and Republicanism, in other words, those features characterising French 
national identity. In this way, Sarkozy projects the vision of the Republican French 
universalism toward the whole Europe. In Sarkozy’s words, Europe is an enlarged 
in-group projection of French national identity through the vision of a ‘French’ 
Europe. Sarkozy’s understanding of Europe is thus based on an attempt to establish 
French influence in the domains of European politics and culture. 
 
In order to explore the process of legitimisation, this analysis focuses on 
those strategies adopted in Sarkozy’s editorial to sustain the implementation of 
policies to integrate Muslims. The goal is to identify and research those textual 
features, which give meaning to the discourse of civic integration.  
 
First of all, Sarkozy legitimises his political standpoint by reference to the 
feelings of “the people” [8] and argues that politicians’ incapacity to connect with 
the people will “feed populism” [10]. At the same time, Sarkozy’s appeal to 
people’s feelings is per se a populist strategy, in fact populism defines a view 
supporting “the rights and powers of the common people in their struggle with the 
privileged elite” (Norton et al, 2010: 612).   
 
Sarkozy appeals also to his people’s emotion in order to legitimate his 
perspective. For example, “violence” and “visceral contempt” are associated to the 
behaviour of those members of elite, who refuse to listen to what “comes from the 
people” [8]. He also states that when the elite becomes “deaf to the people – 
indifferent to their problems, feelings, and aspirations – we feed populism” [8-10]. 
Here, “feeling” and “aspirations”, according to Sarkozy, describe the correct spirit of 
people as opposed to the lack of empathy evident in the opinion of the elite. 
 
Sarkozy choses words that give emotional emphasis to arguments, in doing 
so, this text creates a cause-and-effect relationship through emotional and personal 
meaning. This strategy is also developed in Line 12, where Sarkozy asks “How can 
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we be surprised by the success of extremists when we ignore the unhappiness of 
voters?”, thus reducing the problem of the referendum to a basic question that lies 
within the dichotomy of “happiness/unhappiness” within people, implying that 
being discontent is a matter of unhappiness rather than a social problem. Again, in 
Line 22, Sarkozy writes: “Instead of vilifying the Swiss, we would do better to ask 
ourselves what their vote revealed”. The use of “vilifying” typifies the point of view 
that Sarkozy’s approach to those elites who criticised the Swiss vote.  
 
A further strategy adopted by Sarkozy is to focus Muslim’s responsibilities 
towards France. For example, Sarkozy argues that religion must be practiced 
“discretely” and must avoid undue “provocations” [55-56].  Here “discretely” means 
in a private way, without creating any conflict with other groups, a point that 
exemplifies Sarkozy’s view on the role of religion in the public sphere. As a 
consequence, Sarkozy implies that the rights of religious minorities do not and must 
not override or change the secular identity that the French majority accepts 
culturally. I underscore above, Sarkozy criticises the privatisation of religion and 
supports a more “positive” role of religions in the public sphere; however, he seems 
to conclude that Muslims are responsible to practice their faith without challenging 
the sensibilities of French people.  
 
In a key paragraph, Sarkozy calls also on Muslims to avoid “anything that 
could be regarded as [a] challenge to” [51] the creation of a moderate Islam in 
France. A rejection of French cultural and political roots will “scupper” or damage 
[52] the integration of Islam into French society [52]. Thus, according to Sarkozy, 
Muslims are not only responsible of political belonging, but also the creation of a 
French version of Islam. This implies that in its current form, Islam cannot be part of 
France, and for this reason, Islam must modify itself, so it can belong to and join the 
presumed French identity. Muslims have also the obligation to recognise and accept 
the French “social and civic contract” [54]. It is not enough simply to recognise the 
political and cultural roots of France. For this reason, Muslims must respect the rules 
of French society without asking for any special accommodation.  
 
To summarize the main points of this textual analysis, Sarkozy’s editorial 
shows elements of style and enunciation that are typical of a political speech despite 
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the fact that the contribution was written for publication in a newspaper. In this 
editorial, Sarkozy calls on Muslims to accept the designated political and cultural 
identity of France. In overviewing the characteristics of French national identity, 
Sarkozy defines Islam as a historical Other by distinguishing Europe and Islam as 
two separate essences that can be resolved only through the belonging of Islam to 
France. However, Sarkozy does not preclude anyone from being integrated into or 
being part of the defined French society if they simply are willing to accept the 
mutual sharing of already defined French values. 
 
4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice 
 
This section explores the social and political implications of the French 
discourse of civic integration and focuses on two critical considerations: 1) 
normative ambivalence in the French politics of identity and its unwillingness to 
consider Muslim diversity as part of the French self and 2) any hidden social and 
economic rationality underlining the discourse of civic integration. 
 
The very language of Sarkozy’s model of integration is based on normative 
assumptions regarding the political and cultural nature of French national identity.  
Sarkozy recalls that the most important aspect of national identity is based on the 
principle of Laicité, or in his words, “the separation of the spiritual and the secular,” 
which, according to Republicanism, is the only cultural-behavioural filter against 
fanaticism [46]. Thus the secular-liberal state, according to Sarkozy, should 
incorporate religious and cultural characteristics into the very foundation of its 
social contract; at the same time, Muslims must publicly recognise French identity 
while the civic contract has to deliberately exclude any other identity that might 
challenge French values, which are basically “Republican” and “deeply marked by a 
Christian civilization” [49-50].  
 
Sarkozy conceptualises republican and Christian religious values as a 
universal discourse and assumes the homogeneity of these values as a given national 
characteristic. Is France in fact secular? Sarkozy seems to think that it is only 
partially so and that the country is instead the product of a compromise between 
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“Christian civilization” and republican political values. The importance of 
“Christianity” in Sarkozy’s view raises the question whether France is indeed truly 
secular or what precisely the French term Laïcité implies. 
 
This discourse addresses, in a political context, the ways in which national 
identity can be used to support, rather than deny, the integration of Muslims, via the 
adoption of liberal and civic values that are inherent in it.  However, Sarkozy’s 
appeal to unity and cohesion is based on a discursive strategy aimed at devaluing 
Muslim immigrants as Other, not for their different ethnicity, but for those of their 
intrinsic cultural differences that might clash with French liberal values. 
Accordingly, Sarkozy promotes a specific integration that is aimed at underlining 
the Muslim immigrants’ responsibilities toward France and its political community. 
 
While the French idea of secularism confers equal dignity on all religions 
[40], Sarkozy downplays, in some instances, those religious and cultural distinctions 
peculiar to Islam, disregarding that these distinctions are central to the essence of 
that faith. Sarkozy declares that Islam does not need to undermine “its core beliefs” 
in order to be considered as French [51-54]. At the same time, he also declares that 
all Muslim immigrants should integrate themselves into French society and respect 
its cultural traditions and values, which he expressly defines as having “Christian” 
roots and “Republican values” [49-50]. This is a very particular conceptualisation of 
national identity, since non-Christian minorities such as Jews, and recently Muslims 
coming from the nation’s colonies, have always populated the French nation. 
 
The assumption that Muslim groups have some distinctive religious customs 
ignores the natural process of cultural adaptation and mixing to which minorities are 
exposed, and thus reinforces the perception that Muslims are the Other. The effect of 
this view, in turn, reproduces a hierarchy of acceptable and unacceptable cultures 
and religions. By determining who can and who cannot be included, civic 
integration presupposes an unequal relation between France and Islam, which can 
then be explained as the need of Muslim immigrants to adopt ‘advanced’ French 
democratic and secular values. 
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Sarkozy declares that he will “do everything to ensure that French Muslims 
enjoy the same rights as all other citizens. I will fight all forms of discrimination” 
[47-48] but anything that could challenge Republican values will damage the 
creation of a “French Islam” [51-52]. Sarkozy’s discourse aims at recognizing a 
public role to Islam [40-42], though it is defined as a foreign religion [49-50] and 
religion of immigrants [36]. In other words, Sarkozy’s model of integration is not 
sympathetic towards the acceptance of the Islamic faith, but only towards the 
creation of a specific national version of Islam.  
 
This concept of “French Islam” is problematic because it implicitly assumes 
that the present Islam is alien to French society and traditions. Muslims can be 
integrated only if they agree to create a French Islam, thereby renouncing any of 
their political and cultural characteristics that can be deemed to contrast with or 
oppose French identity. Consequently, this discourse infringes the liberal principle 
of religious freedom and contradicts the secular notion of state neutrality, selectively 
accepting Islam only when it belongs to France.   
 
A main argument in Sarkozy’s speech is that Muslims should embrace the 
French national identity for their own best interests. In his words, “national identity” 
is the only antidote against “sectarism” and “tribalism” [35], and once again, he 
discusses the creation of a “French Islam” that “shares our social and civic contract” 
[53-54]. Thus, Sarkozy’s discourse is aimed at promoting the recognition of Islam as 
a full member of French society through common rules and mutual duties that will 
still protect the French national identity. 
 
Sarkozy’s discourse aims at integrating Muslim immigrants and their 
religious diversity; in his words there is no attempt to neglect Muslims and their role 
in French society as advocated by the radical right. The emphasis on common values 
as the core of the requirement integration has an inclusive character. For this reason, 
Sarkozy calls on Muslims to respect the French social and civil contract. However, 
there is a caveat, namely that Muslims must submit to those values and norms 
embedded in the French social and civic contract. As a consequence, there is a small 
space for foreign cultures and identities, which promote values in conflict with the 
principle of Republicanism and secularism.  
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Integration can be only achieved through the complete ‘inclusion’ within the 
French political system and the French political community. This universal 
condition to inclusion excludes any form of multicultural society. Indeed, diversity, 
which is not French, may just be tolerated but certainly it cannot be recognized by 
the State. For this reason, it can be argued that Sarkozy’s discourse – despite the 
term is not mentioned – it has a clear assimilationist nature (Brubaker 2001: 535).  
 
This approach of universal inclusion can work with the first generation of 
immigrants, as they tend to adapt, transform or deny their own identity during the 
process of integration. There is only a substantial level of exclusion for those 
newcomers that do not want to change their inner values. However, this approach 
can be a problematic limit in absorbing any religious, political, or cultural features 
related to the identity of the second generation of Muslim immigrants. A large part 
of this group is inclined to emphasise its cultural diversity through public self-
assertion; young Muslim women who ask to be allowed to wear the veil at school or 
in public are an example of this process. Therefore, the application of an inflexible 
interpretation of Republicanism and secularism is likely to become more and more a 
source of conflict with the second generation’s need to redefine its identity with 
traditional practices. 
 
A second major implication in this discourse is to imply cohesion but at the 
same time, this hides economic and social problems experienced by Muslims. 
Sarkozy refers to the problem of self-segregation among Muslims in France, through 
what he calls “sectarism” and “tribalism” [35], but he does not address the economic 
causes of this social exclusion. Both the suburban segregation and religious 
radicalisation of Muslims in France have been linked at least in part to social 
exclusion and economic disparity (OSI 2010, Amghar 2007). For many Muslims, 
the appropriate response to such social exclusion, which is a mix between economic 
inequalities and ethnic discrimination, is to “form their own associations based on 
their common identity in Islam” (Maayan 2007: 5). 
 
The French model of civic integration is therefore grounded, on the one 
hand, on the acceptance of a political discourse promoting uniform civic values to 
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produce a normative homogenisation of cultures; on the other hand, this discourse 
lacks of any consideration about economic and social inequalities. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that French Muslim immigrants face greater segregation and social 
exclusion than other minorities (Jackson & Doerschler 2012). It could be debated 
whether those are consequences of the civic contract, but certainly the French model 
of integration does not provide real content to the professed universal values of the 
Republic or concern about the social aspirations of the Muslim population of France. 
 
To sum up, the increased concern within the French public debate about 
Muslim immigration has reinforced a traditional French discourse on the nation-
state that asserts two discursive strategies: firstly, the persuasiveness of 
Republicanism and secularism in shaping the national identity of France; secondly, 
the rejection of any public recognition of ethnic and cultural identities as antithetical 
to the national identity. As a consequence, the integration of Muslims implies 1) the 
personal commitment to French Republican principles; 2) the effective respect of 
secular values and 3) a stronger involvement of the immigrant in French society. 
This last point implies not only an integration process based on the knowledge of 
French values but also on grounds of a high adaption to French national community. 
In this manner, French civic policy aims at absorbing immigrants as completely as 
possible into society – politically, socially and culturally. 
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Chapter Summary 
 
Taking as a nodal point Sarkozy’s editorial published in the Le Monde 
newspaper on 8 December 2009, the analysis developed in this chapter offers a 
reconstruction of the French public debate on integration in the aftermath of the 
Swiss national referendum. 
 
Sarkozy understands that the vote prohibiting the minaret was a response to a 
more multifaceted problem than religious freedom. In his view, Europeans’ anxiety 
over losing their national identities cannot be ignored [31-32]. However, Sarkozy's 
editorial came not only in answer to the concern about the Swiss referendum but in 
the midst of a broader debate over French national identity that was launched by his 
government in October 2009 (Marquand, 2009). This debate was aimed at 
discussing two central questions: “what it means to be French today” and “what 
immigration contributes to French national identity” (Cosgrove, 2010). 
 
The outcome of the content analysis shows an important degree of 
convergence in the mediatisation of Sarkozy’s editorial across Europe. The press not 
only debated Sarkozy’s arguments but also conveyed a general agreement in 
considering the Swiss vote not as an isolated episode of intolerance but as a 
symptom of a deep concern towards the complex problem of immigration. The 
visibility gained through the transnational coverage represented for Sarkozy, a 
political opportunity to use the European public sphere to communicate his agenda 
on the integration of Muslims. This ability of Sarkozy in leading the European 
public debate became clearly evident along the debate on the Burqua Law. 
 
There are three key observations that come out of the Critical Discourse 
Analysis of Sarkozy’s discourse. First, integration is based on universal and already 
accepted normative assumptions on the political and cultural nature of French 
identity. Thus, Sarkozy argues that people need cultural homogeneity, while 
isolationism and self-segregation should be rejected because they are threatening the 
national identity of French society. At the same time, the most important aspect of 
this discourse on integration lies in its potential for discrimination by limiting the 
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affirmation of any other form of diversity that could possibly undermine social 
cohesion and also by producing inflexible hierarchies for identifying acceptable and 
unacceptable cultures and religions. Sarkozy demonstrates this limitation currently 
through the request to Muslim immigrants to adopt only advanced French 
democratic and secular customs. 
 
Second, the French discourse of civic integration implies a one-way process 
that is based on the acceptance of the French identity. Although Republicanism does 
confer equal dignity on all religions, the French model of integration is particularly 
unresponsive when it comes to culture and religion. Especially, it tends to downplay, 
and in some instances to ignore, religious and political distinctions that are peculiar 
to Muslims, no matter how important it is to their faith and practice. The paradoxical 
consequence of this approach is that it promotes exclusion rather than inclusion, an 
integration that is aimed at reinforcing group boundaries rather than promoting full 
social cohesion. 
 
Third, Sarkozy calls for a fight against discrimination towards Muslims, but 
he does not mention the economic problems of immigrants nor include them in his 
discourse on integration. These are issues that may lie at the root of some of the 
current social distress of many urban areas in France, which is a reality of social and 
economic divisions along ethnicity. For this reason, the attempt to consider 
integration only through the achievement of the citizenship certainly confirms 
Republican values, but it has not resolved the social problems of Muslim 
immigrants. These economic divisions and a perceived lack of social opportunities 
for a large part of the Muslim population, especially among those of second 
generation, are the causes of self-segregation in communities shaped by a 
traditionalist Islam. 
 
The next chapter reconstructs the public debate on integration through an 
investigation of Merkel’s speech during the Young Christian Democrats convention 
in 2009. In this speech, the German Chancellor states that Germany’s effort to create 
a multicultural society has "utterly failed," and claims the necessity of defending the 
German identity as a major justification for asking for more social cohesion. 
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Chapter 5: Who Belongs to the German National Community? 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter offers an account of the controversy raised during the speech 
delivered by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel on 16 October 2010, when she 
addressed a meeting of the youth organisation of her conservative Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) party at Potsdam. In her speech, Merkel stated that efforts 
to build a multicultural society in Germany had "utterly failed" [24] and stated: "The 
concept that we are now living side by side and are happy about it does not 
work"[25]. Notably, Merkel’s speech not only supported the failure of Multikulti but 
expanded the view that Muslim immigrants are expected to integrate into German 
culture, Leitkultur and adopt its values. 
 
Merkel’s speech should be considered one of the more important on 
immigration given by a Head of Government in Germany in recent years. In the 
post-war period, any high-level discussion of the role of immigrants has always been 
likely to address only the margins of the political debate in order to avoid any 
controversy. In being careful of the legacy of racial discrimination that resulted in 
the Holocaust, politicians avoided speaking in negative terms of a culturally mixed 
society (Kolb 2008: 5). Hence an open criticism of immigration and 
multiculturalism has long been unthinkable in German public debate. 
 
After reunification and especially since the end of the nineties, there has been 
a upward debate within German society on the proper level of immigration, 
especially regarding Muslims, the effects of immigration, and the degree to which 
Islam can actually be integrated successfully into Germany (Pautz 2005). 
Simultaneously, political debate has also focused on defining the key characteristics 
of German national identity. As a consequence, the concept of Leitkultur, the 
leading German culture, has entered the political debate through conservatives who 
want to define German national identity in a very restrictive way (Pautz 2005: 4). 
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The chapter is divided into four analytical parts. The first part deals with a 
contextualisation of Merkel’s speech and the place of that speech in the general 
debate on integration that took place before the speech and has continued following 
it. The second part focuses on the reconstruction of the discourses relating to the 
German debate on Muslim integration. Starting from Merkel’s speech as the nodal 
point, the analysis evaluates the discourse articulation of the debate and its coverage 
across Europe. The third part is an analysis of the textual features and political 
effects. The last part discusses socio-cultural practice and explores some of the 
assumptions, which are the bases of Merkel’s stance against multiculturalism and 
their limits in defining only a correct way for integrating Muslims. 
 
1. The Political Context of the Debate 
 
This section places Merkel’s speech within the context of the contemporary 
German debate on integration, and aims to identify which political controversies 
have fuelled public opinion anxiety about a more ethnically diverse society and the 
perception of the Muslim community as a ‘problematic’ minority, which cannot or 
do not want to participate in German society. 
 
In Western Germany after World War II, “the concepts of nation, belonging 
and citizenship” were still “determined by the idea of an ethnically homogenous 
community” as a basis for state organisation “defined by descent, [and] a common 
culture and history” (Miera 2007: 3). This restrictive approach to national identity, 
despite its racist aberrations under Nazism, was prolonged by the outcome of the 
division of Germany (Joppke 1996: 468) and the consequent German diaspora. West 
Germany was conceived as the homeland of all Germans and for this reason 
prioritised only the immigration of co-ethnics (Kolb 2008: 5). 
 
Citizenship was recognised through the “principle of descent”, namely ius 
sanguinis (Green 2004: 28) and the naturalisation of immigrants was complex and 
discretionary, which meant that acquiring German nationality was considered an 
exception (Miera 2007: 3). Instead, opening “the national community to foreigners 
would have posed the risk” of redefining national identity and of weakening the 
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German responsibility to its “dispersed and repressed co-ethnics in the East” 
(Joppke 1999: 63). According to Article 116 of the Basic Law (the West German 
Constitution), automatic citizenship was assigned to ethnic German refugees who 
fled from the Communist East. Thus only migrants with German ethnicity 
[Aussiedler] could be fully admitted into the national community (Miera 2007: 3). 
 
The public debate on immigration was thus characterised by the rejection to 
consider Germany as a country of immigrants. Immigrants were called ‘foreigners’ 
[Ausländer] or ‘guest workers’ [Gastarbeiter], mirroring “the general view that they 
did not belong to German society, and would leave the country” (Miera 2007: 4). 
The massive recruitment of “guest-workers in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s did not 
challenge this concept as foreigner workers were regarded as residing temporarily in 
Germany” (Bös 2004) and “immigration policies focused almost absolutely on 
control and return of migrants” (Kurthen 1995: 922-923). As a consequence of this 
view, Germany did not grant permanent residence to migrant workers, thus 
establishing both a guest-worker regime and the priority of German state interests 
over the right to the integration of migrants (Joppke 1999: 98). In fact, conceiving 
the Federal Republic before the reunification as a country of immigration and 
integrating multiple minorities in the national body would have contradicted the 
“Basic Law's conception of a provisional state geared toward the recovery of 
national unity” (Hailbronner 1983: 2113). 
 
It was only after reunification that the public openly considered Germany to 
be a country of immigrants. A new vision about ethnic and cultural diversity was 
thus established based on the incontrovertible evidence that the long-term settlement 
of immigrants and their families was an avoidable reality (Miera 2007: 5). The first 
step towards the adoption of an integration policy was taken in 1991 with the reform 
of the Aliens Act, which has provided an important simplification of the complex 
process of naturalisation (Kurthen 1995: 930). However, the law did not grant any 
status to non-German immigrants; foreign people continued to being considered just 
as ‘aliens’. In addition, the requirements for naturalisation demanded fifteen years of 
residence and the renouncement of their former nationality (Kurthen 1995: 933). As 
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a consequence, most immigrants and their children born in Germany continued to 
remain as foreigners. 
 
The situation changed under the government led by the Greens and the 
Social Democrats – (SPD), which took pro-active steps to reform immigration and 
integration policies. First, the government reformed Nationality Law by recognising 
the principle of ius solis (Farrell 2003:8). In more detail, the new regulation, which 
came into force on 1 January 2000, allowed children of foreigner immigrants to 
obtain citizenship if one parent has been legally resident in Germany for eight years 
(Miera 2007: 5). Second, the 2004 Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) made 
provisions on the entry of foreigners, their residence and asylum procedures (Carrera 
2006: 3). The introduction of this immigration policy marked an important turning 
point compared to the previous legal situation; in fact immigration was finally 
recognised through formal access to the job market and legal equal treatment. 
 
The policy introduced also some measures to promote the civic integration of 
immigrants mainly focused on language acquisition. Primarily, newly arriving 
migrants, apart from citizens of EU-member states and refugees, were obliged to 
take attend the Integrationskurse, a 600 hour program of German language 
instruction and 30 hours of civic instruction (Carrera 2006: 4). According to Joopke 
(2007) the new Integrationskurse, extended to immigrants the same program that 
was established for facilitating the integration of German-ethnic migrants 
(Aussiedler), which originally was not open to non-ethnic immigrant groups such as 
the guest workers. Secondly, the Immigration Act expressed concern for security 
and strengthened counter-terrorism measures to control asylum seekers and 
migrants. A key aspect was the possibility for immigration officials to deport "hate 
preachers" and terror suspects without trial (Gräßler 2006). 
 
Various changes have characterised immigrant policy after the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) led by Merkel won the elections in 2005 and 2007. The 
conservative stance was deeply influenced by a traditional concept of the nation, 
based on traditional “cultural, ethnic and religious” features (Stehle, 2012: 168). 
Although, some of these amendments to the existing legislation were intended to 
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integrate the EU policy guidelines on immigrants and refugees, which have been 
promoted in the name of ‘integration’ (Cheng 2008: 60). 
 
The 2007 reform of the Immigration Act policy introduced an ‘integration 
from abroad’ clause. With this clause, migrants were required to prove to have a 
certain minimal level of knowledge of German as a condition for their admission 
(CMR 2010: 36). Exceptions were granted for non-EU immigrants from Japan, 
Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland and the United 
States of America, who could prove to have the required basic linguistic knowledge 
after entering Germany. This deferential treatment creates a clear discrimination 
between immigrants and especially targets Turks, who are the largest community of 
immigrants. In 2007, the government also reformed the Nationality Act and required 
a nation-wide citizenship test for all applicants starting from 1 September 2008. This 
requirement reversed the law of 1999, which did not request any linguistic or value 
test for naturalisation. According to Cheng (2008: 60), the implication of this 
amendment is to replace the old blood restriction with ‘values.’ 
 
Despite many and quick changes after the reunification on matters of 
citizenship and immigration, a principle, which has remained stable, is that the main 
instruments for integration in German society are civic and language requirements. 
Immigrants are required to learn the German language and to prove their knowledge 
of the national culture and respect of the Constitution (German Federal Foreign 
Office, 2013). However, the are two steps in this process of integration 1) before 
entry, through a basic language course and test to take abroad; 2) and after 
admission through both an advanced language course and an orientation course, 
which conclude in two final tests and together they constitute the integration test. 
 
In conclusion, the political debate on German identity and integration of 
immigrants has been characterised by three different historical periods: First, dealing 
with the German diaspora after 1945; Second, defining a new German national self-
conception after reunification; Third, the civic integration of non-German 
immigrants in contemporary German society. Overall, the German approach to 
integration still considers naturalisation not as an instrument to promote integration 
like in France, but as a final point of a successful process of integration. At the same 
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time, the process of integration requires several tests and a considerable amount of 
cultural adaptation. 
 
2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice 
 
The first step of the empirical analysis is the reconstruction of the discourses 
related to the debate on Muslim integration. Starting from Merkel’s speech 
addressed on 16th October 2009 as the nodal point, the analysis evaluates the 
conditions and practices involved in the enactment and reproduction of the speech. 
This section offers two levels of analysis, namely interdiscursivity, and the 
intertextual chain. Across these two levels, the analysis pays close attention to 
interdiscursive and intertextual analysis, so as to offer a bigger picture of the text in 
terms of how it mutually relates to other discourses held in the public sphere and 
how other discourses actually framed Merkel’s speech. 
 
Interdiscursivity 
 
This analytical level is aimed at investigating how Merkel’s speech is 
established in a specific discursive context and how it can be articulated with other 
discourses. Broadly speaking, the speech is entangled with two discourses, a firm 
critique of multiculturalism and a detailed definition of the features that characterise 
German identity. These two discourses revolve around the question of whether 
German national identity is challenged by the multicultural character of the present 
society (Ichijo, 2011: 77), which is perceived by the public opinion as a more 
ethnically diverse society (Stehle, 2012: 168). 
 
Merkel claims that there are large numbers of immigrant descendants often 
viewed today as a major problem in certain urban areas: “In Frankfurt am Main, 
two-thirds of the children under five years old have migrant backgrounds” [30] and 
“twice as many of them have never graduated from any school” [31] or “never 
finished any vocational education”. Thus, according to Merkel, multiculturalism has 
led to the development of ethnic ghettoes, which has brought a lack of willingness to 
participate in wider social or political life. Civic integration policy is instead recalled 
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to overcome the ineffectiveness of multicultural policies through a social project 
aimed at assimilating within immigrants, the liberal values that identify German, 
European and Western societies. 
 
The discourse on the failure of multiculturalism can be seen as an essential 
response to avoid a conflict between a separatist Muslim community and the liberal 
values at the core of contemporary Germany, such as freedom of speech, secularism, 
gender equality and anti-totalitarianism. This discourse recalls Habermas’ concept of 
constitutional patriotism (1990, 1998) by advocating universal, liberal-democratic 
values as the core of the German Constitution [27, 32]. As a consequence, 
integration is predominantly referred to the “basic norms and values as formulated in 
the constitution, equal rights for men and women, human rights, secularism, a 
certain knowledge of the history of our country which would then lead to the 
rejection of anti-Semitism” (Lofink 2005: 84). At the same time, these aspects are 
strategically opposed “towards Muslim migrants who are accused of lacking these 
attributes” (Miera 2007: 10). 
 
Second, the denunciation of multiculturalism failure is strictly connected to 
the vision of national identity and conceptualisation of German leading culture. 
Following German re-unification, concepts of “political identity and national 
culture” experienced significant redefinition (Stehle 2012: 168) along with the 
necessity to “re-establish a ‘normal’ German national consciousness cleared of the 
memory of the Holocaust” (Pautz 2005: 41). This normal consciousness began in the 
early 1980’s and continued after the reunification (Williams, Bishopa & Wighta 
1996: 215-216) with the emergence of the Leitkultur discourse as the substitute for 
the disqualified discourse on nationhood. 
 
The Leitkultur discourse was first introduced in 1998 by the German-Arab 
sociologist, Bassam Tibi as a cosmopolitan discourse based on the ideals of the 
European Enlightenment - of the precedence of reason over religious revelation and 
dogma, and based on human rights including freedom of religion that resulted in a 
society funded on pluralism and reciprocal tolerance (2001: xvi). Thus, according to 
Pautz (2005), the discourse of Leitkultur is instrumental to full German 
“normalisation” through the undertaking of a two-fold discourse, the goal of which 
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is to put the Holocaust into full historical perspective and thus consign it to a closed 
chapter of German history. The Leitkultur discourse can be also related to the 
discourse on “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 1996). Namely, constitutional 
patriotism presupposes that universal principles recontextualised in the “constitution 
of a community” might develop identification and belonging which go beyond 
“conventional forms of loyalty based on ethnic origins, national culture or religious 
tradition” (Mavelli, 2012: 98). 
 
At the same time, the discourse that underlines Merkel’s assumptions on 
Leitkultur is not based on the emergence of a post-ethnic German society, but 
defines German and European identity as “strongly influenced by the Christian-
Jewish heritage” [29.]. As noted by Habermas (2010), the “arrogant appropriation of 
Judaism” is an incredible “disregard of the fate the Jews suffered in Germany” and 
also a “relapse into an ethnic understanding” of German culture, which is a 
dangerous challenge to the liberal constitution as it is based on a distinction between 
“us” and the foreigners. This attempt is very evident when Leitkultur is defined by 
religion through citing the Judeo-Christian tradition rather than simply German 
culture. As a consequence, it can be argued that the discourse on a Judeo-Christian 
Leitkultur defines a monocultural German society as opposed to a newcomer culture. 
In doing so, this particular discourse on Leitkultur draws distinct boundary lines 
between nationals and Islam with the national body, and excludes Muslims from 
public life if they do not agree to assimilate the values of the majority. 
 
The Leitkultur discourse entered the political debate officially in the fall of 
2000, when the former chairman of the CDU party, Friedrich Merz, called on non-
nationals living in Germany to fully adopt the country's "mature, liberal Leitkultur" 
(quoted in Mittelman 2010: 62). Merz's appeal to the homogenisation of immigrants 
to German society raised concern, even within his own party, but after a few years 
the concept become an acceptable one in the present political debate. The question 
of Leitkultur has also involved a part of the Left; Thilo Sarrazin, an economist and 
member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) denounced in a book (2010) the 
failure of Germany's post-war immigration policies. In particular, he described 
immigrants, especially Arabs and Turks, as reluctant to Leitkultur and argued that: 
“No other religion in Europe makes so many demands. No immigrant group other 
110	  	  
than Muslims is so strongly connected to claims on the welfare state and crime” 
(Sarazin 2010b). As a consequence of his assumptions, Sarazin advocates restrictive 
immigration policies in Germany and across Europe to limit Muslims’ presence, as 
Muslim immigrants cost the society more than they can generate in added economic 
value (Sarazin, 2010b). Despite the amount of large criticism, he obtained a great 
consensus in a large part of the German population including Social Democrats (The 
Independent, 2011). 
 
This dispute over Sarazin’s thesis inspired the former German President, 
Christian Wulff (Christian Democratic Union - CDU), to dampen the debate by 
stating that Islam was part of Germany. Specifically, on October 4, 2010, during his 
speech on the anniversary of German unification, Wulff affirmed in front of the 
Parliament, that in addition to Christianity and Judaism, “Islam also belongs in 
Germany” (Reuters, 2010b). His speech received major applause in the Bundestag, 
and “yet just a few days later, many on the conservative side of German politics and 
society” appeared to be very unsettled by it (Spiegel Online, 2010a, 2011). 
 
Shortly after Wulff’s speech, different conservative leaders firmly reacted 
against the thesis that Islam can be considered part of the German nation. For 
example, the General Secretary of the CDU, Herman Gröhe, or the Christian 
Democratic Union Bavarian Governor, Horst Seehofer, both stressed the importance 
of preserving the German Leitkultur (Spiegel Online 2010b, 2010c). Also, Merkel 
did not escape the opportunity to refer to the Leitkultur. In November 2009, one 
month after the Potsdam speech, at the CDU Annual Conference in Karlsruhe, she 
recalled the "Christian view of mankind" but also the Germans’ “Judeo-Christian 
tradition” [christlich-jüdischen Leitkultur], specifically declaring that Germany 
needs more public discussion "about the values that guide us and about our Judeo-
Christian tradition" (Merkel, 2010: 27). 
 
Certainly, references to Christian roots are standard in the Christian 
Democratic Party, but these references are not used anymore to define a common 
tradition that defined a Christian democratic political tradition, rather they have been 
used as a divisive concept, explicitly based on the assumption that Islamic culture 
cannot be integrated into European culture. On November 16, 2010, the CDU passed 
111	  	  
at the 23rd Annual Party Conference a resolution titled “Future Responsibility” 
[Parteitages der CDU Deutschlands Verantwortung Zukunft] in which it stressed 
that German culture is based on the "Christian-Jewish tradition, ancient and 
Enlightenment philosophy and the nation's historical experience" (CDU, 2010: 2). 
 
The resolution also states that "Our country benefits from immigrants who 
live and work here. But Germany does not benefit from a minority that refuses to 
integrate, does not want to learn our language, and denies participation and 
advancement to their children. … We expect that those who come here will respect 
and recognise our cultural identity" (CDU 2010: 2). This resolution explicitly 
marginalises Islam, as it underlines the fact that Islam is not part of German roots 
and is viewed as an immigrant religion belonging to those who do not want to 
integrate into German culture. 
 
Such a strong emphasis on the Judeo-Christian tradition of German identity 
can be also found in a resolution approved in November 2011 at the 24th Annual 
Party Conference of the CDU. Titled “A Strong Europe – A Bright Future for 
Germany”, the resolution says “Europe is a community of values. This holds true 
despite all the diversity and differences that exist between its various Member 
States”, yet European identity is “unified by our common roots of Greek philosophy, 
Roman law, Christianity and Judaism, along with the liberal spirit of the 
Enlightenment” (CDU 2011:4). Indeed, this document reconfirms the concept 
elaborated a year earlier, but in using a rescaled perspective, it universalises the 
concept of a leading cultural identity in the national discourse, which does exclude 
Islam, but unifies the other different traditions of philosophical thought. 
 
The Leitkultur discourse is certainly relevant in framing the debate on 
immigration, but it is not established as a concrete political goal to change the 
legislation on immigration. It is rather a mode to organise ways of thinking and 
talking about the integration of immigrants into Germany. There are also two 
important limitations in the political framework of Germany that constrain any 
repressive development of the discourse of Leitkutur. 
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Firstly, the German constitutional framework has understandably created a 
greater institutional sensibility towards ethnic or religious discriminations. As a 
consequence, the constitutional court would reject any policies targeting minorities. 
Secondly, the federal legislative framework makes it difficult to implement common 
policies within different Landers as the constitution does not allow for a centralised 
policy to override the autonomy of single German states. A large amount of political 
power is decentralised and respects the different sensibilities concerning integration 
policies. 
 
As a consequence, despite a very tough public debate, the Leitkultur 
discourse is more focused in defining a shared consensus toward a very abstract self-
definition of national identity rather than excluding Muslim immigrants through 
specific laws and policies. At the same time, this political discourse risks reinforcing 
a problematic perception of integration, as Muslims are automatically seen as 
opposed to those specific values identified in the German nation. Thus, those tests to 
evaluate the level of integration can be seen as an attempt to realise German 
Leitkultur ideals. 
 
To sum up, three discourses emerge from Merkel’s speech: First, the 
discourse on the failure of multiculturalism reveals a political assumption that there 
is only one correct method to integrate Islam and rejects any recognition of other 
integration perspectives. Second, the leading aspects of German identity are defined 
through its own historical national specificity, which universalises the particular 
values, rules and norms of a European civilisation influenced by Christian-Jewish 
heritage. 
 
Intertextual Chain  
 
The objective here is to analyse how the nodal point is disseminated and 
recontextualised across the European press. The outcome reveals the role that 
national press can have in selecting and disseminating topics through the European 
public sphere. There are some preliminary considerations to make about the analysis 
of this speech. 
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Merkel’s speech in Potsdam has become very well known in Germany, and 
also across Europe for the controversy it provoked. Despite a large number of 
comments and editorials published, the full transcript of the speech is not available, 
and it has never been translated into other languages (see the full transcript and 
translation I provided here in the appendix 2). As a consequence, Merkel’s speech is 
a highly mediatised political communication, which gained enormous coverage 
across Europe and beyond, but it is plausible to assume that few people had a real 
chance to listen to that speech. 
 
Many of the ensuing articles in the European press were mostly based on that 
one small passage from Merkel’s speech, which was taken out of context because of 
the sensationalism of some of her claims and thus perhaps undervaluing or ignoring 
the nuances and complexities of Merkel’s stated arguments. Press coverage is thus 
partial and done in snippets. All the articles refer to just the excerpt where Merkel 
firmly attacked multiculturalism for being an utter failure. 
 
Another controversial excerpt refers to the Christian roots of Germany. 
Precisely, the AFP reports this in relation to Merkel’s statement: "We feel attached 
to the Christian concept of mankind, which is what defines us. Anyone who doesn't 
accept that is in the wrong place here” (AFP, 2010). However, this quotation does 
not appear in the original speech given in Potsdam on 16 October 2010 [Appendix 
2]. According to the Deutsche Welle, the statement was actually delivered the day 
before at another regional conference3 of the CDU in Berlin (Schrader, 2010). The 
quotation remains original, although certainly, the misattribution is unprofessional. 
The replication that this error had across European press proves once again, the 
extent that the national public spheres are more and more interconnected. 
 
On the Internet, I found the full video of the speech that is clearly in German 
and almost 40 minutes long on YouTube4 under the Junge Union (Youth Christian 
Democrats) channel. I also found several shorter clips available online, which are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 "Wir fühlen uns dem christlichen Menschenbild verbunden. Das ist das, was uns ausmacht." Wer 
das nicht akzeptiere, "der ist bei uns fehl am Platz". (Schrade/DW, 2010). 
4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WaEg8aM4fcc 
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different lengths, generally between 50 and 80 seconds and in some cases are 
dubbed or subtitled. However, I was able to access all of the videos, which always 
included the same passage on multiculturalism from minute 45 of the integral video: 
"At the start of the [19]60s we invited the guest-workers to Germany. We kidded 
ourselves for a while that they wouldn't stay, that one day they'd go home. That isn't 
what happened. And of course the tendency was to say: let's be 'multikulti' and live 
next to each other and enjoy being together, [but] this concept has failed, failed 
utterly." As a consequence, the dissemination of these videos through the Internet 
and social media remains based only on a small passage of the broader speech. 
 
In regards to the press coverage, I collected 58 articles from leading national 
newspapers in France, Germany and the UK through the Nexis and Factiva 
databases for seven days between 17 and 24 October. The corpus distribution (table 
5.1) shows a wide amount of coverage across the three countries. Clearly, the 
German sample is overrepresented (27 articles and 11 newspapers) but interestingly 
the ratio is slightly higher than the French one (+0.3). While the British sample has a 
medium size but a lower ratio, it reveals that many newspapers published just one 
article on Merkel’s speech. Conversely, in France, each newspaper published more 
than two articles. 
 
Table 5.1 
Merkel	   France	   Germany	   UK	  
Articles	   13	   27	   18	  
Sources	   6	   11	   12	  
Ratio	   2.17	   2.45	   1.50	  
 
 
In the second step of the analysis, I have indexed the thematic dimensions 
(TD), which have been prioritised (table 5.1). These dimensions refer to the main 
line of argumentation employed by the press to define the relevant themes adopted 
by the press in the coverage of the nodal point and provide a basis for indexing and 
quantitatively analysing the level of convergence in the European public sphere. 
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According to the model proposed in chapter 3, I have considered seven 
thematic dimensions: first, the membership, which includes references to 
citizenship, civic duties and respect of the Constitution. Second, the issue of 
religious diversity debated as a difference to tolerate rather than as a pluralist 
encounter. Third, the cultural tradition dimension, which covers references to ‘our 
traditions’ and ‘our values’ that define Germany as a monocultural society, based on 
a common past, common traditions and an apparently homogeneous and coherent 
value system. The fourth category relates to the national identity dimension and 
refers to feelings of belonging to the German nation. Fifth, the thematic dimension 
of Europe includes references to the EU, but also to a European moral community 
and German’s position in relation to it. Sixth, the securitisation of ethnic relations 
includes the risks concerning urban segregation, the highest level of delinquency but 
also religious radicalism. Yet, social justice refers to social and economic 
inequalities, which can explain the problems faced by Muslim immigrants in their 
process of integration. 
 
Table 5.2 
Thematic	  Category	   France	   Germany	   UK	   Avg.	  
1.	  Membership	   11	   26	   12	   16.3	  
2.	  Religious	  diversity	   9	   13	   9	   10.3	  
3.	  Cultural	  tradition	   11	   26	   16	   17.6	  
4.	  National	  identity	   8	   25	   9	   14.0	  
5.	  European	  perspective	   10	   14	   13	   12.3	  
6.	  Securitization	   11	   24	   17	   17.3	  
7.	  Social	  Justice	   3	   11	   7	   7.0	  
 
These categories refer to the main line of argumentation employed by the 
press and reveal to what extent the national press can have a specific role in 
selecting and disseminating a nodal point. I coded more than one thematic 
dimension for each article. It is possible to see through the distribution in Table 5.1 
how all the thematic categories are consistent in the three countries, while national 
identity (TC 4) is more relevant just in the German debate. Overall, it can be argued 
that the European press agrees with Merkel that immigration is problematic as it is 
creating a self-segregated community (TC6) especially among Muslims, and 
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therefore newcomers have to integrate themselves (TC 1) and respect the norms of 
the countries where they live. Here is the outbreak of the most common claims:  
 
• Ethnic ghettos are a social problem (TC 6); 
• Countries have the right to set requirements for immigration (TC 1, 3, 5, 6);  
• Immigrants should master national language (TC 1, 5, 6); 
• Subsidising immigrants’ program for integration is not sufficient (TC 1, 7); 
• Muslims have to abandon practices, such as forced marriages (TC 1, 2, 6); 
• Government needs to encourage the training of Muslim clerics (TC 2, 6) 
• Immigrants cannot exploit and weigh down the welfare system (TC 6, 7);  
 
The claim on multiculturalism was certainly the most divisive in the press 
coverage. Although commentators converge on the fact that ‘ghettos’ are a serious 
social problem (TC 6) in many urban areas of Europe, a large part of the press does 
not see multicultural policies as being responsible for this urban segregation. Liberal 
and moderate newspapers openly contest the claim on multiculturalism, but for 
different reasons. In fact, the former are more willing to accentuate that Germany is 
already a multicultural society, and the latter raises doubt as to whether Germany 
has ever adopted multicultural policies. Instead, conservative newspapers and 
tabloids tend to agree with Merkel on the failure of multiculturalism. 
 
I found further differences at the level of contestation between internal and 
foreign debate. In the German press, liberal newspapers tend to question Merkel’s 
argument because they generally reject the very concept of German Leitkultur 
[Appendix 5: DE #11, #14, #18]. A very different position comes from business 
press, which conceivably is more concerned with the fact that German industry and 
the economy need workers from abroad [Appendix 5: DE#13, #14, #15]. In 
particular, it is underlined that immigration has been extremely regulated in 
Germany; as a consequence any attempt to represent immigration as uncontrolled 
does not correspond to the reality. In France and the UK, press agreement seems to 
focus on the fact that Merkel’s tone was intentionally exasperated for electoral 
reasons in order to distract the public opinion from the real economic problems of 
Germany and the Eurozone [Appendix 5: FR #5, #6, #13,  UK#12, #13, #15]. 
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The outcome of the content analysis shows an important degree of 
convergence in the mediatisation of Merkel’s speech and a convergence in framing 
some of the underlining themes. This convergence represented for Merkel an 
unexpected communicative success, as its speech did not address a European public. 
However, the statement on multiculturalism generated controversy across Europe 
and in some cases also beyond. Although there is common agreement on the fact 
that ‘ethnic ghettos’ are a serious social problem in many urban areas of Europe, 
large parts of the press do not see multicultural policies as being responsible for this 
urban segregation. At the same time, it can be argued that the press agrees with 
Merkel that newcomers have to integrate themselves and respect the norms of the 
countries where they live. 
 
3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimisation 
 
This section examines the textual aspects of discourse practice through a 
clearer understanding of the meanings of text. The analytical model proposed in the 
present section puts forward a general overview about the textual features, and a 
second stage that focuses on the political effects of that textual practice through an 
assessment of the Othering and legitimation strategies on which the text is based and 
can thus be interpreted.  
 
First of all, the textual analysis was conducted on an English translation of 
the Merkel speech. As underscored already, this analysis is not aimed at 
investigating linguistic features of the German language, but rather to understand the 
arguments and the logic behind the German discourse on integration as presented by 
Merkel in her speech. In doing so, I offer a transcript of the speech fully translated in 
English [Appendix 2]. This text is the corpus of the analysis for the present chapter. 
As a consequence, some micro-textual features are lost in the present analysis, due 
to the translation. In addition, the complexity of the German language, such as its 
preference for composed words, cannot be translated into English. For this reason, 
the analysis of this speech pays more attention to the features of the text that are 
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most relevant in any macro-analysis, rather than an absolute microanalysis of the 
text.  
 
The style of this political statement is a traditional public speech addressed to 
a Party Convention. This type of communication fulfils a ritual function of any 
party; it tends to be mainly celebrative in its overall communicative purpose. As a 
consequence, the speech shows highly conventionalised features, which characterise 
a speech delivered at party conventions. For example, the speech begins with a 
traditional greeting “Dear friends of the Young Union [Junge Union]” [1] and a 
closure of “heartfelt thanks” [34]. Successively, the first paragraph is based on 
personal anecdotes, which is a classical rhetorical strategy aimed at obtaining the 
attention of the audience. In succession, the speech is arranged in coherent thematic 
sections of different lengths, but the flow from paragraph to paragraph is made 
through a strong argumentative logic. 
 
The speech can thus be divided into nine thematic segments: 1) greetings and 
introduction [1]; 2) a contextualisation of the role of the CDU in German history 
from the Cold War to the present [2-3], which has a celebrative function; 3) a 
contextualisation of present and future problems for Germany [5- 7]; 4) an analysis 
of the role of Germany in Europe [8-10]; 5) the explanation of what the central 
mission is for an industrial country [11-15] and 6) how the welfare state has to be 
reconsidered [16-24]. In the middle of the speech, there is a break of some seconds, 
which is also a rhetorical device to regain the attention of the audience, before 
Merkel introduces a second opening 7) in which [25-28] she celebrates again the 
Party, by recalling the historical leaders, their role after reunification and the leading 
principles of equalities shared by all Christian Democrats. In section 8, she recalls 
the German President’s statement about the role of Islam in Germany and moves to 
the problem of immigrant integration and multicultural policies [29-33].  
 
When looking at the length of these thematic sections, the clusters 
concerning the Welfare state [16-24] and immigration [29-33] are certainly the 
largest, with 8 paragraphs for the welfare section and 5 paragraphs for the section on 
immigration. These two sections are not only consecutive, but also linked through a 
short digression [25-28] in which Merkel declares both the political agenda of her 
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government as a necessity to assure Germany a future and a role in the World [25] in 
accordance with the Christian values of the CDU [26, 28]. In the conclusion [34], 
Merkel ends her speech by challenging the audience regarding the importance of 
taking action according to their Christian Democratic values, which lead the CDU 
party. 
 
Concerning the Othering, the aim herein is to examine the construction of the 
Other through those textual features that emphasise social identities and collective 
values. First of all, it is interesting to note how Merkel does not speak directly to 
Muslims or immigrants. For example, in the sentence: “Because the ones who we 
want to integrate, those are the ones who need examples to follow” [31], the “We” is 
opposed to the “ones”. The "We" is clearly the German people, which have the role 
to integrate the “ones”. However, the “ones” is not clearly identified through any 
ethnic or religious group, it represents an abstract Other. In this way, Merkel is more 
prudent than Sarkozy in addressing the Muslims. She prefers talking of the “ones” 
who Germany has to integrate [31.] However in the speech, there are many elements 
that clarify that this Other is made up of Muslim immigrants, especially when she 
claims that immigrants have to assume secular values and traditions [30]. 
 
Merkel refers quite often to a Christian identity to define the in-group. 
However, this speech was delivered to a convention of a party, the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU), which from its very name, declares its own Christian 
roots. These references can be considered as coherent with the political space in 
which the speech was given. As a consequence, when Merkel mentions a “Christian 
image of human beings” [26] or the “Christian Democratic understanding of people” 
[28], her attempt is not actually aimed at excluding those who are not Christian. 
Instead, she seems to be referring to the CDU political tradition, which does try to 
apply Christian values to public policy decisions.  
 
Merkel, in fact, recognises that “Islam is a part of Germany” [29]. Indeed, 
she agrees with German President Wulff, who had said that Islam belonged in 
Germany. At the same time, she believes “that our culture is strongly influenced by 
the Christian-Jewish heritage” [29]. In this way, she reinforces the dynamic of Self 
and Other by defining the Self as being deeply tied to Judeo-Christian legacy and 
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the Other through highly stereotypical assumptions on Muslims. For example, 
Merkel recognises that “we” have received various different contributions from the 
“Arabic territory” [29] like “algebra and astronomy” [29]. However she does not 
make any specific distinction within Islam [29] between Mediterranean, Arab or 
Turkish, as for her, these distinctions in culture or religion or both are not relevant, 
because all are opposed to the concept of German Leitkulture. In other words, 
Merkel is more interested in offering an essentialist definition of Muslims as a non-
European Other.  
 
This last consideration is especially important because it reveals how Merkel 
tries to establish a discursive strategy based on the “positive self- and negative 
Other-presentation” (Woodak, 2007: 333).  As a consequence, when Merkel speaks 
of a "Christian culture" in the country, she seeks also to create differentiation by 
conferring identity and political status on Christian Germans and opposes it for 
those who do not have Christian values. However, she clearly abuses some religious 
concepts, in fact, it is not always very clear what Merkel defines as “Christendom” 
[29] or the "Christian image of human beings" [26]. Nor is it evident to what extent, 
she believes that Christian values are compatible with Jewish ones.  
 
As Habermas (2010: paragraph 17) correctly denounced, the discourse on 
“Judeo-Christian” is a political attempt to recontextualise the old, formerly defamed, 
anti-Semitic discourses in order to stigmatise a new minority, namely, the Muslims. 
Indeed, any appeal to Judeo-Christian traditions is manipulative and instrumental, 
because it wants to exploit the Jewish question against Islam, and to make Muslims 
incompatible with German Leitkultur and central for a society based on the 
construction of “in- and out-groups” (Woodak & de Cillia 2007: 333).  
 
At the same time, the Leitkulturdebatte can also be explained as the attempt 
to re-establish a German identity within a wider European context (Pautz 2005), thus 
allowing Germany to reconstruct an acceptable German national consciousness. For 
example, Merkel claims the goal of Germany is to promote the image of an open and 
tolerant country present in Europe. She also adds the importance of Europe for 
Germany: “our coexistence in Europe... Europe is our present and our future” [8]. 
Furthermore, she asks “Is Germany still European?” and answers “of course” [9]. 
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She also admits how “the unifying of Europe has helped us [Germany]” [32]. In this 
way, Merkel seeks to establish a national identity and consciousness within the on-
going European debate over the roots of European civilisation.  
 
At the level of legitimisation, the analysis focuses on the strategies of 
legitimisation through references to authority or power. Precisely, the aim is to 
identify how the text provides a particular social structuring of discourse to become 
universal and thus a part of the legitimising system that sustains the discourse of 
civic integration. 
 
Merkel legitimises integration through the need of more social cohesion and 
responsibility among Muslims. Specifically, she claims that it would be nice to “live 
happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other” [31]. But she argues 
that Germany is broadly secular, believes in gender and social equality, and does 
allow dissent and ideological irreverence. Islam, on the other hand, is widely 
interpreted as prescribing a precise society based on religious precepts, preaches 
gender inequality, and endorses hierarchy, absolutism, and asceticism [32]. 
Moreover, Muslim culture is lead by an assertive culture, characterized by an intense 
religious and social control, which is bent on changing its own.  
 
Integration, according to Merkel, requires that Muslims accept that 
democratic and secular institutions come before any religious statements. The 
consequence, according to Merkel, is that German society cannot let its values be 
undermined: "it's important in regard to Islam that the values represented by Islam 
correspond with our Constitution" [32]. Specifically, she argues the problem of 
integration of Muslims is not based on the practice of religion, but rather on the 
respect by Muslims of the liberal values expressed in the German constitution. For 
example, she says it is “girls must go on school trips, participate in physical 
education; as for forced marriages we want nothing to do with that; it’s incompatible 
with our legislation” [32.]. For these reasons, Merkel sees in education the proper 
way to integrate Muslims into German society. 
 
A second aspect of the legalization strategy is based on the need of more 
vigilance and control against to prevent insecurity. Talking of the urban segregation 
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of immigrants, Merkel says that immigrant youth break the law 6, 8, or 9 times 
before going to court [33] or that police officers “can't enter” these segregated areas 
where immigrants live [33]. More precisely, according to Merkel, the lack of 
integration regarding immigration involves the risk of immigrants becoming socially 
isolated because there are large chances to live with the German ‘Other’ in a 
‘parallel society’, where German cultural norms might become faraway [30]. 
 
A last aspect of the legitimisation of integration is based on an economic 
rationale, which assumes the need of integration in order to preserve German 
economic development [5]. In her speech, Merkel recalls the history of 
contemporary German immigration and specifically Turkish immigration, when she 
states “we are a country that, that at the beginning of the 1960's brought guest 
workers to Germany—and now they live with us” [30]. Specifically, after WWII, 
Germany accepted immigrants to fill the lack of labour, due to the nation’s war 
dead. Initially, immigrants were from Europe, yet afterwards, Germany had to open 
its borders also to Turks and others to satisfy the demand for workers. 
 
To sum up, through the process of Othering, Merkel tries to establish a 
collective identity through the use of “We” to identify all those people who 
recognise the Christian roots of Germany. In Merkel’s speech, one can identify a 
process of Othering through a definition of the boundary between insiders and 
outsiders. As a consequence, integration is legitimated by the necessity to protect 
Germany’s cultural, political and economic features. At the same time, this 
legitimisation is often premised upon a fear of Islam due to the incompatibility of 
some Muslim practices with the German legal system. Therefore, vigilance and 
regulation are essential, since Muslims tend to live in segregated area and are 
inclined to fanaticism. Finally, Merkel’s legitimisation of integration also has an 
economic instrumental function, which is to guarantee Germany’s social security.  
 
4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice 
 
The goal of analysing the social practice is to underline the social and 
political implications of the discursive structure under analysis. Specifically, the 
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analysis will focus on three critical considerations: 1) the normative ambivalence in 
the German politics of identity and its limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of 
the European self; 2) the debate on the integration of Muslims as a central part of the 
process of regulation of immigration and 3) any hidden political or economic 
rationality underlining the discourse of civic integration. 
 
Merkel makes it clear that immigrants will likely stay and more will continue 
to arrive in Germany, as “immigration is an irreversible process especially because 
Germany needs immigration for supporting its economy and its manufacturing 
industry” [32] and the “amount of people with a migration background among the 
younger population is increasing, not decreasing” [30]. Although the effect of a lack 
of integration is creating social problems in many urban areas, Merkel does not 
follow an anti-immigration discourse. According to her, in fact the right solution 
would not be to block immigration, as she clearly recognises the “economic” 
importance of immigration, which is central for Germany in a globalised world [5]. 
Yet, Merkel demands more effort from Muslim immigrants to integrate themselves 
in German society and have them accept the values that characterise German 
cultural identity [Leitkultur]. Therefore, Merkel suggests that there is a specific 
moral right for a host society to ask for and expect more integration from 
newcomers. 
 
Merkel advocates for a model of integration in which immigrants are an 
integral part of the society, hence “integration is a central theme” [30] for the 
realisation of a cohesive society. But she is very firm in evaluating multicultural 
policies as a failure because these policies allow foreigner cultures to remain 
separate and justify the non-acceptance of shared values. Instead, her approach to 
integration focuses on a pedagogic process, which addresses the newcomer towards 
positive models. However, this approach does not suggest a reciprocal learning 
between the majority and immigrants, but rather an ambiguous attitude centred on a 
universal and superior morality of the German society. In her words, those “we want 
to integrate” are those who need “examples to follow” [30]. This last statement 
uncovers the one-way conceptualisation of Merkel’s model of integration, in which 
the newcomer does not have any subjectivity. 
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The subsequent debate thus presupposes the ability of the state to define 
which values are acceptable and compatible with German national identity and 
which are not. As a consequence, the universality of liberal principles becomes more 
of a myth for those immigrants who have a dissonant identity that cannot be 
conciliated within German national culture [Leitkultur]. This point confirms the 
withdraw from any engagement with the newcomer. The immigrant is perceived as 
‘alien’ element that could challenge the original and preferred sense of German 
nation, if the state does not contribute to his moral education. Thus, when Leitkultur 
is recontextualised into the discourse on civic integration, it becomes a strict 
prescription of how the immigrant has to change for not being considered a 
foreigner, but at the same time restrains any possible affirmation of a non-German 
identity. 
 
Merkel does not simply concern herself with the cultural and religious values 
of immigrants, but also focuses heavily on the socioeconomic integration of 
immigrants through their active participation in the labour market. In Merkel’s 
discourse, there is a clear obligation for immigrants to contribute to German welfare. 
To be more precise, Merkel’s speech takes into account, immigrants’ individual 
responsibility towards the political community: “Each individual is important for us, 
each individual, that is our goal, will get a chance in our country” [27] or “you will 
be supported when you are in a situation of need but we also have a demand for you 
that each of you, who can, contributes to society” [22]. Individual responsibility is 
thus central in the process of integration, and the immigrant must be held 
individually accountable of his own integration, while the collective community 
cannot be responsible of immigrants’ actual needs. 
 
Civic integration, as defined by Merkel, thus constrains the process of 
integration into an economic rationality, which focuses on maintaining a stable 
political environment in order to guarantee the desired economic progress that 
Germany wants. As a consequence, multiculturalism is considered a failure because, 
in granting specific rights to collective groups, it weakens individual responsibility. 
In fact, multicultural policies, according to Merkel, do not enforce the acceptance of 
good citizenship by immigrants and also do not encourage them to have full 
consideration of their responsibilities towards the welfare of the nation. 
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To summarise, in this analysis of the socio-cultural practice of discourse, it 
was possible to find out how the German discourse on civic integration is entangled 
with two discursive strategies aimed at politicising the national identity and 
providing economic rationality to the need for a civic identity. As a result, only the 
assimilation of civic values is considered central to effective integration and the 
support for welfare policies that fully guarantee real social integration can be easily 
rejected because it does not bring a specific contribution to economically advance 
the nation. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
Taking as a nodal point the speech that Chancellor Merkel offered at a 
meeting of the youth organisation of her conservative party in Potsdam in October 
2010, the analysis developed in this chapter offers a reconstruction of the public 
debate across Europe after Merkel’s speech. 
 
The analysis of the national press proves there was a significant degree of 
convergence in the mediatisation of Merkel’s speech. In particular, the claim that 
any attempt to build a multicultural society in Germany has failed received the 
largest amount of coverage. Despite the fact that the press accepts the premises of 
Merkel’s argument, namely that ‘ethnic ghettos’ are a serious social problem for 
public order in many cities of Europe, large parts of the moderate and liberal 
newspapers do not see multicultural policies as the main cause of this segregation, 
rather they question the poor level of social integration that German policies have 
promoted. At the same time, press across Europe agree with Merkel on the fact that 
immigrants have to integrate themselves and respect norms of the countries where 
they live. 
 
There are three key observations that come out of the Critical Discourse 
Analysis. First, central to Merkel’s speech there is an explicit attempt to universalise 
the acceptable values, rules and norms of the German majority through the cultural 
and religious identity that characterise the national community. At the same time, 
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this so-called Leitkultur can become an inflexible cultural-national discourse that 
determines which forms of diversity are compatible or appropriate within Germany. 
 
Second, Merkel’s speech undertakes a moral duty on behalf of the dominant 
cultural majority to determine the limits and obligations of the Muslim, who needs 
to abandon those practices and values that are incompatible with German legislation 
such as forced marriage. Certainly, this last point can be easily agreed, but the 
politicisation of the German national culture reduces those immigrants who want to 
express a different cultural identity like Muslims to a political problem. 
 
Third, it is a real contradiction that a public discourse aimed at asking for 
more unity and cohesion to immigrants, especially Muslims, is then supported by 
such a restrictive assumption of the national culture. Merkel invokes integration as a 
liberal democratic principle but then, the national cultural domain, which remains 
based on an ethnic-religious identity, prescribes what inner values are acceptable in 
the immigrant. 
 
In the next chapter, the third and last case study analyses the debate 
generated by the British Prime Minister on the occasion of the 2010 Munich 
Security Council, when David Cameron delivered a provocative speech on the 
failings of state multiculturalism. The aim here is to examine not only how Cameron 
echoes Merkel’s speech, but also how he suggests that Britain has to integrate 
Muslim people through a “muscular” integration based on imposing liberal values 
codified in the British national identity. 	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Chapter 6: The Doctrine of “Muscular” Liberalism 
 	  
Chapter Overview 
 
A few months after Merkel’s controversial statement that multicultural 
society in Germany had “utterly failed” [Appendix 2], David Cameron gave a 
speech on 5 February 2011 [Appendix 3] at the International Security Policy 
Conference held in Munich. In this speech, Cameron argues that multicultural 
policies are responsible for creating “separateness" rather than an encouragement of 
immigrant participation in society [8]. Moreover, Cameron is concerned that the 
marginalisation of Muslims creates a fertile terrain for extremism, as radical 
Islamists can find new supporters within disaffected Muslim youth. For this reason, 
Cameron claims that multicultural policies should be replaced with a new policy 
aimed at promoting British values within the Muslim population in the UK. 
 
Specifically, he states that a “tolerant society” is passive and neutral to 
values and for this reason, it cannot integrate immigrants and therefore leaves them 
alone [16], while a “muscular” liberal society should encourage “active participation 
in society” in order to achieve integration through “true cohesion” [17]. 
Consequently, Cameron calls for a policy of “muscular liberalism” [16] to guarantee 
that Muslims respect national British “core values” such as democracy, equality 
before the law and human rights. In this manner, Cameron’s discourse on civic 
integration argues for explicit emphasis to be placed on the need for Muslims to 
adopt liberal values. 
 
This speech is treated here as a nodal point of the British public debate on the 
integration of Muslims because it magnifies the recent shift in the British approach 
to integration. The traditional British model of integration was considered pluralist 
because it was established on the importance of minority groups and stressed 
importance “on integration, not as a process of acculturation to the nation and civic 
values, but as a programme of equal access to the rights of British society, which 
itself recognised multiculturalism as a social and political goal” (Bertossi 2007: 4). 
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At the same time, due to the emergence of different controversies related to Muslim 
immigration, such as segregation and extremism, the British model has turned away 
from a pluralist model in favour of a more civic approach (Bertossi 2007: 4), which 
stresses the relevance of common national civic values as a requirement for 
integration. 
 
This chapter has four parts. The first part aims at offering a historical and 
political contextualisation of the debate. The second part focuses on the 
reconstruction of the discourses related to the British debate on Muslim integration. 
Starting from Cameron’s speech, the analysis evaluates the discursive practices 
involved in the enactment of the speech through interdiscursivity and intertextuality. 
The third part is concerned with the textual strategies found in the nodal point. The 
last part offers an explanation of socio-cultural practices and specifically moves to 
examine the political limits in the discursive articulation underlining Cameron’s 
speech. 
 
1. The Political Context of the Debate 	  
In the present section, I review the evolution and arguments of the public 
debate on immigration in order to contextualise the shift from a pluralist to a civic 
model of integration. 
  
In legal terms, the traditional British model of integration implied that 
everyone born in British territories was recognised as having "British subjecthood" 
within the allegiance of the Crown (Hansen, 1999: 69). Thus, the jus solis granted 
British nationality to anyone born in the United Kingdom or one of the Crown 
colonies. The historical reason of why the British model can be identified as 
pluralist is based on the fact that as an empire, Britain did not experience the same 
pressures that led “other countries to a rigorous definition of their nationality”, in 
order to restrict the movement of individuals, especially traders or colonisers (The 
Round Table, 1973: 139). 
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Secondly, as a monarchy, nationality and migration laws were based on 
“allegiance to the Crown”, rather than an attachment to “descent from a particular 
stock” or “a particular territory” (The Round Table, 1973: 139). For these reasons, 
the British model has been always considered as antithetical to the French 
Republican model (Favel, 2001: 4), which is based on a strong political definition of 
individual citizenship as a source of national unity.  
 
Throughout the 1960s, the criteria of nationality and citizenship were still 
codified in the British Nationality Act of 1948 and “post-war migrants who arrived 
in the United Kingdom as ‘British subjects’ have been recognised as ethnic and 
racial minorities requiring state support and differential treatment to overcome 
barriers in their exercise of citizenship” (Meer and Modood 2009: 479). Furthermore 
the government wanted to integrate minorities “into the labour market and other key 
arenas of British society” (Meer and Modood 2009: 479) through several Race-
Relations Acts by promoting equality of opportunity (Lester, 1998).  
 
The British approach to integration was based on a political compromise 
between the Conservative and Labour parties’ on immigration legislation (Hansen 
2000: 144), as an approach to a normalisation of race relations through the 
implementation of antidiscrimination policies. In the words of the Labour home 
secretary Roy Jenkins, Britain set out to create “cultural diversity, coupled with 
equal opportunity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”. Specifically, he defined 
integration “not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, 
accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Jenkins: 
1967: 267).  
 
From the end of the 1960s, the speeches of Enoch Powell, a conservative 
MP, had become very popular in large part due to conservative public opinion, 
which also included traditional Labour supporters within the working-class (Hansen 
2000: 172).  In two of his most famous speeches “There is a Sense of Hopeless” 
(1968a) and the “Rivers of Blood” (1968b), Powell attacked the British Nationality 
Law, which allowed any citizen of the Commonwealth to flee to the United 
Kingdom. 
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 Specifically, Powell addressed his criticism towards the government’s 
decision to accept Indian and Pakistani refugees from Kenya and Uganda and 
predicted violent racial conflicts in the near future as a consequence of this 
continuing influx of immigrants. Moreover, Powell, in the “Rivers of Blood” 
(1968b) addressed a radical critique of the Race Relations Act 1968, which he found 
immoral and offensive as granting the possibility to “immigrant communities” to 
“organise” and “consolidate their members, to agitate and campaign against their 
fellow-citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with the legal weapons” 
(1968b).  
 
As a result of increasing public concern for immigration, the Immigration 
Act 1971, increased controls on immigration and restricted the right of British 
subjects from the Commonwealth to migrate to the UK (Herbert, 2008: 16). 
Specifically, only British subjects with sufficiently strong links to the United 
Kingdom had the right of residence. Afterwards, Thatcher’s government politicised 
the discourse on national identity and the public opinion’s concern for immigration. 
Thus, the reform of the Nationality Law in 1981 gave up the imperial tradition of 
loyalty to the Crown and partially abandoned the jus soli (Hansen 2000: 208). 
 
The first major event that raised concern in public opinion about Muslims 
was the controversy created by the publication of The Satanic Verses in 1988 
(Parekh 2002: 295). After the publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel, the Muslim 
community felt that “as citizens they [were no less] entitled to equality of treatment 
and respect for their customs and religion than either the Christian majority 
denominations or other religious minorities” (Meer and Modood 2007:  5). Thus the 
Rushdie affair revealed the lack of political achievability and public understanding 
faced by Muslim communities in the UK.  
 
As a result, Muslims asked for real accommodation of their religious and 
cultural specificity by the State (Meer 2010: 75).  Conversely, the fact that Muslims 
did not want to assimilate British values if integration required surrendering their 
religious heritage, raised concern in public opinion, which became more and more 
sceptical about the effectiveness of the existing model of integration. In this way, the 
Rushdie’s Affair became a turning point for Islamic presence in Britain because it 
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underlined the lack of understanding and, specially, the lack of sympathy towards 
Muslims’ political visibility. 
 
A second event that highlighted the crisis of integration policies was 
certainly the ethnically-motivated riots in 2001(Bagguley and Hussain 2006:547, 
2008: 1). Although the causes of the riots were based on the deep-rooted segregation 
of South Asian-Muslim communities, which authorities had failed to address for 
generations (Oldham IRP 2001), the media “denounced the refusal of members of 
ethnic minorities to adhere to British identity” and public opinion perceived the 
problem of integration as “a lack of loyalty and civic responsibility” of Muslims 
(Bertossi 2007: 29). 
 
In response to public concern, the New Labour government, under Tony 
Blair, began to focus on policies based on community cohesion (Somerville 2007: 
55), which were aimed at talking about the need to value difference, while 
emphasising a “common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities” (LGA 
2002: 6). This new concern over integration brought the government to review the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 and adopt standardised tests to 
demonstrate knowledge of language and life in the UK. Applicants have to prove “a 
sufficient knowledge” of English or Welsh or Scottish and pass the “life in the 
United Kingdom” test (Life in the UK 2004: 11). In addition, the 2002 Act 
introduced a citizenship oath and pledge to be given in a public citizenship 
ceremony. 
 
The public’s perception of Muslims’ settlement completely deteriorated after 
the terrorist attacks of 7th July 2005. Although the British model of integration has 
been always considered more advanced compared to the mono-cultural models of 
France or Germany, it was second-generation immigrants in a multicultural Britain 
who perpetrated the bombings in London. As a consequence, much of the public 
concern was oriented towards a reconsideration of multiculturalism, which was held 
responsible for Islamic separateness and related to a growing radicalised Muslim 
youth. 
 
132	  	  
In a speech following the 7/7 attacks, Blair argued that the origins of 
extremism were not "superficial but deep" and could be found "in the extremist 
minority that now, in every European city, preach hatred of the West and our way of 
life" (2005). Under his guidance, the Blair government drafted an anti-terror strategy 
titled “Prevent Strategy”, which sought to counter extremism by controlling and 
regulating Muslim organisations (Coolsaet, 2011: 225). At the same time, the 
Labour government “devoted greater attention to what has often been phrased as a 
‘hearts and minds’ approach to Muslim communities”, by enrolling “Muslim 
individuals and community organizations in their efforts to prevent radicalisation 
and promote voices of mainstream Islam amongst the Muslim youth” (McGhee, 
2008: 71). 
 
Labour under Gordon Brown’s leadership, who succeeded Blair as Prime 
Minister, tried to establish specific conservative credentials with an attack on 
immigration and multiculturalism (Alleyne 2011: 101). The aim was to gain an 
electoral consensus on the assumption that people would demand action on 
immigration above all other issues and divert attention away from the economic 
crisis. In a famous speech delivered during the celebration of 300 years of Union 
between England and Scotland in 2007, Brown defined “British identity” through 
the shared values and common interests that characterise Britain institutions. He 
argued that multiculturalism failed to emphasise what ties the country together; thus, 
according to him, multiculturalism became “an excuse for justifying separateness” 
and a “tolerance of – and all too often a defence of – even greater exclusivity” 
(Brown, 2007). 
 
In brief, five different issues have framed the British political debate on 
immigration: Firstly, the main reason why the British model of integration adopted a 
pluralist approach is because most of the immigrants were coming from former 
colonies and as such, were British subjects. Secondly, the fear of uncontrolled 
immigration from the Commonwealth countries brought Britain to reconsider a 
complete revision to the Nationality Law. Thirdly, the Muslims’ request for 
accommodating religious and cultural diversity especially after the Rushdie Affair 
increased the scepticism of public opinion toward multicultural integration. 
Fourthly, the ethnic conflicts during the 2001 riots, shifted immigration policy from 
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a pluralist model to a civic approach to civic integration. Finally, in the post-9/11 
context, the concern for terrorism reinforced the view of Muslims’ lack of loyalty 
and civic responsibility. 
 
2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice 
 
This section looks at the immediate communicative processes of Cameron’s 
speech, in other words, the conditions of social reproduction found in the text. It 
offers two levels of analysis, namely, interdiscursivity and the intertextual chain. 
Across these two levels, the analysis pays close attention to interdiscursive and 
intertextual analysis, so as to offer a bigger picture of the text in terms of how it 
mutually relates to other discourses held in the public sphere and how other 
discourses actually framed Cameron’s intervention. 	  
Interdiscursivity 
 
The objective is to specify how a nodal point is established in a specific 
discursive context and how it can be articulated with other discourses. Moreover, it 
is relevant to analyse how this discursive framework is also translated into concrete 
policies and institutional arrangements aimed at securitising ethnic relations. 
 
Cameron agrees with Merkel that multicultural policies are a failure, because 
it encourages different ethnic groups (especially Muslims) to close themselves off 
from mainstream society. The discourse that Muslims are a self-segregated minority 
can be located in the thesis of ‘parallel lives’ (Philips 2006: 27) that was developed 
in the public inquiry on the 2001 riots (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008; Oldham IRP 
2001), which accused Muslim communities with self-segregation and “adopting 
isolationist practices under a pretence of multiculturalism” (Meer and Moodod 2009: 
481). According to Cameron, multicultural policies cause urban segregation, which 
causes some disaffected youth to reject the interpretation of a moderate Islam and to 
adopt a more radical interpretation. In this way, it is possible to identify a set of 
three discourses to which Cameron draws to in his speech. 
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First, Cameron attacks multiculturalism for destabilising and accentuating 
both exclusion and radicalism within immigrant groups. Multiculturalism is seen as 
leading to the development of an unwillingness to participate in wider social or 
political life, a lack of identification with British ‘norms’ and ‘values’ and, in some 
frequent cases, the emergence of extremist religious groups who are intent on 
menacing citizens and political establishments. This approach links multiculturalism 
to the discourse of securitisation of ethnic relations and especially to the anti-
terrorism agenda. Cameron explicitly criticised the previous government for 
focusing too narrowly on terrorism and violent extremism and failing to be 
sufficiently “muscular” in standing up for British liberal values [16]. For this reason, 
Cameron suggested a new government approach to extremism through a revision of 
the Prevent Strategy elaborated by the Labour government. 
 
Second, by rejecting multiculturalism Cameron promotes a discourse on 
civic integration, which emphasises community cohesion and a participative 
conception of citizenship, which requires a sense of belonging and common vision 
for all communities living in the UK. This community cohesion is based on moral 
virtue and a civic identity based on national values. Specifically, Cameron calls for a 
policy of "muscular liberalism" [16] to guarantee that Muslims respect national 
British values such as democracy, equality before the law and human rights [4, 5]. In 
this manner, Cameron’s discourse on civic integration argued for explicit emphasis 
to be placed on the need for Muslims to adopt liberal values. However, this specific 
discourse on civic integration recalls more the tenets embedded in Republican 
discourse, rather than those from a liberal discourse, in which individuals have equal 
opportunities and diversity is supposed to be seen as having positive value. 
 
Third, the call for muscular liberalism has been adopted in the new Prevent 
strategy presented on 7 June 2011. According to the Home Office website (2011), 
the plan is largely based on 1) responding to the ideological challenge of Islamism 
and those who promote it; 2) preventing people from being drawn into terrorism; 
and 3) monitoring extremism and radicalisation within institutions and 
organisations. Therefore, the new security policy does reflect the Prime Minister's 
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February 2011 speech in Munich in which he created a link between non-violent 
Islamic extremism and terrorism5. 
 
Paradoxically, this “muscular” approach to integration challenges traditional 
liberalism, as it has the potential to undermine those values that Cameron defines as 
liberal and would likely defend. It is understandable that public funding would not 
be used for radical groups, but it raises concern of the attempt to delegate to 
universities and Internet providers, the power to take action actively against groups 
or individuals who "do not support our core values" (Home Office 2011: 12). 
 
As a consequence, this prevention strategy commits the Government to 
broadening its counter-terrorist efforts to include a new public enemy, the 
“nonviolent extremist”, who is a Muslim, “who may reject violence, but who [does] 
accept various parts of the extremist worldview” [4]. However, despite the rhetoric, 
Cameron’s measures were part of the general political debate on Islamic extremism, 
already established under Labour in 2007 via a concrete political agenda to change 
the legislation on counter-terrorism. 
 
Fourth, by focusing on civic integration and social cohesion, Cameron recalls 
his social conservative discourse on the Big Society6. In detail, the Big Society’s 
discourse offers a political foundation for the social transformation of British 
society, based on a transfer of the moral centre of society from the government to 
the civic sphere through an application of four priorities: 1) more power to 
communities; 2) volunteerism and participation to community; (3) transferring 
power from central to local government; and 4) support of charities and social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Prevent strategy explicitly claims that dealing “with radicalisation will depend on developing a 
sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values” (Home Office 2011: 12). In a 
specific section on “Higher and Further education” (Home Office 2011: 74), the government asks 
universities to monitor those “people who may be drawn into extremism and terrorism” (2011: 78) 
and to protect students “from the consequences of their becoming involved in terrorism, and take 
reasonable steps to minimise this risk” (2011: 79). There is also a section on the Internet that 
proposes to limit “access to harmful content online in… schools, public libraries and other public 
buildings” (2011: 80) and “remove unlawful and harmful content from the [I]nternet” (2011: 80). The 
new Prevent Strategy has also extended its reach to include the NHS. Doctors, nurses, and other 
medical staff will be asked to identify those patients at risk of being drawn into radicalisation. 
However, it is not clear how doctors, teachers or Internet providers would be able to detect and 
evaluate what is "unlawful" or “harmful” (Home Office 2011: 77), and clearly a matter of political 
evaluation and potentially an extremely divisive designation. 
6 This discourse was introduced by Cameron during the Conservative Party Conference on 8 October 
2009 and became a key concept of the Conservative Manifesto in 2010 
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enterprises (Bochel 2011: 15). Thus the Big Society discourse is based on the 
necessity to make civil society self-responsible for its own welfare and security 
(Heppell and Seawright 2012: 25). This discourse implies that all aspects of cultural 
and political integration of Muslims can be reduced to inducing self-responsibility 
for their community, rather than waiting for the support of State multicultural 
policies. 
 
To sum up, Cameron’s speech in Munich could be articulated around three 
different discourses: 1) multicultural policies have failed to promote integration, as 
British society has become too tolerant, less secure and more vulnerable to Islamic 
extremism; 2) securitisation as a strategy to tackle the home-grown causes of 
extremism, through 3) a muscular liberalism involved in guaranteeing that Muslims 
respect national British core values such as democracy, equality and respect of the 
law; 4) muscular liberalism is thus entangled to the conservatory idea of Big 
Society, which focuses on individual self-responsibility for his own community. 
 
Intertextual Chain 
 
The objective here is to analyse how the nodal point is disseminated and 
recontextualised across the European press. The outcome reveals the role that 
national press can have in selecting and disseminating topics through the European 
public sphere. On 5 February 2011, Cameron gave his speech [Appendix 3] at the 
International Security Policy Conference held in Munich. According to Cameron, 
many young British Muslims are drawn to Islamist extremism because they feel 
separated and marginalised. 
 
The press underscored how Cameron’s speech echoed the controversial 
comments made by Merkel a few months earlier in Potsdam, when she defined 
multiculturalism as a failure, saying Germany had not dedicated adequate attention 
to the civic integration of immigrants. Similarly to the process of dissemination of 
Merkel’s speech, Cameron’s statement also gained enormous popularity through 
broadcasters, the new media, and the press, becoming a significant example of a 
highly mediated event in the realm of modern political communication. 
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Table 6.1 – Coverage of Cameron’s speech across Europe 
Cameron	   France	   Germany	   UK	  
Articles	   11	   7	   42	  
Sources	   7	   4	   7	  
Ratio	   1.57	   1.75	   6	  
 
For this analysis I have collected 57 articles from leading national 
newspapers in France, Germany and the UK through the Nexis and Factiva 
databases for seven days between 5 and 12 February 2011. The distribution (Table 
6.1) of articles shows that the UK sample is clearly overrepresented with 42 articles, 
but still this number is very high considering the fact that I excluded nearly 200 
articles published by tabloids; this result reveals indeed a very high interest for the 
British press for the issue of integration. The distribution (Table 6.1) of non-local 
coverage is homogenous. The French press confirms its previous trend for Merkel’s 
nodal point (13 articles and a ratio of 2.17, while now is slightly lower with 11 
articles and a ratio of 1.57). The German cluster counts 7 articles, which is 
significantly lower if compared to the coverage of the two previous nodal points 
(Chap. 4 and 5), but the ratio is higher than the French one (1.75). 
 
The German result is unexpected as Cameron’s speech was given in Munich. 
My impression is that the press covered the conference in Munich and many 
important speakers gave a speech. As a consequence, it is reasonable to argue that 
Cameron’s speech had to share the German media agenda with other speakers. By 
looking at the conference program reports, on the same day the following speakers 
had been called to give a talk: Ban Ki-moon, Merkel, Hilary Clinton, van Rompui 
and McCain7. Moreover, I can exclude an anti-British prejudice, as in the same 
period I have found several articles covering Cameron’s statement on the Egypt 
crisis and Mubarak’s resignation (February 11, 2011). 
 
For each article I coded more than one thematic category (TC). The 
distribution of the themes appears consistent for the TC 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (avg. > 12) 
in the three countries. Overall, the European press agrees that Cameron accused 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The full program of the 47th Munich Conference, February 4-6, 2011 is available on the following 
page: http://www.securityconference.de/en/activities/munich-security-conference/msc-2011/program/ 
(accessed on 1st September 2013).    
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multiculturalism as a failure, saying it was partly responsible for promoting Islamist 
extremism. 
 
Table 6.2 – Thematic Dimensions 
Thematic	  Dimension	   France	   Germany	   UK	   Avg.	  
1.	  Membership	   6	   4	   26	   12.0	  
2.	  Religious	  identity	   7	   4	   27	   12.6	  
3.	  Cultural	  tradition	   8	   7	   31	   14.0	  
4.	  National	  identity	   6	   5	   35	   17.0	  
5.	  European	  perspective	   5	   5	   28	   12.6	  
6.	  Securitization	   9	   6	   31	   15.3	  
7.	  Social	  Justice	   3	   2	   18	   7.6	  
 
In more detail, the analysis has considered seven thematic categories as 
reported in Table 6.2. First, membership (TC 1) includes references to citizenship, 
integration and respect of law. Second, the issue of religious diversity (TC 2) is 
debated as a difference to tolerate, rather than a pluralist encounter. Third, the 
cultural tradition (TC 3), which covers references to ‘our traditions’ and ‘our values’ 
that define the UK as a mono-cultural society, based on a common past, common 
traditions and an apparently homogeneous and coherent value system. The fourth 
category relates to the national identity (TC 4) and refers to the political discourse of 
belonging to the UK. Fifth, the European perspective (TC 5) includes references to 
Europe as a Western moral community and the British position in relation to it. 
Sixth, the securitisation of ethnic relations (TC 6) includes the risks concerning 
urban segregation, the highest level of delinquency, but also political violence and 
religious radicalism. Conversely, social justice (TC 7) refers to social and economic 
inequalities, which can explain the problems faced by Muslim immigrants in their 
process of integration. 
 
These categories refer to the main line of argumentation employed by the 
press and reveal to what extent the national press can have a specific role in 
selecting and disseminating a nodal point. Here is a breakdown of the most common 
claims:  
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! Young British Muslims were drawn to violent ideology because they found 
no strong collective identity in Britain (TC 4, 6) 
! The failure of multiculturalism is a threat to security (TC 6) 
! State multiculturalism encourages different cultures to live separate lives 
(TC 1, 6) 
! Young Muslims are rootless. (TC 2) 
! Second generation Muslims search for something to belong to and believe. 
(TC 4) 
! Lack of integration can lead young Muslims to Islamism. (TC 2, 6) 
! Integration has to be based on more active, muscular liberalism and less 
passive tolerance. (TC 1, 4, 3) 
! A passively tolerant society stands neutral between different values. (TC 3) 
! Europeans need to believe in liberal values and actively promotes them. (TC 
5) 
! References to earlier speech given by Merkel and Sarkozy or the Burqua 
Law. (TC 5) 
 
Regarding the Burqua law (TC 5), the French parliament approved the ban 
on 11 February 2011, six days after Cameron gave his speech. The same day of the 
French parliament’s vote, Sarkozy gave an interview on the French TV in which he 
joined Merkel and Cameron’s attack on multiculturalism and made a very 
controversial statement: "If you come to France, you accept to melt into a single 
community, which is the national community, and if you do not want to accept that, 
you cannot be welcome in France" (Appendix 6 FR #1, #2; DE #4, #5, #6; UK #43). 
 
Regarding contestation, Cameron’s remarks enraged many critiques from 
British commentators. First, Muslim groups attributed to Cameron, the will to place 
an unfair responsibility on minority communities about integration, while he failed – 
in their view - to stress how the majority could help Muslims feel more welcome in 
Britain (UK #6, #7). This last point is quite central to criticism of the social policies 
developed by the Tory cabinet. Bunting, for instance, remarked how Cameron’s 
“nostalgia for a strong national collective identity, and a sense of shared values” is 
highly improbable in a country in which “all kinds of collective identities have been 
weakened or abandoned” and “institutions that expressed and inculcated a sense of 
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nationhood are in decline, whether [they be] political parties, trade unions or 
Christian churches” (UK #24). In addition, many columnists underscored how such 
an attack against multiculturalism was a mere attempt to distract public opinion from 
the government’s unpopularity for making massive budget cuts (UK #18, #26). 
 
Those British columnists, who support Cameron's arguments, are split in two 
groups. The liberals agree that in several cases, multiculturalism has meant more 
segregation (UK #10; #15); yet they disagree on the complete renunciation of 
multicultural policies because they are seen as a process by which people respect 
and communicate with each other. As a consequence, they argue that integration 
should promote a feeling of belonging in society as long as more economic security 
is offered as an incentive to encourage social cohesion (UK #14; #16). The 
conservative front generally agrees on blaming British society as a passive and 
tolerant community, which encourages immigrants to live apart (UK #20; #19). 
Some editorialists also recognise that Labour polices are accountable for this failure, 
because they have failed to provide a vision of society to which immigrants can feel 
they want to belong (UK #8; #10). 
 
By mapping German and French newspapers, it is possible to observe that 
contrary to what happened in regard to Merkel’s speech, on this occasion the 
coverage was not limited to the sensationalism of the statements on 
multiculturalism, but offered a more complete evaluation of the speech. Overall, it is 
possible to argue that in this case there was a more reflective approach to the 
question of integration. At the same time, it has to be recalled that Cameron gave his 
speech during an international event and the transcript was in English and available 
on the PM’s website, and this facilitated a more elaborate understanding of its 
complexities and political implications than what occurred following Merkel’s 
speech. 
 
By comparing the social media to the press coverage, very often the speech 
is took out of context and focus takes place only on the most controversial 
statements on multiculturalism undervaluing and ignoring the nuances and 
complexities of other claims. There are several video extracts available online of 
different lengths, generally lasting between two and three minutes, all of which 
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include Cameron’s attack on multiculturalism: “Under the doctrine of state 
multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart 
from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of 
society to which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these 
segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our 
values” [8]. It is possible to argue that new media, on the contrary to the press, tend 
on one hand to increase levels of intertextuality through an exponential 
dissemination of the same extracts; on the other hand, they reduce the level of 
interdiscursivity by focusing only on a specific discourse on multiculturalism. 
 
To sum up, Cameron’s speech was largely mediatised across Europe 
confirming once again an interest of the press in covering political statements on 
integration. However, the process of convergence in France and Germany focused 
more on how Cameron echoed Merkel in stating multiculturalism as a failure, 
reproducing, in this way, a polarisation between liberal and conservative 
commentators. Instead, the British press paid more attention to domestic prevention 
of Islamic extremism and the revision of the Prevent Strategy plan. Despite 
widespread criticism about the willingness to refuse multicultural policies and the 
attempt to securitise Muslim relationships, Cameron’s speech did gain a large 
consensus across the European press on the need to promote political belonging and 
encourage social cohesion among second generation Muslim immigrants. 	  
3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimisation 
 
This section examines the textual aspects of the speech. The analytical model 
proposed in the present section proposes a general overview about the textual 
features, and a second stage that focuses on the political effects of that textual 
practice, through an assessment of the Othering and legitimation strategies on which 
the text is based and can thus be interpreted.  
 
The textual analysis is conducted on the transcript delivered by the Prime 
Minister’s press office [Appendix 3]. The style of this political statement is that of a 
public speech addressed to an international forum during a plenary session. It is 
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characterised by a charismatic speaker who generally detains political authority and 
a competent audience composed of experts and diplomats. However, some style 
features of the speech seem to be more coherent in terms of domestic political 
communication. For example, the speech tends to be mainly celebrative in its overall 
communicative purpose and is characterised by a rhetorical articulation that fulfils a 
typical ritual function of similar political speeches offered to partisan conventions, 
rather than one delivered to an international conference. Also, the vocabulary 
includes plain language and basic words, avoiding any technical jargon that is often 
seen in speeches intended for an international audience. Moreover, in the text, there 
are important keywords that have very strong political connotations for a British 
audience, for example, “British values”, “collective identity”, “national identity” and 
“local identity.”  
 
In addition, in the opening part of the speech, Cameron positions himself by 
his use of the singular pronoun “I”: “Today I want to focus my remarks on 
terrorism…” [1]. In this way, he states and delivers his own identity through use of 
“I” but then in Line 3 he moves to the use of “We”, which stands for the British 
nation: “We are dealing with our budget deficit” [1] or “We will still have the fourth 
largest military defence budget in the world” [1]. In this way, Cameron is not just 
addressing those in his immediate audience, but also addressing all Britons by 
establishing a common identity between him and them. It is this sense of the plural 
"we" at the beginning of his speech, which in and of itself is a performativity in the 
manner often used when a speaker addresses distant actors and confers identity and 
political status on them.  
 
At the level of Othering, the speaker defines himself and expresses 
contrasting identities. An interesting feature defining the definition of the in-group 
identity can be observed when Cameron changes the register of subjectivity, so that 
the “we” may stand also for the international community: “We must ban preachers 
of hate from coming to our countries” [12]. The use of “we” also establishes a 
common identity with its international listeners and recognises in them a specific 
political authority, which Cameron calls upon to act: “We must ban” [12]. 
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From the beginning of his speech, Cameron makes it quite clear that “liberal 
values” [4] of freedom and tolerance are main features defining the British society. 
Specifically, he refers to those values as “Western” [5] and indeed embedded in 
“Western democracy” [4]. In addition, liberal values are expressed and persuasively 
conveyed by Cameron so as to contrast British society with Islamic extremism. He 
defines Islamists as a people who refuse liberal values and universal human rights 
[4, 5]. In particular, Cameron also defines a set of normative points to discuss 
whether Muslims and their organization can be considered part of the political realm 
when they are fully accepting “universal human rights – including rights for women 
and people of other faiths”, in the “equality of all before the law”, in “democracy 
and the right of people to elect their own government” and experience “integration” 
[12]. 
 
Cameron does not articulate the Other as traditional Islam, but rather as an 
Islamic extremism. According to Cameron, Islamist extremism is based on “a 
distortion of Islam” [12] and represents a serious threat for European countries [3] 
because it rejects liberal values and promotes separation. Moreover, Cameron 
distinguishes the difference between Islam and Islamism by saying that “Islamist 
extremism and Islam are not the same thing” [4]. Islam is defined as a peaceful 
religion [4] and “Western values and Islam can be entirely compatible” [5]. An 
example comes from “the streets of Tunis and Cairo”, when people demanded “the 
universal right to free elections and democracy” [5]. Only the Islamist is regarded as 
having a fundamentally different and opposing British identity. Therefore, Cameron 
is not concerned with those Muslims who integrate into the political community and 
accept the same liberal values but with Islamists who indoctrinate young Muslims 
who feel apart and unaligned. 
 
Cameron does not focus on negative social or cultural differences, deviances 
or threats attributed to these extremists, but rather on ideology. The word “ideology” 
is repeated 11 times to denote Islamic extremism, while Cameron never defines his 
own idea of cohesion and integration as being ideological, even when he claims that 
Britain must adopt a policy of "muscular liberalism" to enforce the core values of 
the nation within the immigrant community [16]. Therefore, this attempt to define 
“ideological extremism” as a threat helps to recontextualise the construction of a 
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discursive construction of the in- and out-groups (Woodak, 2007: 333). To be more 
precise, Cameron deploys a positive and non-ideological perception of the in-group, 
which projects a negative and ideological position toward the out-group. This 
strategy is central to the process of Othering, which identifies Islamist extremists as 
the Other inside the British community.  
 
The main risk for the British community is represented by those “groups and 
organisations” as directed by charismatic leaders who “promote separatism by 
encouraging Muslims to define themselves solely in terms of their religion” [10]. 
This “ideology of extremism” and “separatism” indeed “can engender a sense of 
community, a substitute for what the wider society has failed to supply” [10].  As a 
consequence, Cameron seems more concerned not with terrorists, but rather those 
“non-violent extremists” who preach Islamist ideology without practicing violence, 
or in his words, those terrorists who “were initially influenced by what some have 
called ‘non-violent extremists’ and then took those radical beliefs to the next level 
by embracing violence” [11].  
 
At the level of legitimisation, the analysis focuses on the strategies of 
legitimisation through references to authority or power. Precisely, the aim is to 
identify how the text provides a particular social structuring of discourse to become 
universal and thus a part of the legitimising system that sustains the discourse of 
civic integration. 
 
The key problem, according to the British Prime Minister, comes from those 
segregated communities that reject traditional Islam to support radical Islamism. 
Cameron blames multiculturalism for encouraging “different cultures to live 
separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream” [8].  The 
menace of “segregated communities” [8] is used to legitimatise a discursive strategy 
that aims at universalising cultural and political values as both uniform and 
necessary for integration into British society: "We have even tolerated segregated 
communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values” [8].  
 
This last point also reveals how much political belonging is central to 
Cameron’s development of civic integration. In Cameron’s words, “we must build 
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stronger societies and stronger identities at home” [16], but “we need a lot less of the 
passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism” [16]. 
A passive “tolerant society” does not integrate citizens, but rather leaves them alone 
[16], while a “muscular” liberal society should encourage “meaningful and active 
participation in society” in order to achieve integration through “true cohesion” [17]. 
Consequently, the dimension of universalization of a particular form of liberalism, 
defined as “muscular”, is the main strategy Cameron uses to legitimatise his 
discourse on civic integration.  
 
Cameron discourse develops also an international perspective to legitimate 
the necessity to take action against Islamic extremism: “We will not defeat terrorism 
simply by the action we take outside our borders” [3]. Here “we” and “our borders” 
refer to the Western European community as it is confirmed in the following: 
“Europe needs to wake up to what is happening in our own countries” [3.] This 
strategy also confirms his interest to prove that other international leaders are 
legitimate partners in the debate on security and integration. Specifically, he shows 
an interest in partner speeches by remarking: “as Angela [Merkel] has said the 
security aspects of our response…” [3.] In this way, despite the fact that Cameron 
delivers a statement that concentrates more on domestic policy rather than foreign 
policy, he projects Britain into a transnational political debate by focusing on a 
common strategy for integration and security to adopt across Europe.  
 
To summarise the approach to textual strategy, Cameron expresses a concern 
about extremism in the UK based on the “ideology” of Islamism [4], which he 
believes both disaffects and radicalises Islamic youth. His viewpoint is that 
multicultural policies are responsible for creating separateness rather than 
encouraging participation [8], and for this reason, he argues that multicultural 
policies should be replaced with a “muscular liberalism” [16] that promotes 
effective integration. As a consequence, Cameron’s demand for community 
cohesion and appeals to a national identity reveal an attempt to assume an 
unquestioned and inevitable reality of those Muslims who refuse political belonging 
and disrupt social cohesion. This textual strategy raises several questions about the 
political nature and the practical limits of this discourse on integration. 
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4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice 
 
The goal of the present section is to underline the social and political 
implications of the discursive structure under analysis. Specifically, the analysis 
focuses on three critical considerations: 1) the normative ambivalence in the British 
politics of identity and its limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the British 
self; 2) the debate on integration of Muslims as a main part of the process of 
immigrant regulation and 3) any hidden social and economic rationality underlining 
the discourse of civic integration. 
 
First, Cameron defends the British tradition of liberalism and then 
determines the limits and obligations of Muslims through a definition of nonviolent 
Islamic extremism. The nonviolent extremist is someone who does not belong or 
accept these liberal values and takes on radical beliefs, but without engaging in 
actual violent or terrorist acts. This concern has deep implications for the definition 
of integration as it shows the risk of arbitrariness embedded in this asymmetrical 
hierarchical relationship of power, in which Cameron’s government wants to decide 
who is a threat to democracy or not. 
 
Cameron’s discourse is contradictory with its basic liberal assumption when 
targeting non-violent extremism. Liberal democracies have a historical tradition of 
discussing “how to prevent illiberal and undemocratic forces from abusing the rights 
and powers that liberal democracy extends to all” (Kymlicka 2010: 116). British 
liberals have never banned either the Communist or Republican parties, although 
these groups do want to abolish British institutions, such as the Parliament or the 
Monarchy. As Kymlicka puts it, democratic liberalism “gives free speech [also] to 
those who would refuse free speech to others” (2010: 159).  
 
A constant vigilance against any political form of extremism cannot be based 
on the suppression of basic liberal principles for some. Democratic liberalism is 
based on the assumption that governments cannot interfere in the lives of individuals 
outside of guaranteeing that all citizens are protected from the control of others. 
Instead, Cameron’s discourse on security and extremist prevention is based on the 
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assumption that the political authority should be the arbiter over who is democratic 
and who is not. 
 
This contradiction between respect for freedom of speech of a violent 
minority and an enactment of majority safety, points to the “diversity dilemma” 
mentioned by Jackson-Preece (2005), namely, that the principles that legitimate a 
political community may conflict with the freedom of minorities to refuse both 
belonging and uniformity. Precisely, the collision of values, such as “freedom” and 
“belonging”, creates the presence of the Other as a potential source of insecurity and 
conflict (Jackson-Preece 2005: 3-5). 
 
Second, the security-based approach embedded in the discourse of “muscular 
liberalism” aims to impose a British identity as a solution to violent extremism. 
However, in practical terms, this discourse justifies only the implementation of 
measures to regulate Muslim extremism through a highly ideological view of 
political belonging based on identity. 
 
According to Cameron, the problem of identity reflects the deep dilemma 
that is inherent in the discourse of multiculturalism and its failure to achieve social 
cohesion. Consequently, Cameron claims "It’s that identity, that feeling of belonging 
in our countries, that I believe is the key to achieving true cohesion” [17]. Yet rather 
than seeking to deal with the cultural challenge offered by Muslim identities, 
Cameron attacks multiculturalism for destabilising and accentuating both exclusion 
and radicalism within immigrant groups. “True cohesion” [17] does not imply any 
form of cultural mediation; it is only a political act that implies to Muslims that they 
belong to and have a British identity. 
 
Cameron claims legitimacy of the state in terms of its authority and 
obligation to protect its citizens from any threat (Edelman 1977: 4-5; Jackson-Preece 
2005, 2006) that can disrupt political stability. Yet, muscular liberalism is a form of 
withdrawal from any engagement with some Muslim communities where Islamism 
is seen as central to a certain vision of the political sphere. Moreover, proposing a 
form of cultural homogenisation of a particular minority ignores the fact that 
cultural/religious differences cannot be resolved by only the obligation of a national 
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identity. It is quite doubtful that such a proposal can be effective to reduce tension 
and prevent violence, as relations between the state and radical Muslim extremists 
are not viewed as related to the deliberative function of the public sphere, but as a 
question related to state security (Kymlicka 2011: 44). 
 
Cameron’s discourse strategy appears to be justifying a policy that is aimed 
at preventing nonviolent actions through the negation of liberal values like freedom 
of speech for a specific target group. Thus, when the government only claims the 
right to limit democratic debate and negotiation to protect itself, political 
mobilisation may be banned as a form of extremism, and even if Muslim “demands 
can be voiced, they will be rejected by the larger society and the state” in the name 
of the discourse for prevention of extremism (Kymlicka 2007: 589). Overall, 
organisations and groups that advance claims against the state can only be 
considered disloyal. Consequently, the process of securitisation and especially its re-
contextualisation in the discourse of extremism prevention have deep implications 
for the public sphere, because Islam, or at least its more radical parts, is represented 
as threatening the identity of a hegemonic community and undermining its political 
and cultural model (Buzan et al. 1998). 
 
This discourse works through the exclusion of those cultural and political 
differences that are considered unacceptable by the political authority through the 
use of the specific normative framework. Any organisation that does not reject 
extremism will be marginalised on the basis of its political ideology. However, such 
a discourse implies a lot of ambiguities, for example, what is the legal difference 
between “radical extremists” and “nonviolent” ones [11]? Is someone who supports 
the implementation of Sharia law automatically a “nonviolent extremist” because 
that person rejects liberal values? 
 
As a consequence, securitisation and integration are based on the same 
process of uniformisation of political belonging and an explicit emphasis on the 
need for Muslims to adopt liberal values, wherein relations between the state and 
Muslims would be a matter of state security and not a matter of normal democratic 
debate and negotiation (Kymlicka, 2007). Integration is thus reduced to just the 
ability to internalise dominant liberal values.  
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Third, according to Cameron’s discourse, poverty and social injustice cannot 
be considered to be the basis for integration failure, as “many of those found guilty 
of terrorist offences in the UK and elsewhere have been graduates and often, middle 
class” [6]. Yet, the recent study Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections 
(Simcox, Stuart, & Ahmed 2010) contradicts Cameron’s argument, as reported by 
the Home Office’s Prevention Strategy (2011: 25), data shows that “just under one 
third of the total for whom information on education was available had attended 
university or a higher education institute.” Indeed, Cameron commits the mistake of 
misrepresenting the social and class reality of those people who decide to follow 
Islamic radicalism. 
 
This discourse intentionally refuses to take into account the fact that Muslims 
live disproportionately in the most deprived urban areas in poor housing where they 
receive only a basic education and are discriminated against in employment [7]. 
According to Cameron, poverty is only a contributory factor to terrorism, instead 
“one important reason” why “so young Muslims” are inclined to support terrorism is 
“a question of identity” [7]. Thus, Cameron undertakes identity as a causal 
explanation of radicalism and rejects any other counter-argument to explain social 
exclusion such as urban segregation, low social mobility or institutional 
discrimination, which can well be the root cause of the manifestations of extremism. 
 
Referring to this point, Cameron aims at creating of self-responsible and 
active individuals. Cameron specifies precisely how this active participation can be 
promoted. He suggests: “making sure that immigrants speak the language of their 
new home and ensuring that people are educated in the elements of a common 
culture and curriculum” [17]. He also proposes “introducing National Citizen 
Service”, a programme for kids “from different backgrounds to live and work 
together” [17]. Here it is possible to recognise an overlap between the discourses of 
‘Big Society’ and civic integration, which is also confirmed by the belief that a 
“common purpose can be formed as people come together and work together in their 
neighbourhoods” [17] through an active engagement of immigrants. In Cameron’s 
own words, civic involvement “will also help build stronger pride in local identity” 
[17].  
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Cameron appears to contradict himself when advocates at the same time for 
integration through participation in society, “by shifting the balance of power away 
from the state and towards the people” [17] and linguistic, educational and even civil 
service policies. What seems clearer is that the government is not retained or 
deemed responsible for offering effective programs to produce economic security 
and social solidarity, but it is responsible towards the cultural and political 
integration of Muslims. This approach may enhance social cohesion, but cultural 
differences have to be legitimated, otherwise these programs can reproduce 
dangerous assumptions aimed at creating conformity and cultural homogenisation. 
 
To summarise, Cameron attacks state multiculturalism for tolerating non-
liberal values. These liberal values, which identify British national identity, are a 
necessary means for maintaining a stable political environment that guarantees the 
desired integration of Muslims.  Instead, the Muslim extremist is someone who does 
not belong or accept these liberal values and takes on radical beliefs, and also 
without engaging in actual violent or terrorist acts.  
 
This security-based approach embedded in the discourse of ‘muscular 
liberalism’ aims thus to impose liberal values as a solution to integration; at the 
same time the risk of arbitrariness embedded in this asymmetrical hierarchical 
relationship of power is self-evident, in which the government wants to decide 
which values are a threat to democracy or not. As a result, only the uncritical 
assimilation of liberalism is considered to be central to integration, while welfare 
and multicultural policies are considered not effective in reaching political 
belonging. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
Taking as the entry point Cameron’s speech on the prevention of Islamic 
extremism given at the International Security Policy Conference in Munich in 
February of 2011, the analysis developed in this chapter offers a reconstruction of 
the public debate on Muslim integration and evaluates the political conditions and 
the social practices involved in the enactment of the discourses around this debate. 
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The British debate on Muslim integration recontextualises a discourse on 
security that is aimed at the implementation of measures to regulate Islamic 
extremism through both homogenisation and political integration, but without 
precise policies for contrasting social exclusion. Accordingly, Muslim immigrants, 
especially those who are second generation, are exclusively responsible for their 
own integration, while their membership is dependent upon their ability to 
internalise dominant liberal values and nothing more. 
 
There are three key observations that come out of the Critical Discourse 
Analysis of the British public debate. First, the aim of this muscular liberal discourse 
is to combat radicalism and separatism. According to Cameron, prevention should 
be addressed toward those extremists who preach Islamist ideology even without 
practicing violence. However, the re-contextualisation of this discourse as a policy 
of extremist prevention can have important outcomes in the political sphere, because 
when a minority is depicted as a dangerous enemy, then diversity could be 
understood to be a force that only subverts the security of social cohesion. 
 
Second, Cameron's approach to civic integration is presented as a solution to 
the problem of identity decline in UK society, which he blames on a passive and 
tolerant society. According to Cameron, identity stands for a feeling of belonging 
that he believes is “the key to achieving true cohesion” [17]. However, this “true 
cohesion” does not imply any form of cultural mediation; it is only a political act 
that implies for Muslims that they belong to and have a British identity. As such, it 
is paradoxical that a discourse aimed at asking for more integration through unity 
and cohesion of immigrants, especially Muslims, is supported by a rigid definition 
of national identity. 
 
Third, Cameron underestimates poverty and social injustice as causes of 
separatism and extremism. Instead Cameron’s discourse assumes a model of society, 
also outlined in Cameron’s manifesto for the Big Society, wherein the Muslim 
immigrants must be held individually accountable and morally responsible to the 
British community. As a consequence, integration is more concerned with the 
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obligations that are expected of immigrants, rather than their rights and eventual 
movement toward full social equality. 
 
In regards to the transnational press coverage, the analysis shows a 
significant degree of convergence in the mediatisation of Cameron’s speech. 
However, the process of mediatisation has emphasised in France and Germany how 
Cameron echoed Merkel in stating multiculturalism as a failure. Instead, the national 
press paid more attention to the political implications of Cameron’s domestic 
prevention of Islamic extremism. Despite widespread criticism across Europe about 
the willingness to refuse multicultural policies and the attempt to securitise Muslim 
relationships, Cameron’s speech did also gain a large consensus on the need to 
promote political belonging and encourage social cohesion. 
 
In the next chapter, I provide a comparative analysis of these national 
debates to verify to what extent a discursive process of convergence is emerging 
towards Islamic integration and how these relationships contribute to the 
construction of a shared normative discourse about integration across Europe. 
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Chapter 7: The Transnational Discourse of Civic Integration  
 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
This analysis of the European public debate on Muslim integration examines 
specific debates on the subject in France, Germany and the UK. Each of these 
debates is based on a political statement, which offers a privileged point of entry for 
reconstructing the national public debate. I apply Critical Discourse Analysis to 
investigate how the nodal points link to discourses, the rules according to which 
these discourses are tied together, and how they are re-inscribed into a broader 
political debate. Moreover, I apply Content Analysis to facilitate the comparison of 
national debates and evaluate the role of press in reinforcing a specific discursive 
articulation of civic integration. Here, in brief, I outline the three cases studies and 
the main characteristics that define each of them. 
 
Chapter 4 reconstructs the French public debate by taking as the nodal point, 
Sarkozy’s editorial published in the Le Monde newspaper on 8 December 2009. In 
this article, Sarkozy defends the Swiss vote and calls upon Muslims to refrain from 
provocative attitudes, but also urges them not to forget that Europe has Christian 
values as its foundation. Sarkozy's intervention came not only in response to 
concerns about the Swiss referendum, but also as a result of the broader debate over 
French national identity, which was aimed at creating political consensus within 
French society on the issues of national identity and the integration of Islam. 
 
In the discourse analysis, I underline how the language of Sarkozy’s speech 
emphasises universal and already established normative assumptions contained in 
the discourse of Republicanism and secularism. The increased concern within 
French public debate about Muslim immigration has reinforced a traditional French 
discourse on the nation-state that asserts two discursive strategies: firstly, the 
persuasiveness of Republicanism and secularism in shaping the national identity of 
France; secondly, the rejection of any public recognition of ethnic and cultural 
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identities as antithetical to the national identity. As a consequence, integration of the 
Muslim should respect 1) a personal commitment to French Republican principles, 
2) an effective respect of secular values and 3) an active involvement in French 
society. These three points imply on one hand, the responsibility of Muslims to 
accept and adopt those secular customs and universal values defining the national 
identity. On the other hand, they preclude the possibility of accommodating any 
ethnic and cultural needs. Therefore, multiculturalism at the level of integration 
policy is always rejected, as the existence of structured ethnic communities would 
be a major threat to the universalistic aspirations of the Republic. 
 
The outcome of the content analysis shows an important degree of 
convergence in the mediatisation of Sarkozy’s editorial. Despite widespread 
criticism, the press across Europe agreed with him that the vote was the symptom of 
a deep distress towards the problem of immigration, which could degenerate into 
open xenophobia if European countries fail to integrate Muslims. The visibility 
obtained through the transnational press coverage represented for Sarkozy a great 
political opportunity to use the European public sphere to communicate his political 
agenda on immigration and national identity. 
 
In chapter 5, the German public debate is analysed by taking as the nodal 
point, the speech delivered by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel on 16 
October 2010. This speech generated significant controversy in Germany and across 
Europe, as evidenced by the high number of comments and editorials published as a 
result. In her speech, Merkel claims that multicultural policies of integration have 
been a complete failure and demands more effort from Muslim immigrants to accept 
the values that characterise German cultural identity, namely Leitkultur. 
 
The discourse analysis underlines how Merkel’s speech is characterised by a 
necessity to redefine national identity in a more cohesive way through the attempt to 
universalise the acceptable values, rules and norms of the German majority through 
the cultural and religious identity that characterises the national community. At the 
same time, this attempt to define the German Leitkultur can become an inflexible 
cultural-national discourse that determines which forms of diversity are compatible 
or appropriate within Germany. It can be in fact argued that the discourse of 
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Leitkultur defines a monocultural German society as opposed to other newcomer 
cultures. It is a real contradiction that a public discourse aimed at asking for more 
unity and cohesion to immigrants, especially Muslims, is supported then by such a 
restrictive assumption of the national culture. Merkel invokes integration as a liberal 
democratic principle but then, the national cultural domain, which remains based on 
an ethnic-religious identity, prescribes what inner values are acceptable in the 
immigrant. 
 
The outcome of the content analysis shows an important degree of 
convergence in the mediatisation of Merkel’s speech and a convergence in framing 
some of the underlining themes. This convergence represented for Merkel an 
unexpected communicative success, as its speech did not address a European public. 
Despite general agreement on the fact that isolationism and self-segregation are a 
serious social problem in many cities of Europe, large parts of the press disagree on 
blaming multiculturalism as a cause of these ethnic-ghettos. At the same time, the 
European press considers Merkel’s assumption -that newcomers have to respect 
norms of the countries where they live- to be correct. 
 
Chapter 6 takes as the nodal point Cameron’s speech on the prevention of 
Islamic extremism, given at the International Security Policy Conference in Munich 
in February of 2011. By echoing Merkel’s speech, Cameron argues that 
multicultural state policies have passively tolerated and encouraged British Muslims 
to live apart, thus pushing many young Muslims to embrace Islamism. Instead, the 
state should promote a feeling of belonging in a common society, through a national 
identity, and not be an accomplice of those non-violent Muslim groups that stay 
ambiguous on those liberal values that characterise British national identity. 
 
The discourse analysis conveys the discursive articulation of Cameron’s 
speech as an attempt to universalise a strict form of normativity that explicitly 
rejects any form of tolerance towards non-liberal values in order to avoid undue 
cultural conflict, religious fanaticism and thus maintaining a stable political 
environment that also guarantees the desired integration of Muslims. As a result, 
only the assimilation of liberal values is considered to be central to integration 
policies, while welfare and multicultural policies are not considered as central in the 
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politics of integration. Therefore, Cameron’s discourse magnifies the recent shift in 
British public debate on integration. In fact, the British model of integration has 
turned away from a pluralist approach, which had stressed the role of integration, 
not as a process of assimilation, but as a policy of access to social rights, in favour 
of a more civic model of integration, which places the importance on shared values 
as a key element of integration. 
 
The analysis of the press shows Cameron’s speech was largely covered 
across Europe confirming once again a converging interest of the press for 
controversies on the integration of Muslims. However, press in France and Germany 
focused more on how Cameron echoed Merkel in stating multiculturalism as a 
failure. Instead, the British press paid more attention to the domestic prevention of 
Islamic extremism and the revision of the Prevent Strategy plan. Despite widespread 
criticism about the willingness to refuse multicultural policies and the attempt to 
securitise Muslim relationships, Cameron’s speech did gain a large consensus across 
the European press on the need to promote political belonging and encourage social 
cohesion among Muslim immigrants, especially those of second generation descent. 
 
Starting from this point of departure, the goal of this chapter is to compare 
the three case studies. The assumption is that this public debate across Europe has 
become engaged, not simply in parallel single debates, but also embroiled in a 
common discourse on civic integration. As a consequence, I use the European public 
sphere as an analytical category to investigate the degree of convergence of the 
national public spheres towards a common discourse. 
 
This chapter is developed in five sections. In the first section, I offer a 
comparative analysis of national debates to verify the extent to which a discursive 
process of convergence is emerging and to understand how mutual intertextual 
chains develop between merely different national public spheres. In the second 
section, I compare the socio-political implications of this European debate and I 
question this emerging discourse, which centres its strategy of integration through 
the request to Muslims to adopt abstract values, regardless of their social and 
cultural needs. In the third section, I provide a final assessment of the theoretical, 
methodological and empirical contributions of this project as well as the significance 
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and value of the study. In the fourth part, I review some limitations of the study and 
possible avenues for future research. Finally, I close with final remarks on the full 
project. 
 
1. The Transnational Convergence in the Press Coverage 
 
The three case studies reveal how Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron’s political 
statements have obtained large visibility across Europe through the coverage of the 
national press. However, it is not clear to what extent this simultaneous coverage 
impacts upon national debates, and eventually legitimates a common discourse on 
integration. Therefore my goal is to investigate how a process of transnational 
mediatisation can have a political legitimating function, which creates consensus 
towards a civic integration of Muslims. 
 
In stating my Research Hypothesis (RH 1), I emphasise that this debate 
across Europe is supported by a common discursive space in which diverse national 
actors have enacted and reproduced a common discourse on integration. 
Consequently, in Chapter 2, I explain the conceptual relevance of the European 
public sphere as a forum that facilitates and encourages the dissemination of 
discourses (Trenz 2005: 176; Diez, 2005: 628), which is thought to lead 
subsequently to political consensus. 
 
The public sphere is commonly defined as a communicative space in which 
common problems are debated through a rational-critical confrontation (Habermas 
1989). This deliberative conception of the public sphere assumes an inclusive public 
debate motivated by the goal of obtaining democratic consensus through mutual 
understanding and agreement (Dahlberg, 2013: 24). Public debate is thus seen as 
central to the official decision-making processes, through rational-critical debate and 
opinion formation. However this approach to deliberative public sphere is highly 
normative and aims at defining universal norms, which should be applied for 
evaluating any distortions within the public sphere. 
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My standpoint is instead influenced by discourse theory and argues that it is 
crucial to question the deliberative concept of public sphere with respect to the 
process of discourse formation and interaction with the media. In other words, the 
convergent status of a discourse can obscure other discourses that do not conform to 
what it means to be legitimate. Following this assumption, it can be argued that 
convergence defines the limits of the communicative interaction in public sphere. 
The articulation of a convergent discourse is therefore political, because it defines 
what is included and excluded in the debate. Consequently, the European public 
sphere can be investigated as a transnational arena, in which the simultaneous 
mediatisation of political statements establishes a specific hegemonic articulation, 
which excludes conflicting discourses from the public debate, reducing in this way 
the deliberative practice. 
 
Through a cross-national comparison of the national media coverage, I have 
been able to explore 1) how convergence is enacted among the national spheres via 
intertextuality and 2) which thematic categories are consistent across nations via 
interdiscursivity. I have collected 166 articles, related to Sarkozy, Merkel and 
Cameron’s statements, from leading newspapers in France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom by searching Nexis and Factiva databases in the following 7 days after 
each political statement was delivered. 
 
The coverage of the three nodal points (Table 7.1) proves a reciprocal 
interest across Europe for political statements concerning Muslim immigration. For 
each case study, it is possible to identify a homogenous distribution of the articles. 
Local coverage tends to be higher than foreign coverage in all three cases, but that 
seems quite reasonable, as national press tends to cover more a statement given by 
national leaders. The comparison of the ratio shows that non-local coverage tends to 
be consistent in all three cases within a margin of 0.3-0.6. 
 
The comparison of the ratio is very useful in order to cope with the 
differences among national markets; for example in Germany many newspapers are 
regionally based and not very relevant for international news. Moreover, the Nexis 
database does not include two main national newspapers, and for this reason I had to 
also search the Factiva database. In the case of France, overall, there are fewer 
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newspapers than Germany but are mainly national. Finally, both databases list a 
larger number of British newspapers, first of all because this database targets an 
English audience and secondly, many of these newspapers are tabloids. These two 
reasons can explain why, during the coverage of Cameron’s speech, the British press 
published notably more articles (a ratio of 6 compared to 1.5 of France and 1.7 of 
Germany). 
 
Table 7.1 – Distribution of the articles analysed per country 
Nodal	  Point	   France	   r	   Germany	   r	   UK	   r	   Total	  
Sarkozy	   19	   4.7	   10	   1.2	   12	   1.5	   41	  
Merkel	   13	   2.1	   27	   2.4	   19	   1.5	   59	  
Cameron	   11	   1.5	   7	   1.7	   *44	   6.0	   62	  
Total	   44	   	   44	   	   75	   	   162	  
 
The quantitative measure of the cross-national coverage confirms an 
increasing interconnection among the European public sphere, which enables mutual 
references and links between national public spheres. Certainly this generalisation 
has to be limited to these three specific cases, which are based on controversial 
political statements given by recognised political leaders. At the same time, when 
these two conditions are respected it is likely to expect a replication of the same 
process of convergence across the national press. 
 
Findings indicate that coverage also entails a similar way of framing these 
political statements despite the national differences and problems concerning 
immigration (Table 7.2). 
 
Table 7.2 – Thematic Dimensions 
Thematic	  Category	   France	   Germany	   UK	   Avg.	  
1.	  Membership	   27	   36	   43	   35.33	  
2.	  Religious	  diversity	   30	   24	   45	   33.00	  
3.	  Cultural	  tradition	   34	   41	   55	   43.33	  
4.	  National	  identity	   31	   37	   50	   39.33	  
5.	  European	  perspective	   29	   27	   48	   34.67	  
6.	  Securitization	   35	   37	   56	   42.67	  
7.	  Social	  Justice	   10	   16	   29	   18.33	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The most relevant category for this transnational analysis is the European 
perspective (TC 5). This category does not imply the lack of a national perspective; 
on the contrary, it reveals a dialectical tension between the national and the 
European level, in which the national debate reflects its position on integration in 
relation to Europe as a Western moral community. In particular, content analysis 
reveals that the most remarkable characteristics of this European perspective are: a) 
interest for immigration policies of other European countries; b) interest in public 
debate generated in other European countries; c) recognising leadership to non-
national European political leaders. 
 
Coverage analysis also shows that the press has a similar way to frame the 
problems concerning Muslim integration as a lack of common values (TC 3) and the 
difficulties for Muslims to adopt a national identity (TD 4). In more detail, the 
outbreak of these two categories presents the more recurrent themes used in press 
coverage: 
 
1. Muslims have to recognise and belong to a European/Western civic 
identity; 
2. Integration policies should prioritise those Muslims who agree to 
assimilate the national values of the majority; 
3. Muslim immigrants present intrinsic cultural differences that may clash 
with liberal and secular values shared by Europeans. 
4. Muslims should become more secular, reflective and anti-authoritarian. 
5. Civic integration policies aim at asking for more unity and cohesion of 
immigrants. 
6. National identity is an effective tool to support social cohesion. 
 
The close association among the thematic categories concerning European 
perspective (TC 5), national identity (TC 4) and cultural values (TC 3), confirms 
how the process of identification in a European collective-self (Risse: 2010: 11; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:8) has become a discursive resource in the 
press coverage of the debate over Muslim immigration. In particular, the critical 
discourse analysis of the three nodal points confirms how politicians have reinforced 
the specific construction of a collective identity separated by the Muslim Other 
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through the Us vs. Them contraposition. The definition of a shared identity and 
belonging to a European community is primarily shaped by a discourse that 
promotes a system of communal loyalties based on the acceptance of and 
observance of a common sense of history and traditions within Europe. 
 
This finding is confirmed also by the content analysis, which shows how 
simultaneous press coverage constantly recontextualises a discourse that all 
Europeans belong to a single political community (TC 5) which is respectful of the 
European national identities (TC 4) and asks a high commitment (TC 1) of Muslims 
to accept the values and culture that Europeans share (TC 3). At the same time, the 
empirical analysis conveys that there is a limited discussion of what are those shared 
cultural features among Europeans; they are generally taken for granted as abstract 
principles concerning liberalism and secularism and there is no reflection on the fact 
that those ‘common values’ are subjected to divergent interpretations, even within a 
homogenous national groups. 
 
The unifying character in these debates is the appeal to national discourses, 
which rigidly define the political identity of the national community, such as French 
Republicanism, British Liberalism or German Leitkultur. These discourses are an 
integral part of the national rhetoric and are reproduced in any institutional 
processes. However, the particularity of these national discourses in the literature 
has been used to explain divergent models of integration (Favel 2003). What is 
possible to observe is perhaps the opposite process, namely politicians recur to those 
discourses to legitimate integration through the acceptance and adoption of shared 
values within Europe. 
 
In the reconstruction of national public debates, I underline how both liberals 
and conservatives place the same importance on shared values as a key element of 
integration. For instance, in France, Sarkozy’s view of Republicanism does not 
differ from the one of socialists and consequently they are both afraid of any 
integration policies, which can grant any special rights to minorities, the unity of the 
nation is considered irreducible. In the UK, the national identity plays an important 
factor for both Tories and Labourites; in fact Cameron adopts Labour’s views on 
civic integration and echoes Blair’s rejection of multiculturalism. In Germany, the 
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Green-Red government with the support of the Christian Democrats approved value 
tests and a more ‘selective’ immigration law in order to preserve the specificity of 
the German culture. This convergence seems even more explicit in regards with 
securitisation. 
 
Multiculturalism has been framed as a danger to the security and cohesion of 
the community in the three cases under investigation. The ‘crisis of 
multiculturalism’ comes at a time of increased sensitivity towards security as a result 
of the terrorist events of 9/11 and those of Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 
(Mishra 2008), and therefore, international terrorism has led to an increasing 
securitisation of migration policies (Meinhof and Triandafyllidou 2006: 11, see also 
Cesari 2006; Jackson-Preece 2006). In this context, multicultural models of 
integration have been questioned under the pressure of the media, which have 
increasingly linked Islam with violence, separatism and anti-Western values 
(Halliday 2002; Flood et al 2010). 
 
In the content analysis, I have included a thematic category of security (TC 
6). Therefore I coded any article, which adopts or reports concern for the lack of 
integration as a serious threat to the social cohesion and prosperity of European 
countries. In Germany and France, the debate on the integration of Muslims has 
been related to the issue of public order and urban segregation. Newspapers widely 
report (even in absence of a transcript and a translation from German) Merkel 
attacked multiculturalism as the cause for the self-segregation of Muslim 
immigrants and the higher level of crime related to those segregated areas 
(Appendix 2: paragraph 8). 
 
In the same way, newspapers report Sarkozy’s concern for a frightened 
European population, which sees immigration as a problem of conflicting values and 
are more and more anxious about the “tribalism and sectarianism” of Muslims 
(Appendix 1: lines 33-35). And again, newspapers widely disseminate Cameron’s 
view that the root of extremism has to be found in multicultural policies, which have 
caused urban segregation and have pushed disaffected youth to reject the 
interpretation of a moderate Islam and to adopt a more radical interpretation 
(Appendix 3: paragraph 8). 
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By mapping the coverage of these three statements, it is possible to confirm a 
stable degree of convergence towards the assumption that multicultural policies do 
not encourage adopting those values that belong to the European community (TC 6); 
conversely embracing common values is exemplified as the best practice to deal 
with a correct and safe integration (TC 3). This nexus between securitisation and 
multiculturalism targets newcomers who are assumed, because of their religious and 
cultural identity, to have authoritarian and illiberal values. Once again, this 
discursive articulation points to the European process of self-identification, thus 
preserving those values that characterise the collective-self is a matter of security for 
the political cohesion of European nations. 
 
Two more observations have to be added on the general dynamic of the 
European public sphere. Firstly, the focus on the ability of European press to frame 
simultaneously political statements makes it very important to conceptualise 
convergence as related to the process of mediatisation of the European political 
debate. Press coverage creates a discursive space for arranging and contextualising 
discourses coming from other European countries into the national public debate 
through a consensual and relatively coherent discursive articulation. This process of 
articulation can be explicitly identified as transnational convergence through the 
media. 
 
Second, comparing the coverage of political statements allows us to identify 
the extent of convergence and define the boundary of the debate. Transnational 
convergence via the media tends on the one hand, to increase the level of 
intertextuality through an exponential dissemination of statements while on the other 
hand, it reduces the level of interdiscursivity by focusing only on those arguments 
based on those universal assumptions that refer to national identity discourses. 
However, the empirical analysis reveals how civic integration has been contested in 
several editorials. That proves that the debate remains open to those arguments like 
social justice (TC 6) which are not included in the discursive articulation of civic 
integration. Therefore, intertextuality and interdiscoursivity make the discourse of 
civic integration universal in that it seems to represent the whole public debate. 
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In conclusion, this cross-national comparison of public debates through 
content and discourse analysis emphasises the connections that the European public 
sphere establishes between national countries and how simultaneous debates impact 
on how national public spheres recontextualise transnational discourse on migration 
and integration. It can be claimed, therefore, that convergence, through mutual 
references, organises a shared way of thinking and talking about integration. The 
more the discourse on civic integration converges across national public spheres, the 
more it is perceived as stable and consensual in the public debate because the mutual 
discursive reference limits the force and effect of any oppositional discourse. 
Therefore, convergence through the media contributes to producing and sustaining a 
discursive articulation of civic integration. 
 
2. The Limits in the Discourse of Civic Integration 
 
The empirical analysis reveals how the political statements from Sarkozy, 
Merkel and Cameron are predicated upon a commitment to a common concern with 
civic perspective and political values. Therefore, despite the fact that nodal points 
are based on the cultural and political specificity of the national political context, 
these national discourses share a common assumption on Europe as a moral 
community, which defines what values belong to that community and, perhaps more 
crucially, those that do not belong. As a consequence, this discursive articulation 
centres its strategy of integration through the request to newcomers to assimilate and 
in some cases, dissolve into European values. In this section, I consider the political 
implications of this discourse by pointing to why this model of integration can 
contribute to further marginalisation of Muslim immigrants, rather than representing 
a process of effective inclusion, which can lead to social equality and membership. 
 
In Chapter 1, in the literature review, I emphasise that the main stake of civic 
integration focuses on how political conformity with European norms can become a 
limitation in the inclusion of new, culturally distinct immigrants and conversely, 
how immigrants must change or adapt to be admitted and live in the EU (Joppke, 
2003; Mouritsen, 2006; Favell, 2005). Consequently, I raise the question whether 
this ‘civic turn’ follows just from the national interest or from a process of collective 
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European self-identification (Risse 2010; Kundani 2012), in which national political 
debates have a reciprocal impact on legitimising and reinforcing a similar discourse 
on immigration. For this reason, it has been crucial to compare and acknowledge the 
discursive sources of mutual influence and the motives that go with these national 
debates. 
 
In developing the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, I observe how 
European collective self-identification has become a discursive resource for social 
and political cohesion (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005:8) in several controversies in regards to immigration. In particular, I highlight 
how these controversies are exploited through the Us vs. Them contraposition 
(Delanty and Rumford 2005; Risse and Sikkink 1999) to reinforce the construction 
of the Other. The most controversial aspect of the process of Othering lies in its 
potential for discrimination by defining political criteria to define acceptable and 
unacceptable diversity in the immigrant, while the European ethos is considered a 
quasi-natural and transcendent identity that characterises the European history. 
 
In conducting the critical discourse analysis, I confirm that each nodal point 
refers to specific values associated with a collective identity, and the analysis of the 
press coverage clarifies how these values have been recontextualised and promoted 
through three national public spheres. Furthermore, through the analysis of the 
textual practice, I observe how Muslims are represented as a single monolithic 
block, rather than as a collection of very diverse groups unified only in a single 
religious belief that they practice and often interpret in quite different ways. 
Conversely, I observe how Europe is always claimed as a collective We across 
national borders. 
 
For instance, Sarkozy defines “Europeans [as being] welcoming and tolerant: 
it is in their nature and culture” (Appendix 1: lines 29-30); Merkel defines Germany 
as part of an European “culture”, “strongly influenced by the Christian-Jewish 
heritage” (Appendix 2: paragraph 29) and Cameron calls for a common mission of 
European countries “to wake up to what is happening in our own countries” 
(Appendix 3: paragraph 3) and to defend “Western values” (Appendix 3: paragraph 
4). These discourses are thus constructed on the base of the ‘us-them’ dichotomy but 
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the implication of this dualism places ‘us’ in a higher position, of a more advanced 
civilisation, which implies that Muslim values are wrong or certainly less correct 
than ours. 
 
This discursive articulation of the European ethos starts from the supposition 
that European political, social, and cultural features are always right and appropriate, 
and for these reasons, cultural and identity uniformity are desirable through the 
assimilation of liberal and civic values. This assumes that the Muslim-Other 
constitutes a problem for which We have to find a solution (Honer and Weber, 2010: 
142; Wodak 2008:295). This rationality is used to defend the adaptation of Muslim 
immigrants to the European ethos through polices predicated upon a commitment to 
a common European concern with civic duty and political values. 
 
Any attempts to provide a legal definition of what these values are and how 
they could be declined is a serious limit to the project of the Europe Union, which is 
based on the incorporation of a plurality of cultures in order to override the 
divisiveness and the exclusion caused by nationalism in the tragic history of Europe. 
Therefore, this post-national concept of Europe centred on a model of universal 
inclusion beyond the national, cultural and religious particularistic specificities 
(Mavelli 2012: 116). Paradoxically, this attempt to transcend differences through a 
common ethos and universal moral laws postulates Europe in a dimension of 
exceptionality, which transforms Muslim unyielding diversity as a source of 
political, social and cultural insecurity. 
 
Hence the question is whether it is possible to integrate Muslims through the 
imposition of universal values, norms and cultural attributes shaped by the European 
ethos. I have identified three fallacies in the logic of this model of inclusion. First, 
the European ethos supposes that the majority shares all the features of the European 
self and consequently all values are adopted within the European population. 
Instead, there are always remarkable differences among citizens, especially when we 
consider established minorities are accommodated in the nation. This supposed 
homogeneity is extremely dangerous when applied to immigration because it 
reproduces a new category of Other, which needs to be scrutinised in order to check 
if it belongs to the European ethos. 
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Furthermore, liberal and civic values are defined in an abstract way. Anytime 
those values are referred to in public debate they are hardly ever explained or 
questioned. They are just supposed to have a self-evident and given meaning, which 
is particular and universal at the same time (Georgiou, 2005: 486); particular by 
being defined in a specific political national context, and universal by being 
assumed as an uncontested meaning shared across different social groups and 
countries in Europe (Mauritsen, 2008: 32). The call towards newcomers to adopt 
liberal and civic values thus reveals both the universal character of the European 
ethos and the particular political interest. 
 
The evident point here is that the meaning and implication of these universal 
values – including gender equality, secularism, democracy, freedom of speech and 
tolerance – are presumed as being uncontested. Nonetheless, these values are 
certainly questioned at the national level between different ideological groups, for 
example, liberals and conservatives have different views on civil rights such as 
abortion or gay marriage. Also, at the European level there is not a shared consensus 
among countries on many of these supposed universal values. For example, 
secularism in France has a rigid connotation of separation between the state and the 
church; while in the UK, the Church of England is officially a state church. But even 
the most elementary of human rights such as the protection of linguistic minorities 
or religious freedom are not unequivocally interpreted in all European countries. 
 
The universalization of liberal and civic values tends to idealise our culture 
and prevents us from understanding what we really are and what could be shared 
with the Other. This reluctance to understand the Other creates just different 
categories of immigrants: the “good” migrants are the same as us and deserve to be 
integrated, while the “bad” migrants are so different from us that they cannot be 
integrated (Horner and Weber 2011: 142). This strategy to reduce the complexity of 
the relationships with immigrants towards a process of integration of values risks 
creating further exclusion, as the universal character of the European ethos could 
bring more closure towards all minorities and newcomers who are perceived as not 
European. 
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Second, the most questionable aspect of the discourse of civic integration is 
not based on an absolute exercise of discrimination that would be incompatible with 
the legal constitutional framework of the nation and of the EU, but a form of control 
of the state, which requires immigrants to prove to have assimilated liberal values. 
This new form of ‘governmentality’ (Miller et al 1991) is based on the 
convincement that it is possible to assess whether immigrants are good citizens 
through standardised courses and tests. This liberal paradox implies hence that the 
state can guide individuals toward the acceptance and adoption of liberal values. 
However, such an approach appears highly controversial, as a liberal ethic is more 
articulated than linguistic competency and it would be illiberal to question the inner 
beliefs of the immigrants, unless it is assumed that freedom of speech and religion 
are secondary to the goal of integration. 
 
At the same time, this approach to integration does not address the problem 
of immigrant descendants. In the last ten years, European countries have 
experienced limitations in integrating some religious, political, or cultural features 
developed by second generation Muslims, who are often national citizens. A large 
part of this group is inclined to emphasise its cultural diversity through public self-
assertion; examples of this process are young Muslim women who ask to be allowed 
to wear the veil at school or the political extremism of some young Muslims. 
Therefore, the tendency to reduce this debate on integration to an ‘unquestionable’ 
adoption of core values is likely to remain a source of conflict with those Muslim 
nationals, who need to redefine their own identity with traditional practices. 
 
Several empirical studies prove that despite some conflicts, Muslim 
immigrants of first and second generation descent have been embracing national 
identities and liberal values. The 2007 Gallup World Poll (Nyri, 2007) in a specific 
survey on Muslims in Europe suggests that Muslim residents identify strongly with 
the country in which they live. Data reveals that in France, Germany and the UK, 
Muslims have the same degree of loyalty to the country in which they live as the 
national population. Thus the survey suggests that while religion remains an 
important part of Muslim identity, it does not imply any weaker sense of political 
belonging. 
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This result is also confirmed by a study on eleven cities in seven European 
countries conducted by the Open Society Institute. The Muslims in Europe report 
(OSI, 2010) indicates that Muslims and non-Muslims recognise “similar values as 
important to the country” in which they live; moreover, “these values correspond to 
those that are identified as core European values, such as respect for the law, 
freedom of expression and equality of opportunity” (OSI 2010: 69). The specific 
report on Muslims in London also reveals that Muslims have a higher rate of trust in 
political institutions compared with non-Muslim respondents. Approximately 49 per 
cent of Muslims had trust in the national Parliament, compared with just over 35 per 
cent of non-Muslims (OSI, 2012: 22). 
 
Therefore, findings prove that Muslims in Europe have a “political sense of 
belonging” and “attachment to the city and country where they live” (OSI, 2010: 
23). At the same time, Muslim “religious identity” does not reveal any noteworthy 
effect on respondents’ acceptance of liberal values (OSI 2010: 76). Further evidence 
that Muslims’ level of religiosity does not influence their level of political trust 
comes from the European Social Survey, the German Social Survey (ALLBUS), the 
Home Office Citizenship Survey (HOCS) and Statistics Netherlands. Data analysis 
suggests a positive orientation to political institutions among Muslims, in contrast to 
non-Muslims (Jackson and Doerschler 2012a, 2012b). These findings openly 
contrast with the discourse, reproduced in Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron’s political 
statements, that Muslim immigrants share illiberal values. Therefore, the discourse 
of civic integration seems rooted in assumptions and stereotypes, which should be 
reconsidered carefully in the light of the cultural adaption that Muslims immigrants 
are doing to integrate themselves in their host societies. 
 
What is necessary is a dialogue between the majority and the newcomers 
about diversity, which should not posit our values as antithetic to Muslims or any 
minority culture. Those efforts to promote national values among immigrants can be 
effective if based on a process of participation and education, and not an imposition 
of a supposed superior culture. For this reason, it is possible to be critical towards 
those illiberal and authoritarian values of a minority, but only after having 
questioned the goals of civic integration through a serious self-criticism of any 
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underlining assumptions regarding the rhetoric of common values (Mouritsen 2008: 
34).  
 
There is a third and last critical consideration that emerges from this critical 
analysis: the discourse of civic integration tends to underestimate social and 
economic disparities faced by Muslims in their process of integration. Specifically, 
there is not attempt to offer any economic and social explanation of the process of 
urban segregation. According to Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron, Muslims of first 
and second generation have been encouraged by multicultural policies to segregate 
themselves and to live separate lives apart from mainstream society. 
 
In the analysis of the French nodal point, I underline that Sarkozy calls for a 
fight against discrimination toward Muslims [line: 48], but without mentioning the 
economic and social problems immigrants have for including them in that same 
process of civil integration. By hiding structural inequalities, Sarkozy ignores the 
reality of those disparities that lie at the root of some of the current social distress 
experienced by French Muslims in suburban areas (Mayan, 2007). In this way, the 
French discourse on civic integration aims at taking into account Muslim 
immigrants’ responsibilities toward France and its political community rather than 
their real social needs. 
 
By analysing the German nodal point, I note that Merkel refers to the lack of 
integration of some Muslim immigrants [paragraph 32-33] but she never takes into 
account, the effectiveness of welfare programs to avoid marginalisation of 
immigrants or urban segregation. Merkel explicitly states that immigrants must 
integrate into the national society without counting on welfare policies [#31-32]. 
Thus Muslim immigrants are held individually accountable to guarantee the desired 
economic progress Germany wants. Accordingly, the German discourse of civic 
integration promotes the individual responsibility of immigrants towards the 
economic and social progress in Germany without any further costs to the social 
welfare. 
 
In the study of the British nodal point, Cameron promotes a muscular liberal 
model of integration [#11] to prevent radicalism and terrorism among Muslims. 
171	  	  
Cultural and political integration of Muslims is thus reduced to the development of a 
security agenda based on the control of Islamism and the certitude that Muslim 
groups effectively assimilate liberal values. Conversely, the British discourse on 
civic integration excludes any social integration based on the intervention of the 
state based on the elimination of social and economic inequality [#7]. 
 
These three statements repurpose the “parallel lives” thesis (Philips 2006: 
27), which accuses Muslim communities of carrying out practices of self-
segregation and social isolationisms under the banner of multiculturalism. However, 
there is no evidence that uniform societies offer “better social conditions than 
countries with a long tradition of diversity” (Vieyetz 2008: 87). It can be claimed in 
fact that countries that have better stability and social cohesion are those like Canada 
or Sweden, because they based their policies on promoting and protecting cultural 
diversity through multicultural policies. On the contrary, those countries like France 
that have managed diversity through an exclusion from public space, have shown a 
very high level lack of cohesion. A model of integration concerned with obtaining 
conformity can only create further marginalization, as it does not leave any room to 
accommodate specific cultural aspects (Kymlicka 2010: 99).  
 
Furthermore, several empirical works show Muslims in Europe are more 
likely than the local population to be poorer and live in segregated neighbourhoods 
with high levels of crime (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007). In addition, 
Muslims experience significantly greater rates of unemployment and poverty than 
the general population; while “those who are employed are often in marginal and 
low-paid jobs” or at a higher chance of unemployment (OSI, 2010: 24). Therefore, 
in France, Germany and the UK, Muslim immigrants remain part of an alienated 
underclass, which struggles to be integrated into the economic system.  
 
Perhaps the fact that these countries are still characterised by “deep social 
and economic divisions along ethnic lines” (Jurado 2008: 70) could question 
whether social isolationism and self-segregation can be also explained by social and 
economic inequalities. As a result, politicians should consider in a more realistic 
way, the economic and social discrimination that immigrants face during the process 
of integration. In particular, governments should promote policies aimed at 
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removing all the fundamental barriers to “the participation of immigrants in all 
aspects of economic, social, cultural and political life, including unequal 
opportunities and discrimination” (Jurado 2008: 81). 
 
To summarize, the evidence from the empirical analysis suggests the 
discourse of civic integration is based on a strong convincement that it is possible to 
avoid cultural conflict and maintain social cohesion through the strengthening of a 
collective identity, which requires the adherence to liberal values and respect of 
civic duties. However, such an approach appears highly idealistic, as it seems 
unrealistic that a course or a test could be really effective in promoting integration. 
Moreover, this civic approach tends to overstate the degree to which liberal values 
are universal in Europe as values are by definition subject to divergent political 
interpretations. 
 
Second, several social surveys are explaining that Muslim immigrants have 
the same degree of loyalty to liberal values as the national population, while Muslim 
religious identity does not have any substantial influence on the acceptance of liberal 
values. Therefore, the limit of civic integration is not only to deploy a shared set of 
cultural features to define the borders of the European identity, but to apply 
discriminatory criteria to justify the assimilation of liberal and civic values. Here the 
risk is to introduce, in the management of the relation with immigrants, a dangerous 
ethnocentric view (Balibar 2004: 75), which can see Muslim diversity as a 
deficiency that has to be corrected or expelled. 
 
Third, the discourse on civic integration tends to disregard social justice and 
promote a rationality based on the individual responsibility of the Muslim 
newcomers to integrate themselves without any particular welfare support from the 
state. However, Muslim immigrants of first and second generation descent have 
significantly greater rates of unemployment and poverty than the general population. 
Paradoxically, public debate remains stuck in the belief that diversity brings social 
isolationism and segregation rather than the socioeconomic realities. 
 
Finally, my personal concern touches upon the illiberal character that this 
discourse on civic integration brings to the debate about immigration. Although it 
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can be considered justified the goal to insist on the relevance of a core set of values 
and principles, this debate hides a deeper problem concerning the limits of the State 
power to norm the sphere of individual values and to sanction any deviation from a 
normative identity. Can the state impose on an individual, a requirement to adopt a 
collective identity? Can an individual be a citizen without having to conform to the 
majority’s idea of what are ‘good’ values? And finally can any policy enforce 
integration into the majority? Those questions seem very important not only for 
what is regarded as Muslim immigration, but in the general debate of the respect of 
minority and individual freedoms. 
 
3. The Theoretical and Methodological Contributions of this 
Comparative Research 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to analyse the European debate about civic 
integration during the so called multiculturalism crisis. Civic integration was 
conceived in EU immigration law as a balanced strategy “whereby immigrants were 
asked to abide by core liberal values and were ensured, in return, the gradual 
granting of a set of rights, including social, civic and political rights, comparable to 
those of EU citizens” (Mulcahy, 2008: 118). At the same time, the literature has 
offered a large amount of evidence that a core group of European countries have 
approved policies centred on a distorted version of civic integration akin to 
acculturation or even assimilation (Joppke, 2007; Muller 2007; Kundan, 2012). As a 
consequence, it has been crucial to investigate these national debates in order to 
understand how and why they are converging at the same time towards a common 
discourse on civic integration. 
 
The second goal of this thesis is to provide a considered response to a recent 
debate between scholars in Media studies and European studies, which observes the 
Europeanisation of the public sphere (Eriksen 2005; Trenz, 2005, Triandafyllidou et 
al 2010) as part of a general process of transnational communication (Fraser, 2007; 
Conway & Singh, 2009). Investigating this emerging transnational public sphere and 
the interaction within national public spheres is essential for investigating the 
boundaries of any debate across Europe. The more a discourse converges across 
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national public spheres, the more it is perceived as stable and consensual because the 
mutual discursive reference among public spheres limits the force and effect of any 
oppositional discourse. As a consequence, a process of convergence is not without 
consequences as it can contribute to a distortion of the debate. 
 
The findings from this study offer two major contributions to the literature 
quoted above. First, my thesis provides evidence that the national public sphere 
remains central to the legitimisation of many aspects of immigrant integration in 
terms of national priorities and sensibilities. This is despite the fact that the 
increased number of transnational networks of communication associated with 
globalisation (Fraser 2007) and the process of European integration (Eriksen 2005) 
have questioned the national dimension of the public sphere and led to a 
reconsideration of the concept beyond the national territorial state (Risse 2010). 
Consequently, transnational convergence does not limit the agency of the national 
public sphere; at the same time, convergence through the media can reduce the 
deliberative function of the public sphere by reinforcing previous political decisions 
and controlling the level of contestation. 
 
This apparent contradiction is verified through the observation of the 
simultaneous coverage of Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron’s political statements on 
immigration and multiculturalism. The mediatisation of these political statements 
across Europe has enabled horizontal links and exchanges across national public 
spheres. Thus this process of simultaneous mediatisation has created a national 
discursive space for debating integration through a European perspective. 
Conversely, this reciprocal interest to transnational political discourses seems to 
narrow the capacity of the public sphere to question some arguments, also when they 
are based on wrong assumptions. 
 
Hence, the articulation of a transnational discourse in the European public 
sphere is crucial as such articulation involves the process to establish a normative 
discourse, which aims at organising the complexity of social relationships between 
immigrant minorities and the majority. Consequently, it is central to investigate 
mediatised convergence and its associated discourses in relation mainly to the role 
of the European public sphere and then to deliberative practice. A hegemonic system 
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of discourse limits the process of the deliberative debate, and thus defines the limits 
of the communicative interaction in the public sphere. 
 
The second contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate how this 
simultaneous debate on Muslim immigration reinforces the construction of new 
boundaries between the in-group and the out-group through the definition of the new 
Other (Delanty and Rumford 2005). Specifically, civic integration reinforces a 
discourse on the Other, based on the Self vs. Them construction, which assumes that 
the Muslim constitutes a problem that We have to find a solution for (Honer and 
Weber, 2010: 142; Wodak 2008:295) through a “one way process” of integration in 
which Muslims are “expected to integrate into the existing society without any 
reciprocal accommodation” (Lacroix, 2010: 8). The analysis thus presents evidence 
that discourse on integration tends to legitimise a collective identity among 
Europeans that reflects common traditions and culture. 
 
The public debate across Europe thus seems to be moving towards a similar 
process of collective self-identification, which implies the universal acceptance of 
normative assumptions regarding the political and cultural nature of European 
identity (Risse, 2010). Furthermore, it can be claimed that the same discourse 
assumes that integration can be granted just through the ability of the immigrant to 
internalise the liberal values that characterise the European ethos. Thus, and similar 
to traditional discourses on nationalism, the European identity becomes a discursive 
resource for social and political cohesion (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2005:8) based on the relationship between the identification with a 
distinct political national entity and with a European moral community. 
 
In regards of methodology, the empirical analysis evaluates the conditions 
and practices involved in the enactment and reproduction of the discourse of civic 
integration of Muslims in the national public spheres. Therefore, the analytical task 
is not focused only on the semiotic analysis of the negative view on the presence of 
Muslims and Islam, but also on the analysis of a normative attempt to integrate them 
into a discourse on European identity based on universal values, standards and 
cultural attributes of the majority. 
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By looking at interdiscursivity and intertextuality, the analysis also reveals 
how national nodal points are mutually related to similar national discourses and 
how press coverage is central in creating a European perspective to legitimate a 
civic approach to integration. For this reason, the strategic use of a comparative 
framework, based on a Critical Discourse Analysis in combination with a Content 
Analysis illustrates in detail a) the degree of transnational convergence between 
national discourses on civic integration and b) the intersections between discourses 
on national identity and Europe as a collective representation of a shared community 
represent the cultural space that the Muslim Other must fit into. 
 
The comparative framework is central to underline how transnational debate 
can affect the national public spheres through mutual observation between 
international political actors and national spheres. Specifically, the analysis of the 
transnational convergence allows an investigation of the boundaries of this emerging 
interaction within national public spheres, as such debates involve what is included 
and excluded in this debate. This approach has thus given many explanations of why 
the discourse of civic integration centres its strategy of integration through the 
request to newcomers to assimilate abstract values for legal entry and residence in 
the EU. 
 
In order to cope with the widespread criticism about the reliability and 
validity of any hermeneutic methodology in the social sciences, the thesis has 
provided a rigorous systematisation of how data have been collected and analysed. 
Concerning the validity, this research design combined Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) with Content Analysis (CA) in order to have a second method to gather data 
and validate findings. Specifically, CDA has been useful to understand how 
discourse on civic integration works toward particular political interests, while CA 
has been helpful to identify relevant ‘themes’ in the press coverage and to compare 
similar discursive strategies across Europe. Hence, this triangulation technique has 
facilitated an interdisciplinary approach to the study of political debate and a 
validation of data through cross verification from different sources. 
 
To summarise, my thesis contributes towards bringing theoretical 
contribution and empirical evidence to the study of transnational processes of 
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communication. It explains transnational convergence by investigating: 1) the ability 
of some governmental leaders to shape and lead the European public debate on 
integration of Muslims and 2) how the simultaneous coverage of press can reinforce 
a transnational discourse in the national public sphere. Transnational convergence 
thereby invites us to analyse connections that a transnational discursive space, such 
as the European public sphere, can establish between national countries and how and 
why national public spheres recontextualise at the same time, a common discourse 
on civic integration. 
 
4. Limitations of the Study and Future Research Directions 
 
A number of caveats need to be noted regarding the present study. First, in 
my empirical analysis I reconstruct convergence through the reciprocal influence 
between national public debates. The research design posits that domestic political 
factors are the real explanations for convergence and does not consider 
supranational actors, such as the EU, among the many determinants of national 
debate. However, in the literature review (Chapter 2), I report that several authors 
have underscored how the discourse of civic integration is part of the language 
adopted by the EU institution in regards of immigration (Carrera & Weilsbrock, 
2009, Mulcahy, 2008). For this reason, further analysis might usefully evaluate what 
influence on the public debate over integration comes from European and national 
institutions. In more detail, it could be interesting to study when and how ‘civic’ 
amendments in national legislations have been justified in light of the EC Directives 
on immigration. 
 
Second, the horizontal approach also excludes a bottom-up process of 
communication. In the case of the Swiss ban on minarets, Muslims have appealed to 
European institutions to stop the implementation of that vote (Christmann and 
Dannaci 2012). The same process happened after the French ban on the full veil, 
when Muslim groups appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (Rosen 
2004: 147). Thus, it might be worth addressing a further question in future research 
to explore how transnational convergence can be realised through Muslim political 
practices to pursue their rights and freedoms (Anagnostou and Psychogiopoulou 
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2009) with the support of European institutions. As a consequence, a further study 
could assess those bottom-up processes of communication in which Muslims engage 
political activity against any attempt to exclude their diversity or claim their political 
subjectivity to obtain the recognition of their diversity. 
 
Third, the analysis of the debate does not consider the role of public opinion 
and to what extent the public perceives multiculturalism. The debate on civic 
integration overlaps with the increasing influence of xenophobic parties and more 
than a decade of Islamophobic campaigns. Notably, it is possible to hypothesise that 
political actors are highly sensitive to public concerns about immigration, and for 
this reason, governments could keen to implement civic integration policies in order 
to ‘neutralise’ voters’ fear towards ethnic and cultural diversity. Future research 
could investigate the public’s concern through a multi-dimensional methodological 
approach, which would give additional analytical leverage to the present thesis. For 
example, I could consider a) an analysis of national public opinion surveys, b) in-
depth interviews with ordinary citizens and c) an analysis of the debate through the 
social media. 
 
Fourth, the debate on integration can also be further analysed through 
examining alternative causes such as the ideological orientation of governments. 
Conservative political leaders gave all the three nodal points taken in analysis. 
Therefore, further research could be done through in-depth interviews to public 
decision makers in order to explore to what extent the role of political membership 
is relevant in developing a particular viewpoint and what differences exist with the 
opposition. 
 
Finally, I plan to extend my PhD work beyond this specific debate on 
Muslims to a more specific debate on the admission and integration of immigrants. 
Rather than looking just at Muslim integration, I would like to analyse those 
attempts to present multicultural integration as both divisive and undermining of 
political and social cohesion. Accordingly, it could be interesting to work on a larger 
empirical set of data that is aimed at understanding what forms of diversity are still 
perceived as a destabilising issue for community cohesion in Europe, rather than as a 
general contribution to pluralism. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis focuses on how the European public sphere has recently hosted a 
focused debate on the integration of Muslims, one that reflects a mainly European 
concern toward imparting national culture and values to newcomers. My goal has 
been to assess the mediatisation across Europe of this political debate by 
investigating shared strategies of discourse through which civic integration is 
articulated and legitimated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of 
each national context. Hence the study of this discourse in the European public 
sphere is crucial not only for scholars of media and communication, as this 
discourse involves a large debate on how to manage the complexity of social 
relationships between immigrant minorities and majority in Europe. 
 
When looking at the justification used by Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy, it 
appears clear that their main goal is to obtain a better management of migration. 
However, the evidence from this study also suggests a strong convincement that 
integration can be realised through the promotion of those liberal values necessary to 
avoid cultural conflict and maintain social cohesion. Such a discourse appears 
problematic because civic integration is often reinforced with a normative paradigm 
that tends to overstate the degree to which liberal values are universal in Europe and 
seeks to secure the identity of the national majority, regardless of the social and 
cultural needs of newcomers. As a consequence, civic integration policies could be 
applied as a mechanism for diversity control, through political criteria aimed at 
choosing what categories of immigrants can be admitted and can reside in the state. 
 
There are a number of important considerations that need to be made here 
regarding the mediatisation of the political debate on Muslims and in general of 
immigrants. The analysis of the French, German and British debates demonstrate 
how the presence of Muslims have been framed as a security concern by blaming 
multicultural policies as both a leading cause of Muslim self-segregation as well as 
an obstacle to the lack of integration. The present debate thus reinforces stereotypes 
on Muslims and ignores the process of cultural adaptation and mixing that Muslims 
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are already experiencing in Europe. Sociological surveys show that Muslims have 
started becoming an integral part of European societies and embracing national 
identities and liberal values at the same degree as locals. Therefore, the assumption 
that integration is primarily or solely about cultural and values assimilation depends 
on a total misunderstanding of any advancements that Muslim immigrants are doing 
to be an integral part of Europe. 
 
Certainly, immigrants have a duty to learn the national language and to 
know, respect and observe the Constitution and legislation of the host country. 
However, it appears highly controversial to attempt to define what those liberal or 
‘national’ values are and how these policies may exclude or target those who do not 
believe in such values. As Withe noted, how we define the European demos is an 
ideological matter (2008: 115), and is bound up in a broader question of how the 
Other comes to be represented. 
 
In the reality of an increasingly multicultural and diverse Europe – where 
immigration plays a much larger role than in the near past – such an insistence on 
universal rights, identity and culture risks being socially and culturally divisive 
rather than unifying, as it can potentially reinforce perceptions of minorities as an 
eternal Other (Kymlicka, 2010:99). As a consequence, the attempt to create a civic 
identity based on the reproduction of “non-negotiable and non-questionable” 
European values raises uncertainties about the real transformative potential of the 
European project, specifically considering the realisation of a cosmopolitan Europe 
capable of embracing diversity (Mavelli, 2012: 107). 
 
It is difficult to predict whether civic integration polices will produce the 
desired result of a more cohesive society, or whether they will only marginalise 
immigrants, especially Muslims. However, it appears plausible to argue that 
cohesion occurs when integration takes a two-way process of adaptation, in which 
values, norms and cultures are more a terrain of reciprocal confrontation and 
dialogue rather than an inflexible form of identity developed by a reaction to an 
increasing presence of Muslims. But this is possible only if integration recognises 
that the specificity of Europe is based on tolerance and respect for diversity and not 
on a universal culture to impose to minorities. Therefore, Europeans should 
181	  	  
approach Muslims with respect and a willingness to listen and learn. Central to this 
is the construction of an inclusive European public sphere, in which Muslims can 
make proposals and raise objections, and to bargain and have representation beyond 
and independently of their belonging to any culture, religion or nation. 	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Appendix 1: Nicolas Sarkozy, "Respecter ceux qui arrivent, 
respecter ceux qui accueillent" 
 
France and Swiss minaret vote 
Wednesday 9 December 2010 
 
The present editorial is an edited and translated extract from an article that appeared 
in Le Monde, 9th December 2009. 
 
 
“Material removed for copyright reasons” 
 
 
English Source:  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/dec/09/france-swiss-minaret-
vote-muslims (Accessed on 15th December 2009) 
 
Original French Source:  
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2009/12/08/m-sarkozy-respecter-ceux-qui-
arrivent-respecter-ceux-qui-accueillent_1277422_3232.html (Accessed on 15th 
December 2009) 
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Appendix 2: Merkel’s speech at the “Junge Union” Conference8 
 
Potsdam, 16 October, 2010 
 
 
Dear Philipp Missfelder, dear friends of the 
Junge Union. 
 
 
[1] This year I am here. Last year there 
wasn't a website which was blocked by the 
Konrad-Adenauer-House, either. I reread 
everything that was being circulated, and I 
think it’s good that today, here in Potsdam, 
in Babelsberg, we can talk about what the 
responsibilities of our times are, how we can 
engage in policy-making for the people. And 
I believe it’s worth looking back again at the 
last 20 years. Back then the German 
parliamentary session could not have been 
held in Babelsberg—or perhaps it could 
have. And a few days ago, when we were 
very near here, in Berlin with Helmut Kohl 
for 14 days, we thought about the unity 
party convention of the Christian 
Democratic Union, about this incredible 
time in which suddenly something had 
started to move that the vast majority in 
Germany had already given up hope in. 
Namely, that the Cold War had ended, that 
the Wall had fallen, that Germans were 
united again and that the Christian 
Democratic Union could, as well as the 
CSU, say: It was worth it to stick to our 
ideals, it was worth it to stand for German 
unity. Even though it was a goal that didn’t 
look realistic for many years, it was right to 
stick to this goal, because, dear friends, 
values must be protected even if they aren’t 
attainable at the time. 
 
 
 
 
[2] And for those of you who were still 
relatively young at the time, or even 
Lieber Philipp Mißfelder, liebe Freunde der 
jungen Union,  
 
 
[1] Dieses Jahr bin ich hier. Es wurde letztes 
Jahr auch keine Internetseite vom Konrad 
Adenauer Haus aus gesperrt. Ich habe es 
nochmal nachgelesen, was da alles so im 
Umlauf war, und ich glaube, dass es gut ist, 
dass wir heute hier in Potsdam in 
Babelsberg miteinander darüber sprechen 
können, was die Aufgaben unserer Tage 
sind. Wie wir Politik für die Menschen 
machen können und es lohnt sich glaube ich 
nochmal 20 Jahre zurück zu blicken. Da 
wäre ein Deutschlandtag nicht in Babelsberg 
abhaltbar gewesen oder doch gerade schon. 
Und wir haben vor wenigen Tagen, 14 
Tagen mit Helmut Kohl, ganz nah hier in 
Berlin noch mal an den 
Vereinigungsparteitag der Christlich 
Demokratischen Union gedacht. An diese 
unglaubliche Zeit, in der plötzlich etwas in 
Bewegung kam, was die allermeisten in 
Deutschland ja schon gar nicht mehr 
geglaubt hatten. Nämlich: dass der kalte 
Krieg zu Ende war, dass die Mauer gefallen 
ist, dass die Deutschen wieder vereint waren 
und dass die Christlich Demokratische 
Union sagen konnte, genauso wie die CSU, 
es hat gelohnt, an Idealen festzuhalten, es 
hat sich gelohnt für die Deutsche Einheit 
einzustehen. Auch wenn es ein Ziel war, 
was viele viele Jahre als nicht realistisch 
aussah, so war es richtig an diesem Ziel 
festzuhalten, weil man Werte verteidigen 
muss, auch wenn sie noch nicht erreichbar 
sind liebe Freunde. 
 
[2] Und für Sie, die Sie damals noch relativ 
jung oder ganz klein waren, ist das ja 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The present Transcript and Translation have been obtained through the video available on Youtube 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WaEg8aM4fcc (accessed on 1st November 2010) for reproduction 
please contact Marco Scalvini scalvimi@gmail.com. 
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younger, these are probably just stories 
about history. But history, that’s the 
foundation on which we build and from 
which we take the responsibilities of our 
time. That is why German unity is a success 
story and that is why we can be proud that 
we had German unity with Helmut Kohl as 
Chancellor. And that’s why it was good that 
back then a Christian-Liberal Coalition was 
ruling. There’s no doubt that if Lafontaine 
had said that back then, who knows, dear 
friends, if I’d be standing here today? 
 
 
[3] And now, since last year, we have again 
the possibility to engage in policy-making in 
a Christian-Liberal Coalition. Philip 
Missfelder has indicated what he expects. I 
think these expectations of our party’s youth 
organisations are absolutely legitimate. We 
are living in a time when many things have 
to be decided. Two years ago a fundamental 
financial and economic crisis began. A crisis 
that taught us a lesson, a lesson that is also 
of great importance for us as Christian 
Democrats: namely, this crisis has taught us 
that freedom is essential, which we also saw 
in 1989/90. Freedom is the prerequisite for 
democracy, but freedom is not arbitrary. 
Freedom as we understand it is not a 
freedom of something but a freedom to 
something. A freedom to take responsibility. 
 
 
 
 
[4] What we accomplished with the end of 
the Cold War, defeating the dictatorship, 
socialism, communism, could turn out to be 
just as reprehensible if we have freedoms 
that know no more responsibilities. And in 
the financial markets that kind of freedom 
has been prevailing. That is why the 
financial markets must be regulated. The 
financial markets and also the stakeholders 
there, the products there—for such things 
we also have a responsibility. Market 
excesses should never happen. That is the 
lesson of the international financial crisis. 
inzwischen Erzählung aus der Geschichte. 
Aber Geschichte, das ist ja das Fundament, 
auf dem wir aufbauen und aus dem heraus 
wir die Aufgaben unserer Zeit beziehen. 
Und deshalb ist die Deutsche Einheit eine 
Erfolgsgeschichte und deshalb können wir 
stolz darauf sein, dass wir mit Helmut Kohl 
den Kanzler der Deutschen Einheit hatten. 
Und deshalb war es gut, dass damals eine 
Christlich-Liberale Koalition regiert hat. 
Nicht auszudenken, wenn Lafontaine damals 
das sagen hätte, wer weiß, ob ich dann hier 
stehen könnte, liebe Freunde. 
 
[3] Und wir haben jetzt, seit dem 
vergangenen Jahr, wieder die Chance, in 
einer Christlich-Liberalen Koalition Politik 
zu machen. Und Philip Mißfelder hat darauf 
hingewiesen, was er sich erwartet. Ich finde, 
diese Erwartung der Jugendorganisation 
unserer Partei ist absolut legitim. Wir leben 
in einer Zeit, in der sich vieles entscheiden 
muss. Vor zwei Jahren hat eine elementare 
Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise begonnen. 
Eine Krise, die uns etwas gezeigt hat. 
Gezeigt hat, was auch für uns als 
Christdemokraten ganz wichtig ist: diese 
Krise hat nämlich gezeigt, Freiheit ist 
wichtig, das haben wir nämlich 1989/90 
gesehen. Freiheit ist die Voraussetzung für 
Demokratie, aber Freiheit ist nicht beliebig. 
Die Freiheit, wie wir sie verstehen, ist eine 
Freiheit nicht von etwas, sondern das ist eine 
Freiheit zu etwas. Eine Freiheit, 
Verantwortung zu übernehmen. 
 
[4] Das, was wir geschafft haben mit dem 
Ende des Kalten Krieges, die Diktatur, den 
Sozialismus, den Kommunismus zu 
besiegen, das hat sich dann genauso als 
verwerflich gezeigt, wenn wir Freiheiten 
haben, die keinerlei Verantwortung mehr 
kennen. Und in den Finanzmärkten hat ein 
solcher Freiheitsbegriff geherrscht. Deshalb 
heisst es auch: auch Finanzmärkte müssen 
reguliert werden. Auch Finanzmärkte und 
die Akteure dort, die Produkte dort, auch 
dafür gibt es eine Verantwortung. Exzesse 
der Märkte dürfen nicht passieren. Das ist 
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All this is a confirmation of what has made 
Germany so strong over the last 60 years, 
namely the social market economy of a 
responsible, free, economic order. 
 
 
 
 
[5] The global economic crisis that resulted 
from the financial crisis has been profound. 
That’s the situation that we, in the year 
2010, have before us. You who are sitting 
here today will, in the next 20 years want to 
build our country in whichever sector you 
choose. And so the questions arise: What are 
our tasks? What do they mean? First, what I 
say to you is this: We have to think about 
what the situation will be in the world after 
this crisis. As I have always said: We in 
Germany want to come out of this crisis 
stronger than we were when we entered it. 
Secondly: during such a crisis the deck of 
cards will be reshuffled. That's exactly what 
we are experiencing now. We have strong 
Asian markets. China, for instance, has 
become a lively, challenging competitor. 
And we can't simply say: We don’t like that. 
We have to stand up to the competition if we 
want to preserve our prosperity.  
 
 
 
 
[6] The second challenge that lies before us 
concerns the change in our society’s age 
demographic. Happily people are getting 
older and we have more medical options, but 
there are fewer young people in our country. 
In 1990 the average age was 35, today it is 
42 and in 2030 it will be 58. This is the 
reality. Regarding this, nothing more will 
change. Now is the question: What political 
power has the opportunity and the courage 
and can make the decisions that will lead us 
to the right answer to this challenge? I think 
we all agree: We don't want to have lived 
only in the past in prosperity, security and 
freedom; we want this just as much for 
future generations. That is the task we have 
die Lehre aus der internationalen 
Finanzkrise. 
Das alles ist eine Bestätigung dessen, was 
Deutschland seit 60 Jahren stark macht 
nämlich der sozialen Marktwirtschaft, einer 
verantworteten, freiheitlichen 
Wirtschaftsordnung. 
 
[5] Die Weltwirtschaftskrise, die sich aus 
der Finanzkrise ergeben hat, diese Krise hat 
tiefe Spuren hinterlassen. Das ist die 
Situation, die wir im Jahre 2010 heute vor 
uns haben. Die, die Sie hier sitzen, werden 
in den nächsten 20 Jahren unser Land 
gestalten wollen, an welcher Stelle auch 
immer. Und deshalb ist die Frage: Was sind 
unsere Aufgaben? Was bedeutet das? 
Da sage ich als erstes: Wir müssen uns 
überlegen, was nach dieser Krise die 
Situation auf dieser Welt ist. Ich hab immer 
gesagt: Wir in Deutschland wollen stärker 
aus dieser Krise herauskommen als wir 
hinein gegangen sind. Jetzt wird als zweites 
gesagt: Während einer solchen Krise werden 
die Karten neu gemischt. Genau das erleben 
wir jetzt. Wir haben starke asiatische 
Märkte. China ist ein lebendiger, 
anstrengender Wettbewerber geworden. Und 
da können wir nicht sagen: Das passt uns 
nicht, sondern diesem Wettbewerb müssen 
wir uns stellen, wenn wir unseren 
Wohlstand erhalten wollen. 
 
[6] Zweite Herausforderung, vor der wir und 
Sie alle stehen, das ist die Veränderung des 
Altersaufbaus unserer Gesellschaft. Die 
Menschen werden erfreulicher Weise älter, 
die medizinischen Möglichkeiten werden 
mehr, aber es gibt weniger junge Menschen 
bei uns im Land. Wir hatten1990 noch ein 
Durchschnittsalter von etwa 35 Jahren, wir 
haben heute ein Durchschnittsalter von 42 
Jahren und wir werden 2030 ein 
Durchschnittsalter von 58  Jahren haben. 
Das sind die Realitäten. An diesen wird sich 
nichts mehr ändern. Jetzt ist die Frage: 
welche politische Kraft hat die Chance und 
den Mut und die Entscheidungen, dass wir 
auf diese Herausforderung eine richtige 
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to accomplish. That is why our Christian-
Liberal Coalition has as its mission setting 
the right course for Germany for the next 10 
to 20 years. As part of this we’ll need to 
anticipate some very unpleasant findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[7] Since the last big coalition—not the one 
from 2005-2009 but from the late 60's—
federal politics has been accustomed to 
spending more than it has brought in. This 
has led to a huge mountain of debt, which 
we all have to deal with now. And if we do 
not want your generation and your children 
to have no opportunity whatsoever to shape 
their future, we must drastically change 
course. That's why it was right that the 
CDU/CSU was the driving force in 
incorporating the debt ceiling into the 
Constitution and in saying: We must stop 
living on credit. We cannot continuously 
draw cheques on the future. We have to 
make do with what we have. 
 
 
 
[8] When the left so often debates what 
justice is in our time, then I say: The biggest 
injustice is simply living day to day and not 
caring about the future. We are partners in 
justice when we reduce our debts and finally 
start making realistic financial policies. That 
has a different meaning with our coexistence 
in Europe. Europe is our present and our 
future, which has in the context of Europe 
once again a totally different meaning. We 
have experienced it before, what happens in 
such a crisis, when countries haven't got 
solid finances and nobody believes anymore 
that someday they‘ll pay back their debts. 
That was the case with Greece, and later 
also the rescue of the whole euro. And 
look—you can speculate as much as you 
like whether we acted too soon or too late. I 
Antwort finden? Ich glaube, wir sind uns 
einig: Wir wollen nicht nur, dass wir in der 
Vergangenheit im Wohlstand gelebt haben 
und in Sicherheit und Frieden, wir wollen, 
das für die künftigen Generationen genau so. 
Das ist unsere Aufgabe, die wir erfüllen. 
Deshalb hat unsere christlich-liberale 
Koalition die Aufgabe, die Weichen für 
Deutschland für die nächsten 10 und 20 
Jahre richtig  zu stellen. Da muss man mit 
sehr unangenehmen Befunden rechnen. 
 
[7] Seit der letzten großen Koalition, also 
nicht der von 2005-2009 – sondern Ende der 
60ger Jahre -  hat sich die Bundespolitik 
angewöhnt, immer mehr auszugeben als 
man eingenommen hat. Das hat zu einem 
riesigen Schuldenberg geführt, mit dem wir 
jetzt alle umgehen müssen. Und wenn wir 
nicht wollen, dass Ihre Generation und Ihre 
Kinder überhaupt keine Chance  zur 
Gestaltung mehr haben, da müssen wir 
massiv umsteuern. Und deshalb war es 
richtig, dass die Union die treibende Kraft 
war, ins Grundgesetz eine Schuldenbremse 
aufzunehmen und zu sagen: Wir müssen 
Schluss machen mit dem Auf-Pump-Leben. 
Wir können nicht dauernd Schecks auf  die 
Zukunft ziehen, sondern wir müssen endlich 
mit dem auskommen, was wir einnehmen. 
 
[8] Wenn so oft von der linken Seite darüber 
diskutiert wird, was denn Gerechtigkeit in 
unserer Zeit ist, dann sage ich: das 
Ungerechteste ist, einfach in den Tag hinein 
zu leben und sich nicht um die Zukunft zu 
kümmern. Wir sind Gerechtigkeitspartner, 
wenn wir Schulden abbauen und endlich 
realistische Finanzpolitik machen. Das 
ganze hat in unserem Zusammenleben in 
Europa, Europa ist unsere Gegenwart und 
unsere Zukunft, das hat im Kontext mit 
Europa noch einmal eine ganz andere 
Bedeutung. Wir haben es früher erlebt, was 
passiert in einer solchen Krise, wenn einige 
Länder überhaupt keine soliden Finanzen 
mehr haben und niemand mehr daran glaubt, 
dass sie ihre Schulden eines Tages zurück 
zahlen. Das war der Fall Griechenland; 
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had a very strong opinion and I'm not going 
to depart from it now or in the future. When 
we have a strong euro, then isn’t time to say: 
‘Now we need a little solidarity.’ No, the 
prerequisite for solidarity in Europe is that 
each and every country does its homework. 
That’s what we were expecting from 
Greece. 
 
 
 
 
 
[9] And in connection to this the much 
talked about topic has been: Is Germany still 
European? Do we still feel responsible for 
the heritage of Konrad Adenauer and 
Helmut Kohl? I say: Of course! If we had 
gone through this economic crisis without 
the euro, we would have had a very, very 
difficult time. We would have had to 
constantly rely on currencies. But I also say, 
to defend the legacy of Helmut Kohl and 
Konrad Adenauer, the precondition is that 
we are committed to a reasonably stable 
culture in Europe. That is the basis for a 
common currency and it must not be 
doubted. But precisely because of that it is 
necessary that we set a good example. 
Because if we don't do our homework others 
will not accept the demands that we make. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[10] Solid financial policies are a 
prerequisite for justice in our country. We 
must ask ourselves: What do we want to be 
in 10 years? In 20 years? I think we are 
doing the right thing if we say, Germany 
should be an industrial country! An 
industrial country! This also means that we 
establish a sensible energy policy. An 
energy policy that is not dominated by 
desires and ideologies but an energy policy 
that is oriented toward the future, that says: 
Yes, we want to reach the age of renewable 
später noch die Rettung des gesamten Euro. 
Und schauen Sie, da kann man  jetzt lange 
darüber philosophieren, ob wir zu früh oder 
zu spät gehandelt haben. Ich hatte eine ganz 
feste Meinung. Und von der werde ich auch 
in Zukunft nicht abrücken., wenn wir einen 
starken Euro haben.. Dann kann nicht gesagt 
werden: jetzt brauchen wir mal ein bisschen 
Solidarität, sondern es ist die Voraussetzung 
für Solidarität in Europa, dass jeder, jedes 
Land seine Hausaufgaben macht. Genau das 
haben wir von Griechenland erwartet. 
 
[9] Und es ist ja in dem Zusammenhang viel 
darüber gesprochen worden : ist 
Deutschland noch europäisch? Fühlen wir 
uns dem erbe von Konrad Adenauer und 
Helmut Kohl noch verpflichtet? Ich sage: 
natürlich! Wenn wir ohne Euro durch diese 
Wirtschaftskrise gegangen wären, hätten wir 
eine ganz, ganz schwierige Zeit gehabt. 
Dann hätten wir unentwegt Währungen 
stützen müssen.  Aber ich sage auch, um das 
Erbe von Helmut Kohl und Konrad 
Adenauer zu verteidigen, ist die 
Voraussetzung, dass wir uns alle einer 
vernünftigen Stabilitätskultur in Europa 
verpflichtet fühlen. Das ist die Grundlage 
für eine gemeinsame Währung und daran 
darf auch nicht gezweifelt werden. Aber 
genau dafür ist es eben auch notwendig, dass 
wir mit gutem Beispiel voran gehen. Denn, 
wenn wir unsere Hausaufgaben nicht 
machen, werden andere von uns nicht 
akzeptieren, dass wir an Sie Forderungen 
stellen. 
 
[10] Die solide Finanzpolitik ist eine 
Voraussetzung für Gerechtigkeit in unserem 
Land. Da müssen wir uns fragen: was 
wollen wir denn sein in 10 Jahren, in 20 
Jahren? Da glaub ich, tun wir gut daran zu 
sagen: Deutschland soll ein Industrieland 
sein! Ein Industrieland! Dazu gehört auch, 
dass wir eine vernünftige Energiepolitik 
machen. Eine Energiepolitik, die nicht von 
Wünschen und Ideologien beherrscht ist, 
sondern eine Energiepolitik, die auf die 
Zukunft ausgerichtet ist; die sagt: ja, wir 
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energy, but that at the same time says: We 
want to keep our jobs, we want affordable 
electricity and we want to guarantee the 
security of the energy supplies in our 
country. These are the three points on which 
we’re focusing our energy plan. Therefore a 
full commitment to renewable energies is 
needed. 
 
 
 
[11] But I can’t charge blindly forward and 
make this happen tomorrow. I need bridges 
that lead me into this age of renewable 
energies and that, at the same time, allow 
people to continue living in prosperity. This 
is exactly what we are doing. That’s why we 
say that, to a certain extent, we’ll need to 
extend the lifespan of  the nuclear power 
plants. And we’ll still need to use coal as an 
energy source for a certain period of time. 
These bridges will take us more quickly, not 
more slowly, to the age of renewable 
energies. In addition, I say that whoever 
wants to establish renewable energy sources 
in Germany must also be willing to build 
new infrastructure. We will need hundreds 
of kilometres of new power lines. High-
voltage power lines. 
 
 
 
 
[12] And, dear friends, if one is in favour of 
wind energy or solar energy but wherever a 
powerline is to be installed suddenly joins 
the citizens’ initiative, that just doesn’t make 
sense! That is why it will be very important 
to talk with the people at this point about 
how we will implement change. We can be 
happy that we were all born in a country 
where there are already electrical lines and 
the railroads tracks  have already been laid. 
Otherwise it would be quite difficult to 
know whether we would still manage to 
enforce electrification and railway building. 
 
 
 
wollen das Zeitalter der erneuerbaren 
Energien erreichen, die aber gleichzeitig 
sagt: wir wollen unsere Arbeitsplätze halten, 
wir wollen Strom bezahlbar lassen und wir 
wollen die Versorgungssicherheit in 
unserem Lande garantieren. Das sind die 
drei Punkte, an denen wir unser 
Energiekonzept ausrichten. Deshalb ein 
uneingeschränktes  Bekenntnis zu den 
erneuerbaren  Energien. 
 
[11] Aber ich kann nicht mit dem Kopf 
durch die Wand gehen und das von heute 
auf morgen schaffen, sondern ich brauche 
Brücken, die mich in dieses Zeitalter der 
erneuerbaren Energien so führen, dass 
gleichzeitig die Menschen in Wohlstand 
weiter leben. Genau das machen wir. 
Deshalb sagen wir: Wir brauchen eine 
bestimmte Verlängerung der Laufzeiten der 
Kernkraftwerke. Da sagen wir auch: wir 
brauchen die Kohle noch als Energieträger 
für bestimmte Zeit. Und diese Brücken 
werden uns schneller und nicht langsamer zu 
einem Zeitalter der erneuerbaren Energien 
führen. Dann sag ich aber auch hinzu: wer 
erneuerbare Energien in Deutschland aber 
durchsetzen will, der muss auch bereit sein, 
neue Infrastruktur zu bauen. Wir werden 
hunderte von Kilometern von neuen 
Leitungen brauchen. 
Hochspannungsleitungen. 
 
[12] Und, liebe Freunde, wenn das so 
aussieht, dass man zwar für die 
Windenergie, die Sonnenenergie ist, aber 
überall, wo 'ne Leitung verlegt werden soll, 
ist man Mitglied der Bürgerinitiative, dann 
geht das nicht zusammen! Deshalb wird es 
ganz wichtig sein, an dieser Stelle mit den 
Menschen darüber zu sprechen, wie wir 
Veränderungen durchsetzen. Wir können ja 
froh sein, dass wir alle in einem Land 
geboren wurden, wo es schon elektrische 
Leitungen gab und Bahnschienen schon 
fertig waren. Ansonsten hätten wir es ja 
ganz schwer, ob wir es noch schaffen 
würden, die Elektrifizierung und die 
Eisenbahnifizierung durchzusetzen, steht im 
189	  	  
 
[13] But we are also making a contribution 
in our generation to modernisation and 
change, whether through road construction 
and railway projects, as indeed they are 
represented here, or whether through new 
high-voltage power lines or broadband 
connections. All of this is our task, 
otherwise we will lose touch with the future. 
And now I say quite clearly: I believe that 
the road project, which is also a European 
project, from Paris to Bratislava, through 
Hungary and on to Turkey, is a really 
important one for Europe. And I think we all 
have grounds for advocating for Stuttgart 
21. But—and people are smiling in the 
second row because I said “but”—I’m 
saying merely that the railway is still not 
finished. And herein lies the task: you, we, 
are sitting here with this enthusiasm for 
these projects, and with this enthusiasm we 
have to go to the people and convince them.  
 
 
 
 
 
[14] Politics functions today and this is 
something beautiful. It can no longer be the 
case in Germany, after the successful 
unification that one can decree by order of 
the mufti that something will now be done a 
certain way. Rather the people expect from 
us—and rightly so—that we talk with them 
about our projects. And you can see from 
the ‘western runway’ construction project, 
for example, that we learned something. 
When you ask Roland Koch or anyone else 
in Hesse what was done to implement the 
new runway project at the airport, there were 
endless discussions. And that’s why it’s our 
task now to make it clear that there are many 
who are also for Stuttgart 21 and who aren’t 
afraid to bring into discussions those who 
have doubts today and try and convince 
them. That is the task we have today in the 
modern world. 
 
 
Raum. 
[13] Aber dass wir in unserer Generation  
zur Modernisierung und Veränderung auch 
einen Beitrag leisten, sei es durch 
Straßenbauprojekte, sei es durch 
Bahnprojekte, wie sie hier ja auch vertreten 
sind, oder sei es durch neue 
Hochspannungsleitungen oder 
Breitbandverkabelung. All das ist unsere 
Aufgabe, sonst werden wir den Anschluss 
an die Zukunft verlieren. Und jetzt sage ich 
ganz deutlich: Ich glaube, dass das 
Verkehrsprojekt, das ja auch ein 
europäisches ist, von Paris nach Bratislava 
über Ungarn fort in die Türkei , ein richtig 
wichtiges für Europa ist. 
Und ich glaube, dass wir auch alle Gründe 
haben, uns für Stuttgart 21 einzusetzen. 
Aber, es lächelt in der 2. Reihe, weil ich 
'aber' sage, ich sage ja lediglich, damit ist 
der Bahnhof ja noch nicht fertig gebaut. 
Deshalb kommt die Aufgabe. Mit der 
Begeisterung, mit der Sie, wir hier sitzen 
und euch für dieses Projekt einsetzt, mit 
dieser Begeisterung muss man auch zu den 
Menschen gehen und sie überzeugen. 
 
[14] Politik funktioniert heute, und das ist ja 
etwas schönes, das lässt sich ja in der 
Bundesrepublik nach der geglückten Einheit 
nicht mehr so, dass man sagen kann  per 
order de mufti, das wird jetzt so gemacht, 
sondern, die Menschen erwarten von uns, 
mit Recht, dass wir mit ihnen über unsere 
Projekte sprechen. Und daran können Sie 
sehen – aus der Startbahn West z.B. hat man 
etwas gelernt – wenn Sie Roland Koch, alle 
anderen in Hessen dort fragen, was gemacht 
wurde, um das Projekt der neuen Startbahn 
am Flughafen durchzusetzen, dann waren da 
unendlich viele Gespräche. Und deshalb ist 
es unsere Aufgabe jetzt, deutlich zu machen: 
es gibt viele, die auch für Stuttgart 21 sind, 
und die scheuen sich nicht davor, mit denen, 
die heut Zweifel haben, auch ins Gespräch 
zu kommen und Überzeugungsarbeit zu 
leisten. Das ist die Aufgabe, die wir heute in 
einer modernen Welt haben. 
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[15] The central task, if we want to be an 
industrial country, is surely to talk about 
how it looks in the job market. When I 
became the Federal Chancellor five years 
ago the situation in the winter of 2005 was 
such that a large German magazine opened 
with the correspondingly large letters: “5 
Million Unemployed! Mrs. Merkel, They 
Are Now Yours!” Well, I still found them to 
be Schröder's fault but now they were mine. 
And, dear friends, today, five years later, we 
are at 3 million! That is our success. Our 
success. It is not only our success. Medium 
and large companies, trade unions, 
employers all worked together. But without 
reasonable framework requirements it could 
not have been accomplished. 
 
 
 
[16] Let me add, also in light of our 
changing age demographics, that every year 
there are now 200,000 more people retiring 
than there are young people entering the job 
market. It is now time to fight for each and 
everyone so that they can receive 
employment. Three million unemployed is 
too many and jobs for all must remain the 
goal of our politics. Even if this isn’t 
feasible tomorrow and perhaps not the day 
after tomorrow, it must be done! We know 
that we have 2 million long-term 
unemployed. That is too much! In the 
federal budget we spend €40 billion on long-
term unemployment, the local governments 
spend another €10 billion. Imagine if we 
could manage to find a job for half of the 2.2 
million people. 
 
 
 
[17] Therefore, and I state this quite clearly, 
we will not rest until we have tried to give 
everyone an opportunity through training 
and reintegration. We cannot give in to the 
faint cry asking us to allow increased 
immigration again until we have made every 
effort to qualify our own people and give 
them a chance. Among these 2.2 million we 
[15] Die zentrale Aufgabe, wenn wir 
Industrieland sein wollen, ist sicherlich, dass 
wir darüber sprechen: wie sieht es denn auf 
dem Arbeitsmarkt aus? Als ich vor 5 Jahren 
Bundeskanzlerin wurde, da war im Winter 
2005/2006  die Situation so, dass eine große 
deutsche Illustrierte aufmachte mit den 
entsprechend großen Lettern: 5 Millionen 
Arbeitslose! Frau Merkel, das sind jetzt 
Ihre! Tja. Fand zwar immer noch, dass das 
noch Schröders Schuld war; nun waren's 
meine. Und, liebe  Freunde, heute, fünf 
Jahre später sind wir bei 3 Millionen! Und 
das ist unser Erfolg, unser Erfolg. 
Es ist nicht nur unserer Erfolg. Daran haben 
Unternehmen, Mittelständler und Große, 
daran haben Gewerkschaften, Arbeitnehmer 
mitgewirkt. Aber ohne vernünftige 
Rahmenbedingungen wäre das auch nicht. 
 
[16] Jetzt sag ich, auch angesichts der 
Veränderung unseres Altersaufbaus, jedes 
Jahr gehen jetzt 200 000 Menschen mehr in 
Rente als junge Menschen auf den 
Arbeitsmarkt kommen, jetzt heißt es, für und 
um jeden zu kämpfen, dass er auch einen 
Arbeitsplatz bekommt. 3 Millionen 
Arbeitslose sind zu viel und Arbeit für alle 
muss das Ziel unserer Politik bleiben, auch 
wenn  es nicht morgen und vielleicht noch 
nicht  übermorgen realisierbar ist, es muss 
geschafft werden! Und da wissen wir, dass 
wir 2 Millionen Langzeitarbeitslose haben. 
Das ist zu viel ! Im Bundeshaushalt geben 
wir 40 Milliarden Euro für 
Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit aus, die Kommunen 
nochmals 10 Milliarden. Stellen Sie sich mal 
vor, wir würden es schaffen, für die Hälfte 
der 2,2 Mill. Menschen wieder eine Arbeit 
zu finden. 
 
[17] Deshalb sag ich ganz klar: wir werden 
nicht ruhen, bevor wir nicht hier versuchen, 
über Qualifizierung und Wiederein-
gliederung jedem eine Chance zu geben. 
Und der leichte Ruf, wir sollen noch mal 
ganz viel Zuwanderung haben, dieser leichte 
Ruf, dem dürfen wir nicht nachgeben, bevor 
wir nicht alles daran gesetzt haben, um 
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have 700,000 single mothers because of the 
lack of childcare. Indeed, Ursula von der 
Leyen did the right thing as Federal Minister 
for Family Affairs when she put the 
emphasis on childcare. 
 
 
 
 
 
[18] And 1.3 million of those 2.2 million are 
people over the age of 50. Let me tell you 
one more thing: If we don't start thinking 
differently as a whole society, from the 
company policies to the trade unions, and 
say that people over 50 must have a chance 
in our job market, that they don’t belong to 
the ‘scrap heap’, so to speak, and are no 
longer employable, if we can't treat older 
and more experienced people differently, 
judge them differently, then we will as a 
society fail. This is not a humane society! 
 
 
 
 
 
[19] Therefore, our task is as follows: of 
course people at an advanced age (when 
someone such as myself who is 56 talks 
about an advanced age at 50, it’s funny, but 
that’s the way it is)—in any case, if these 
people are not given the chance and the hope 
of also having a job when they pass 60 then 
the debate about raising the retirement age 
to 67 becomes, of course, quite difficult. 
When we see how the life expectancy is 
increasing then it’s clear that there are, 
indeed, no reasonable alternatives to the 
decision we have taken to extend the 
working life. 
 
 
[20] I ask you sincerely in your discussions 
with the young members of the Green Party 
and the SPD to keep putting pressure on 
these pain points. What is being done time 
and again in the SPD under Mr. Gabriel’s 
leadership, counter to what Franz 
unsere eigenen Menschen im Lande zu 
qualifizieren und ihnen eine Chance zu 
geben. Und bei diesen 2,2 Mill. haben wir 
etwa 700 000 alleinerziehende Mütter. Da 
mangelt es an Kinderbetreuung. Deshalb hat 
Ursula von der Leyen es richtig gemacht, 
dass sie als Familienministerin einen 
Schwerpunkt auf Kinderbetreuung gesetzt 
hat. 
 
[18] Und 1.3 Millionen von den 2.2 Mill. 
sind Menschen, die über 50 sind. Jetzt sage 
ich Ihnen ein Weiteres: wenn wir nicht ein 
gesamtgesellschaftliches Umdenken von der 
Politik über die Unternehmen bis hin zu den 
Gewerkschaften bekommen, die sagen, 
Menschen über 50 müssen eine Chance auf 
unserem Arbeitsmarkt haben, die gehören 
nicht sozusagen als 'Altes Eisen' benannt 
und nicht mehr als nicht vermittelbar. Wenn 
wir das nicht schaffen, dass wir mit denen, 
die älter sind, mit denen, die Erfahrung 
haben, anders umgehen, sie anders 
einzuschätzen, dann werden wir als 
Gesellschaft scheitern. Das ist doch keine 
menschliche Gesellschaft! 
 
[19] Deshalb heißt die Aufgabe: natürlich 
Menschen auch im höheren Alter (wenn 
man , wie ich 56 ist und dann von höherem 
Alter bei 50 spricht, ist auch komisch. Aber, 
na ja, ist halt so) jedenfalls, wenn man dann 
Menschen nicht die Chance und die 
Hoffnung gibt, auch arbeiten zu können, 
wenn man über 60 ist, dann wird die 
Diskussion über die Rente mit 67 natürlich 
schwierig. Aber wenn wir sehen, wie die 
Lebenserwartung steigt, dann gibt es doch 
keine vernünftige Alternative zu dem 
Beschluss, den wir gefasst haben, dass wir 
zu einer verlängerten Lebensarbeitszeit 
kommen. 
 
[20] Ich bitte Sie ganz herzlich, auch in 
Ihren Gesprächen mit den Jungen aus der 
Grünen Partei und auch der SPD, legen Sie 
den Finger immer wieder in die Wunden. 
Was dort in der SPD immer wieder gemacht 
wird, unter Führung von Herrn Gabriel, 
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Müntefering was doing, has nothing, 
absolutely nothing to do with future- or 
reality-politics. But the precondition is also 
that we make it a norm for one to still be 
employable at 50 after losing one’s job.  
 
 
 
 
[21] And, dear friends, now that we have 
recalculated the Hartz IV reforms, I believe 
herein lies another social debate of great 
importance: when children today are writing 
down as their career aspiration ‘Hartz IV’ 
something has gone wrong in our society. 
Hartz IV, long-term unemployment, that is 
an expression for rapid minimum 
subsistence income, that is an expression of 
our understanding of society: we say that 
those in need, who need the solidarity of the 
community, will also get it. 
 
 
[22] But the task remains—this is the true 
sense of encouraging and challenging 
people—that long-term unemployment is 
not a life destiny, rather one must do 
everything possible to get out of it. And 
therefore it was right, regarding the Hartz IV 
reforms and the minimum subsistence 
income, to say, We’re taking the alcohol and 
cigarettes away because it must be worth it 
to them to earn some money themselves and  
be a part of society’s working life. In other 
words, when we do this we say to people: 
We will support you in an emergency 
situation, but we also have a task for you, 
everyone of you who can contribute 
something to society must do this as well. 
This discussion has to be held with the 
utmost determination. 
 
 
 
[23] Besides the retirement pensions we 
need to also be concerned with the future of 
our healthcare system. This, I tell you, is the 
most difficult subject in all developed 
industrial societies. Take a look at other 
gegen das, was Franz Müntefering gemacht 
hat, das hat mit Zukunfts- und 
Realitätspolitik nichts, aber auch gar nichts 
zu tun. Aber die Voraussetzung ist eben 
auch, dass wir es zu einer Normalität 
machen, dass man auch noch mit 50 
vermittelbar ist, wenn man seinen 
Arbeitsplatz verloren hat. 
 
[21] Und, liebe Freunde, jetzt haben wir die 
Hartz IV-Sätze neu berechnet. Ich glaube, es 
ist auch hier eine gesellschaftliche 
Diskussion ganz, ganz wichtig: wenn es 
heute Kinder gibt, die als Berufswunsch 
aufschreiben Hartz IV, dann läuft was falsch 
in unserer Gesellschaft. Hartz IV, 
Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit, das ist Ausdruck 
für rapides Existenzminimum, das ist 
Ausdruck unseres Gesellschafts-
verständnisses: dass wir sagen, wer in Not 
ist, wer die Solidarität der Gemeinschaft 
braucht, der bekommt sie. 
 
[22] Aber es bleibt die Aufgabe, das ist der 
tiefere Sinn von fördern und fordern, dass 
Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit kein 
Lebensschicksal ist, sondern dass man alles 
tun muss, um daraus wieder raus zu 
kommen. Und deshalb war es richtig zu 
sagen bei den Hartz IV-Sätzen, beim 
Existenzminimum, da nehmen wir Alkohol 
und Zigaretten raus, denn es muss sich 
lohnen, auch mal selber wieder etwas zu 
verdienen, damit man in der Gesellschaft 
teilhaben kann am Arbeitsleben.  
Das heißt, wenn wir das tun, den Menschen 
sagen: Ihr werdet unterstützt, wenn ihr in 
einer Notsituation seid, aber wir haben den 
Anspruch an euch, dass jeder, der etwas 
beitragen kann zu dieser Gesellschaft, seinen 
Beitrag auch leisten muss. Diese Diskussion 
muss mit aller Entschiedenheit geführt 
werden. 
 
[23] Und wir müssen uns neben der Rente 
auch mit der Zukunft unseres 
Gesundheitssystems befassen. Da sage ich 
Ihnen: das ist das schwierigste Thema in 
allen entwickelten Industriegesellschaften. 
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countries, how they’re battling over the 
topic of healthcare policy. 
 
 
[24] I want to say one more thing about our 
health care reform because most people like 
hearing the details on this topic. What we 
are doing is of great important, a decisive 
turning point, and it is the following: For 60 
years we have linked the costs for health 
care to labour costs. We are now in a 
situation where we are saying, and this must 
be told to the people: if we don't want a two-
tiered health system then health care 
expenses will have to increase. People are 
getting older, the medical possibilities are 
getting better, but under no circumstances 
does health care get cheaper. Efficiencies 
can be improved and all but on the whole it 
will get more expensive. When it does get 
more expensive and when the international 
competition for work gets stronger, if I don't 
want a two-tiered health system I can no 
longer couple the rising cost of health care 
to labour costs. That is what we have 
decided. The deeper meaning of this 
decoupling—and since nobody should be 
overextending themselves we’re, of course, 
going to put a ceiling on the amount and 
say: whoever can’t pay it themselves will be 
supported, but no longer through the 
solidarity of the contribution system and 
ever-growing costs but rather through the 
solidarity of the taxpayers. Among them, the 
10% highest earning pay 50% of the income 
tax. That is more justice, not less justice. 
And that’s one thing we have to 
aggressively make clear in debates with the 
Social Democrats and the Greens. I'm saying 
it now, loud and clear, because I'm aware of 
the complexities around the health care 
discussions even in our ranks. All of it is 
important: doctors’ fees and hospital 
equipment, etc. Particularly important, 
however, is that we tell the people that we 
care about an equitable, sustainable health 
care system. 
 
 
Schauen Sie sich nur auch andere Länder an, 
wie dort um die Gesundheitspolitik 
gefochten wird. 
 
[24] Ich will Ihnen auch zu unserer 
Gesundheitsreform nur eins sagen, weil die 
meisten lieben die Details auf diesem 
Gebiet. Wir machen jetzt folgendes und das 
ist wirklich wichtig und das ist eine 
entscheidende Weichenstellung. Wir haben 
60 Jahre lang die Kosten für die Gesundheit 
immer an die Arbeitskosten gekoppelt. Wir 
sind jetzt in einer Situation, wo wir sagen, 
das muss man den Menschen sagen: wenn 
wir keine 2-Klassen-Medizin wollen, dann 
werden die Ausgaben für Gesundheit 
steigen. Die Menschen werden älter, die 
medizinischen Möglichkeiten werden 
besser, das wird unter keinen Umständen 
billiger. Da kann man Effizienzverbesserung 
machen und alles: insgesamt wird es teurer. 
Und, wenn es teurer wird, und wenn der 
internationale Wettbewerb um Arbeit stärker 
wird, dann darf ich in Zukunft, wenn ich 
eine 2-Klassen-Medizin nicht will, die 
Gesundheitskosten, die anwachsen, nicht 
mehr an die Arbeitskosten koppeln. Dazu 
haben wir uns entschlossen. Der tiefere Sinn 
dieser Entkoppelung, und, da ja niemand 
überfordert werden darf, machen wir 
natürlich eine Überforderungsgrenze und 
sagen: wer das selber nicht bezahlen kann, 
der wird unterstützt, aber nicht mehr durch 
die Solidarität des Beitragssystems, bei den 
anwachsenden Kosten, sondern durch die 
Solidarität der Steuerzahler. Bei denen 
nämlich die 10% der Bestverdienenden 50% 
der Einkommenssteuer zahlen. Das ist mehr 
Gerechtigkeit und nicht weniger 
Gerechtigkeit. Und, das müssen wir ganz 
offensiv in der Auseinandersetzung mit den 
Sozialdemokraten und den Grünen immer 
wieder deutlich machen. Ich sag das jetzt 
hier so klar, weil ich auch um die 
Vertraktheiten um die 
Gesundheitsdiskussion in unseren Reihen 
weiß. Es ist alles wichtig: Ärztehonorare 
und Krankenhausausstattungen, u.s.w.. 
Besonders wichtig ist aber , dass wir den 
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[25] Dear friends, these all are the decisions 
we have to make, which are currently on the 
table and that will set the course for 
Germany. That's why since autumn I’ve 
been talking about decisions. Maybe there is 
no final answer yet as to how, in the next 10 
to 20 years, we want to live with one 
another. That’s why it is also our job to 
affirm, again and again, how we see 
ourselves, our country and our role in the 
world. 
 
 
 
[26] And again I recall the year 1989. 
Actually, something extraordinary happened 
in the former GDR—people who couldn't 
speak their opinions publicly for 40 years 
were suddenly on the streets, saying: We are 
the people! – and shortly thereafter, after 40 
years separation they held our flag in their 
hands saying: We are one people! And since 
then we have been one nation! And all of us 
sitting here today, we are a part of this one 
nation and we must also say how we 
imagine coexisting in this nation for the next 
several decades. First I’ll say that we are 
members of the CDU, the CSU or we stand 
near them. Before we talk about others we 
should first talk about us and what has 
always distinguished us. That's why we call 
ourselves Christian Democrats or Christian 
Socialists. This is the Christian view of man. 
 
 
 
 
 
[27] And if we are truly honest, then we 
should perhaps talk once again about what 
this means. Because many people in our 
country no longer know this as they did 50 
or 60 years ago. And since many people 
don't express it at all anymore because many 
around us don't believe anymore, or hardly 
Leuten sagen: wir kümmern uns um ein 
gerechtes, zukunftsfähiges 
Gesundheitswesen. 
 
[25] Liebe Freunde, das alles sind die 
Entscheidungen, die wir zu fällen haben, die 
im Augenblick in der Beratung sind, und die 
die Weichen für Deutschland stellen. 
Deshalb habe ich auch vom Herbst der 
Entscheidungen gesprochen. Und das alles 
gibt vielleicht noch keine abschließende 
Antwort, wie wir denn in den nächsten 10 
und 20 Jahren miteinander leben wollen. 
Deshalb gehört auch dazu, dass wir uns 
immer wieder vergewissern, wie wir auf 
uns, auf unser Land, auf unsere Rolle in der 
Welt schauen. 
 
[26] Und ich erinnere noch einmal an 1989. 
Da ist ja eigentlich in der ehemaligen DDR 
etwas Unglaubliches passiert: Menschen, die 
40 Jahre lang öffentlich nicht frei Ihre 
Meinung sagen konnten, sind plötzlich auf 
die Straße gegangen und haben gesagt: Wir 
sind das Volk! Und nach 40 Jahren 
Trennung haben sie ganz kurz darauf gesagt 
und dabei unsere Fahne in der Hand 
gehalten: Wir sind ein Volk! Und seitdem 
sind wir ein Volk! Und alle, die wir hier 
sitzen, sind Teil dieses einen Volkes und 
müssen auch sagen, wie wir uns unser 
Zusammenleben in diesem Volk für die 
nächsten Jahre und Jahrzehnte vorstellen. 
Und da sage ich als erstes: wir sind 
Mitglieder der CDU, der CSU oder stehen 
ihr nah. Bevor wir mal über andere 
sprechen, sollten wir erst mal über uns 
sprechen und das, was uns immer 
ausgezeichnet hat. Deshalb nennen wir uns 
Christdemokraten oder christlich-sozial. Das 
ist das christliche Bild vom Menschen. 
 
[27] Und, wenn wir mal ganz ehrlich sind, 
dann sollten wir vielleicht einmal mehr 
darüber sprechen, was das bedeutet. Weil 
viele Menschen in unserem Lande das nicht 
mehr so gut wissen, wie sie es vielleicht vor 
50 und 60 Jahren wussten. Und weil viele 
Menschen es auch gar nicht mehr 
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believe, they go to church only at Christmas. 
This means that only those who are self-
aware can talk confidently to others about 
their identity. That is our priority. And, not 
surprisingly, it is written in our Constitution: 
Human dignity is inviolable. Every single 
person is important to us, every single 
person in our country , this is our mission, 
gets his chance. 
 
 
 
 
 
[28] We talk in our policy program about 
equal opportunity and from this experience 
we give every person an opportunity to 
develop in our society. What so affected us 
as we all sat in front of our televisions 
following the rescue of the 33 coalminers in 
Chile, was that there was a country that did 
not give up on a single person. After 17 days 
they were still saying: No, we will continue 
looking. They found them and they saved 
them, and for every single man they did 
everything humanly possible so that he 
could return into daylight. That is what it 
means to protect the dignitiy of a person in 
an exemplary way. And so it is that each 
person in our society is entrusted to us. That 
is our Christian Democratic understanding 
of man. 
 
 
 
 
 
[29] Our president Christian Wulff recently 
said the right thing when he said that our 
culture is strongly influence by the 
Christian-Jewish heritage. That Christianity 
belongs to us and that Judaism belongs to 
us. From this a large part of our tradition 
developed. And I would remind you that we 
received algebra and astronomy in the 10th 
century from the people of the Arab 
region—this was so much about blessings 
we received from other places. But he also 
said that Islam is also a part of Germany. It 
aussprechen, weil viele um uns herum gar 
nicht glauben, wenig glauben, nur 
Weihnachten in die Kirche gehen. Das heißt: 
Nur wer sich seiner selbst bewusst ist, kann 
selbstbewusst mit anderen über ihre Identität 
reden. Das ist unsere vorrangige Aufgabe. 
Und nicht von ungefähr heißt es in unserem 
Grundgesetz: Die Würde des Menschen ist 
unantastbar. Jeder einzelne Mensch ist für 
uns wichtig, jeder einzelne Mensch, das ist 
unsere Aufgabe, bekommt in unserem Land 
seine Chance. 
 
 
[28] Wir reden in unserem 
Grundsatzprogramm von Chancengleichheit 
und aus dieser Erfahrung heraus geben wir 
jedem Menschen die Möglichkeit, sich in 
unserer Gesellschaft zu entfalten. 
Was hat uns das so berührt, wie wir alle am 
Fernseher gesessen haben und die Rettung 
der Kohlearbeiter dort in Chile verfolgt 
haben, der 33 Bergleute. Dort hat ein Land 
keinen einzigen Menschen aufgegeben. Dort 
hat man nach 17 Tagen noch gesagt: Nein, 
wir suchen weiter. Man hat sie gefunden und 
man hat sie gerettet und hat für jeden 
einzelnen Menschen alles 
Menschenmögliche getan, damit er wieder 
ans Tageslicht kam. 
Das ist, die Würde des Menschen 
exemplarisch zu schützen. Und so ist uns 
auch jeder einzelne Mensch in dieser 
Gesellschaft anvertraut. Das ist unser 
christdemokratisches Verständnis vom 
Menschen. 
 
[29] Jetzt hat unser Bundespräsident 
Christian Wulff doch das Richtige gesagt, er 
hat gesagt, unsere Kultur ist ganz stark vom 
christlich jüdischen Erbe geprägt. Das 
Christentum gehört zu uns, das Judentum 
gehört zu uns. Daraus ist der große Teil 
unserer Tradition erwachsen. Will nur dran 
erinnern Algebra und Astronomie haben wir 
im 10. Jahrhundert von Menschen auch aus 
dem arabischen Raum bekommen, also nur 
soviel auch zu den Segnungen, die wir von 
woanders bekommen haben. Aber er hat 
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is part of Germany, and this is evident not 
only in the footballer Özil. 
 
 
[30] Dear friends, the question now is how 
we handle this issue. Integration is a central 
theme among the younger people of our 
country because the number of people with 
immigrant backgrounds among the younger 
population is increasing, not decreasing. In 
Frankfurt am Main, two out of three kids 
under the age of five have immigrant 
backgrounds. And we are a country that at 
the beginning of the 60’s brought guest 
workers to Germany—and now they live 
with us. We have been lying to ourselves for 
quite some time now. We said to ourselves 
that they’re not going to stay, that at some 
point they would go away. But that is not the 
reality. 
 
 
[31] And naturally the initial approach here 
was to say: Now we’ll create a multicultural 
society and live side by side, content with 
each other. This approach has failed, 
absolutely failed and that's why I decided, 
when I became the Federal Chancellor, to 
bring the theme of integration into the 
Chancellor's office, because it’s one of the 
most important themes of our society. There 
are successful examples and I think we have 
to start right now talking about what has 
been successful elsewhere. Because 
precisely those whom we want to integrate, 
they need role models. And then there are 
many things that have not yet succeeded. 
We were the ones after all who said: Yes, 
these people will stay with us. They have 
contributed to our prosperity, so they must 
have their share. It is not acceptable that 
twice as many of them have never had any 
schooling. It is unacceptable that nowadays 
we have twice as many that have not 
finished any vocational training. That makes 
us the social problems of the future, that's 
why integration is so important and that's 
why, above all, those who wish to be a part 
of our society must not only comply with 
gesagt, der Islam ist auch Teil Deutschlands. 
Und der ist Teil Deutschlands. Das sieht 
man nicht nur am Fußballspieler Özil. 
 
[30] Liebe Freunde, jetzt geht es darum, wie 
wir mit dieser Frage umgehen. Und da ist 
das Thema Integration ein zentrales Thema, 
weil unter den jüngeren Menschen unseres 
Landes die Anzahl der Menschen mit jungen 
Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund 
zunehmen wird und nicht abnehmen wird. In 
Frankfurt am Main ist bei Kindern unter 5 
Jahren von drei Kindern haben zwei einen 
Migrationshintergrund und wir sind ein 
Land das im übrigen am Anfang der 60er 
Jahre die Gastarbeiter nach Deutschland 
geholt hat. Und jetzt leben sie bei uns, wir 
haben uns eine Weile lang in die Tasche 
gelogen. Wir haben uns gesagt die werden 
schon nicht bleiben, irgendwann werden sie 
weg sein. Das ist nicht die Realität.  
 
[31] Und natürlich war der Ansatz hier zu 
sagen: Jetzt machen wir hier mal Multikulti 
und leben so nebeneinander her und freuen 
uns über einander. Dieser Ansatz ist 
gescheitert, absolut gescheitert. Und deshalb 
haben habe ich mich entschlossen, als ich 
Bundeskanzelerin wurde, das Thema 
Integration ins Kanzleramt zu holen, weil es 
eines der großen Themen unserer 
Gesellschaft ist. Und da gibt es gelungene 
Beispiele und ich glaube wir müssen in der 
jetzigen Zeit darauf aufpassen, dass wir auch 
mal über das, was geschafft ist reden. Weil 
gerade die, die wir integrieren wollen, die 
brauchen Vorbilder. Und dann gibt es vieles, 
was auch noch nicht gelungen ist. Und wir 
warens doch die dann gesagt haben: Jawoll, 
diese Menschen werden bei uns bleiben. Sie 
haben zu unserem Wohlstand beigetragen, 
sie müssen ihr Teil haben. Es nicht geht an, 
dass doppelt soviele von ihnen keinen 
Schulabschluss haben, es geht nicht an, dass 
wir heute doppelt soviele keinen 
Berufsabschluss haben. Das macht uns die 
sozialen Probleme der Zukunft und deshalb 
ist Integration so wichtig und deshalb heißt 
es vor allen Dingen, das diejenigen, die 
197	  	  
our laws, must not only commit to the 
constitution, but they must above all, learn 
our language. Learn our language and know 
our language—that must be of utmost 
importance. And that will require a lot of 
effort from us yet. 
 
 
 
 
[32] It’s true that language tests were first 
held in states governed by the CDU/CSU. It 
is important that students who go to school 
at least understand their teacher, otherwise 
they can’t be expected to follow the 
curriculum. It is important and right that we 
direct our efforts towards obtaining 
vocational qualifications. And it is 
absolutely right and important to say that 
girls must go on school trips, participate in 
physical education; as for forced marriages 
we want nothing to do with that; it’s 
incompatible with our legislation. But, on 
the other hand, there has to be openness on 
our side, too. We have always been a 
country open to the world. The unifying of 
Europe has helped us. We are known 
throughout the world as a country that was 
the world champion in exports and is still 
one of the leading export nations. Of course 
we don’t need the kind of immigration that 
burdens our social system, it’s not about 
that, but we will need an immigration of 
specialists because, unfortunately, there 
aren’t many young Germans or immigrant 
children choosing subjects like natural 
science engineering. We definitely don’t 
want to be seen as a country that shuns 
someone who doesn’t immediately speak 
German or grew up with German as their 
mother tongue, and make them feel 
unwelcome here. That would harm our 
country to a major extent, companies would 
go elsewhere because they wouldn’t be able 
to find any more jobs with us. It’s safe to 
say that the challenge of the immigration 
issue is one of the main tasks for the near 
future but it’s also safe to say that we are a 
country that gives people a chance—this 
teilhaben wollen an unserer Gesellschaft 
nicht nur unsere Gesetze einhalten müssen, 
nicht nur sich zum Grundgesetzt bekennen 
müssen, sondern sie müssen vor allen 
Dingen auch unsere Sprache lernen. Unsere 
Sprache lernen, unsere Sprache können und 
darauf muss absoluter Wert gelegt werden. 
Und das wird uns viele Anstrengungen noch 
kosten.  
 
[32] Es ist richtig, dass in den 
unionsregierten Ländern zuerst die 
Sprachtests gemacht wurden. Es ist wichtig, 
dass die Schüler die in die Schule kommen 
wenigstens ihren Lehrer verstehen, weil 
ansonsten ja auch nicht zu erwarten ist, dass 
sie dem Schulstoff folgen können. Es ist 
richtig und wichtig, dass wir auf 
Berufsabschlüsse aus sind. Und es ist 
absolut richtig und wichtig zu sagen, 
Mädchen müssen mit auf die Schulreisen 
kommen, am Sportunterricht teilnehmen und 
von Zwangsehen halten wir gar nichts, das 
ist mit unseren Gesetzen nicht zu 
vereinbaren. Aber es gehört auf der anderen 
Seite natürlich auch ein Stück Offenheit von 
uns dazu. Wir waren immer ein weltoffenes 
Land. Die Europäische Einigung hat uns 
geholfen. Wir sind in der Welt als ein Land 
bekannt, dass Exportweltmeister war und 
noch zu einer der führenden Exportnationen 
gehört. Und wir brauchen keine 
Zuwanderung natürlich, die unsere 
Sozialsysteme belastet, darum geht es 
überhaupt nicht. Aber wir werden auch 
Zuwanderung von Spezialisten brauchen, 
denn leider entscheiden sich zu wenig junge 
Deutsche oder Migrantenkinder dafür 
naturwissenschaftliche Ingenieursberufe und 
anderes zu erreichen. Das heißt wir dürfen 
auch kein Land sein, das nach außen den 
Eindruck vermeidet jeder der nicht sofort 
Deutsch spricht und mit Deutsch sozusagen 
als Muttersprache aufgewachsen ist, der ist 
uns hier nicht willkommen. Das wird 
unserem Land sehr stark schaden. Dann 
werden Unternehmen woanders hingehen, 
weil sie bei uns keine Arbeitsplätze mehr 
finden. Das heißt, die Forderung nach 
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must always be the Germany’s trademark. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[33] What has always been the strength of 
the CDU/CSU is its politics of measure and 
middle. From this arises the legitimacy to 
also challenge that which we are, on the 
other hand, supporting. And this challenge 
has certainly been too timid in many areas in 
the past. But I’ll tell you: this challenge is 
very concrete. A country that challenges 
cannot allow a youngster to break the law 
six, eight or nine times before proceeding to 
court. A country that challenges has to make 
sure that the police have access to every part 
of our country. Places where the police don’t 
dare to enter simply cannot exist. When I 
say this I’m referring not only to people with 
an immigrant background. When in Berlin, 
on the eve of May 1st in Kreuzberg, the 
police declare that the CDU aren’t allowed 
to set up a stand to advertise their principles, 
this is as wrong as when police officers can't 
enter certain towns. 
 
 
 
 
[34] If we in this spirit as I have just 
presented to you, with an idea of our society 
of tomorrow, go with the right decisions in 
these matters in the next few months, then I 
say to you: we have all it takes to convince 
the people. And so, in conclusion, my 
request: When I open the newspaper I 
sometimes get rather nervous. We are not in 
a laboratory for theoretical physics; we are 
five months away from crucial state 
elections. Helmut Kohl has always told us 
one thing: “The expression ‘election 
campaign’ consists of ‘election’ and ‘fight.’” 
And what I expect, it’s not that we’ll have a 
theoretical discussion about this and that, no 
matter how, when or what the outcome of 
the election is. Rather, I expect each and 
Integration ist eine unserer Hauptaufgaben 
für die nächste Zeit. Aber zu sagen, wir sind 
ein Land, dass den Menschen in unserem 
Lande eine Chance gibt, das muss auch 
immer das Markenzeichen Deutschlands 
sein.  
 
[33] Was immer die Stärke der Union war, 
das ist eine Politik von Maß und Mitte. 
Daraus erwächst uns die Legitimation auch 
zu fordern, wenn wir auf der anderen Seite 
fördern. Und dieses Fordern ist mich 
Sicherheit in der Vergangenheit an 
verschiedenen Stellen zu kurz gekommen. 
Aber ich sage Ihnen auch: dieses Fordern ist 
sehr konkret. Ein Land, das fordert, darf 
nicht 6 und 8 und 9 bis auf die Tat eines 
Jugendlichen ein Prozess erfolgt. Ein Land, 
das fordert muss sicherstellen, dass an jedem 
Ort in unserem Land die Polizei Zugang hat 
und dass es nicht Gebiete gibt, in die sich 
kein Polizist mehr reintraut. Ich sage das, 
ich sage das im Übrigen nicht nur in Bezug 
auf Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund, 
sondern wenn in Berlin am Vorabend des 
1sten Mai in Kreuzberg die Polizei erklärt, 
die CDU könnte keinen Stand mehr 
aufbauen an dem sie für ihre Prinzipien 
wirbt, dann ist das genauso falsch, wie es 
falsch ist, wenn Polizisten nicht mehr in 
andere Ortschaften hinein kommen. 
 
[34] Wenn wir in diesem Geist, wie ich 
Ihnen dargestellt habe mit einer Vorstellung 
von unserer Gesellschaft von morgen, mit 
den richtigen Weichenstellungen in der 
Sache in die nächsten Monate gehen, dann 
sage ich Ihnen: haben wir alle Chancen, die 
Menschen zu überzeugen. Und deshalb 
meine Bitte zum Abschluss: Wenn ich die 
Zeitung aufschlage, dann wird man 
manchmal ganz nervös. Wir sind hier nicht 
im theoretischen Physiklabor, sondern wir 
sind fünf Monate vor entscheidenden 
Landtagswahlen. Helmut Kohl hat uns 
immer eins gesagt: das Wort Wahlkampf 
besteht aus Wahl und aus Kampf. Und was 
ich erwarte, das ist nicht, dass wir jetzt 
theoretische Betrachtungen über dies und 
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every member of the CDU/CSU to fight for 
their beliefs and to convince people. That we 
go out and we say, We can do it because we 
have the right ideas for Germany. We want 
to make it happen because it’s our future 
that’s at stake. When we go out with this 
statement, when we are taking care of not 
only ourselves but also the people, then we 
have all the opportunities. Despair is really 
not a good counsellor, nor is fear. Rather, 
let’s go straight to the point, straight to the 
people we must convince. We have a lot to 
do and, it’s true, we have been fighting too 
much. But now the task until March and 
until next year is to fight, work, and 
advertise—everyone altogether. Heartfelt 
thanks!	  	  
 
jenes anstellen, wie wann was bei welchem 
Ausgang passiert, sondern ich erwarte von 
jedem einzelnen in der Union, dass er für 
seine Überzeugungen kämpft, dass er die 
Menschen überzeugt. Dass wir rausgehen, 
dass wir sagen wir können das schaffen, 
weil wir die richtigen Konzepte für 
Deutschland haben. Wir wollen das 
schaffen, weil wir - weil es um unsere 
Zukunft geht. Wenn wir mit diesem Ansatz 
nach draußen gehen, wenn wir uns nicht um 
uns selbst kümmern, sondern auf die 
anderen zugehen, dann haben wir alle 
Chancen. Und Verzagtheit ist wirklich kein 
guter Ratgeber, Angst schon gar nicht, 
sondern ran an die Sache, ran an die 
Menschen, die wir überzeugen müssen. Da 
haben wir viel zu tun, da haben wir uns 
zuviel gestritten, aber jetzt heißt die 
Aufgabe bis zum März und zum nächsten 
Jahr kämpfen, arbeiten, werben und alle 
miteinander. Herzlichen Dank!	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Appendix 3: Cameron’s Speech at Munich Security Conference 
 
Munich, Saturday 5 February 2011 
 
 
 
[1] Today I want to focus my remarks on terrorism, but first let me address one 
point.  Some have suggested that by holding a strategic defence and security review, 
Britain is somehow retreating from an activist role in the world.  That is the opposite 
of the truth.  Yes, we are dealing with our budget deficit, but we are also making 
sure our defences are strong.  Britain will continue to meet the NATO 2% target for 
defence spending.  We will still have the fourth largest military defence budget in 
the world.  At the same time, we are putting that money to better use, focusing on 
conflict prevention and building a much more flexible army.  That is not retreat; it is 
hard headed. 
 
[2] Every decision we take has three aims in mind.  First, to continue to support the 
NATO mission in Afghanistan .  Second, to reinforce our actual military capability.  
As Chancellor Merkel’s government is showing right here in Germany, what matters 
is not bureaucracy, which frankly Europe needs a lot less of, but the political will to 
build military capability that we need as nations and allies, that we can deliver in the 
field.  Third, we want to make sure that Britain is protected from the new and 
various threats that we face.  That is why we are investing in a national cyber 
security programme that I know William Hague talked about yesterday, and we are 
sharpening our readiness to act on counter-proliferation. 
 
[3] But the biggest threat that we face comes from terrorist attacks, some of which 
are, sadly, carried out by our own citizens.  It is important to stress that terrorism is 
not linked exclusively to any one religion or ethnic group.  My country, the United 
Kingdom , still faces threats from dissident republicans in Northern Ireland .  
Anarchist attacks have occurred recently in Greece and in Italy , and of course, 
yourselves in Germany were long scarred by terrorism from the Red Army Faction.  
Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that this threat comes in Europe 
overwhelmingly from young men who follow a completely perverse, warped 
interpretation of Islam, and who are prepared to blow themselves up and kill their 
fellow citizens.  Last week at Davos I rang the alarm bell for the urgent need for 
Europe to recover its economic dynamism, and today, though the subject is 
complex, my message on security is equally stark.  We will not defeat terrorism 
simply by the action we take outside our borders.  Europe needs to wake up to what 
is happening in our own countries.  Of course, that means strengthening, as Angela 
has said, the security aspects of our response, on tracing plots, on stopping them, on 
counter-surveillance and intelligence gathering. 
 
[4] But this is just part of the answer.  We have got to get to the root of the problem, 
and we need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of where these terrorist 
attacks lie.  That is the existence of an ideology, Islamist extremism.  We should be 
equally clear what we mean by this term, and we must distinguish it from Islam.  
Islam is a religion observed peacefully and devoutly by over a billion people.  
Islamist extremism is a political ideology supported by a minority.  At the furthest 
end are those who back terrorism to promote their ultimate goal: an entire Islamist 
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realm, governed by an interpretation of Sharia.  Move along the spectrum, and you 
find people who may reject violence, but who accept various parts of the extremist 
worldview, including real hostility towards Western democracy and liberal values.  
It is vital that we make this distinction between religion on the one hand, and 
political ideology on the other.  Time and again, people equate the two.  They think 
whether someone is an extremist is dependent on how much they observe their 
religion.  So, they talk about moderate Muslims as if all devout Muslims must be 
extremist.  This is profoundly wrong.  Someone can be a devout Muslim and not be 
an extremist.  We need to be clear: Islamist extremism and Islam are not the same 
thing. 
 
[5] This highlights, I think, a significant problem when discussing the terrorist threat 
that we face.  There is so much muddled thinking about this whole issue.  On the 
one hand, those on the hard right ignore this distinction between Islam and Islamist 
extremism, and just say that Islam and the West are irreconcilable – that there is a 
clash of civilizations.  So, it follows: we should cut ourselves off from this religion, 
whether that is through forced repatriation, favoured by some fascists, or the 
banning of new mosques, as is suggested in some parts of Europe.  These people 
fuel Islamophobia, and I completely reject their argument.  If they want an example 
of how Western values and Islam can be entirely compatible, they should look at 
what’s happened in the past few weeks on the streets of Tunis and Cairo: hundreds 
of thousands of people demanding the universal right to free elections and 
democracy. 
 
[6] The point is this: the ideology of extremism is the problem; Islam emphatically 
is not.  Picking a fight with the latter will do nothing to help us to confront the 
former.  On the other hand, there are those on the soft left who also ignore this 
distinction.  They lump all Muslims together, compiling a list of grievances, and 
argue that if only governments addressed these grievances, the terrorism would stop.  
So, they point to the poverty that so many Muslims live in and say, ‘Get rid of this 
injustice and the terrorism will end.’ But this ignores the fact that many of those 
found guilty of terrorist offences in the UK and elsewhere have been graduates and 
often middle class.  They point to grievances about Western foreign policy and say, 
‘Stop riding roughshod over Muslim countries and the terrorism will end.’ But there 
are many people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who are angry about Western 
foreign policy, but who don’t resort to acts of terrorism.  They also point to the 
profusion of unelected leaders across the Middle East and say, ‘Stop propping these 
people up and you will stop creating the conditions for extremism to flourish.’ But 
this raises the question: if it’s the lack of democracy that is the problem, why are 
there so many extremists in free and open societies? 
 
[7] Now, I’m not saying that these issues of poverty and grievance about foreign 
policy are not important.  Yes, of course we must tackle them.  Of course we must 
tackle poverty.  Yes, we must resolve the sources of tension, not least in Palestine , 
and yes, we should be on the side of openness and political reform in the Middle 
East .  On Egypt , our position should be clear.  We want to see the transition to a 
more broadly-based government, with the proper building blocks of a free and 
democratic society.  I simply don’t accept that there is somehow a dead end choice 
between a security state on the one hand, and an Islamist one on the other.  But let us 
not fool ourselves.  These are just contributory factors.  Even if we sorted out all of 
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the problems that I have mentioned, there would still be this terrorism.  I believe the 
root lies in the existence of this extremist ideology.  I would argue an important 
reason so many young Muslims are drawn to it comes down to a question of 
identity. 
 
[8] What I am about to say is drawn from the British experience, but I believe there 
are general lessons for us all.  In the UK , some young men find it hard to identify 
with the traditional Islam practiced at home by their parents, whose customs can 
seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries.  But these young men 
also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the weakening 
of our collective identity.  Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have 
encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart 
from the mainstream.  We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel 
they want to belong.  We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving 
in ways that run completely counter to our values. 
 
[9] So, when a white person holds objectionable views, racist views for instance, we 
rightly condemn them.  But when equally unacceptable views or practices come 
from someone who isn’t white, we’ve been too cautious frankly – frankly, even 
fearful – to stand up to them.  The failure, for instance, of some to confront the 
horrors of forced marriage, the practice where some young girls are bullied and 
sometimes taken abroad to marry someone when they don’t want to, is a case in 
point.  This hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not 
enough is shared.  And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless.  And 
the search for something to belong to and something to believe in can lead them to 
this extremist ideology.  Now for sure, they don’t turn into terrorists overnight, but 
what we see – and what we see in so many European countries – is a process of 
radicalisation. 
 
[10] Internet chatrooms are virtual meeting places where attitudes are shared, 
strengthened and validated.  In some mosques, preachers of hate can sow 
misinformation about the plight of Muslims elsewhere.  In our communities, groups 
and organisations led by young, dynamic leaders promote separatism by 
encouraging Muslims to define themselves solely in terms of their religion.  All 
these interactions can engender a sense of community, a substitute for what the 
wider society has failed to supply.  Now, you might say, as long as they’re not 
hurting anyone, what is the problem with all this? 
 
[11] Well, I’ll tell you why.  As evidence emerges about the backgrounds of those 
convicted of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were initially influenced 
by what some have called ‘non-violent extremists’, and they then took those radical 
beliefs to the next level by embracing violence.  And I say this is an indictment of 
our approach to these issues in the past.  And if we are to defeat this threat, I believe 
it is time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past.  So first, instead of 
ignoring this extremist ideology, we – as governments and as societies – have got to 
confront it, in all its forms.  And second, instead of encouraging people to live apart, 
we need a clear sense of shared national identity that is open to everyone. 
 
[12] Let me briefly take each in turn.  First, confronting and undermining this 
ideology.  Whether they are violent in their means or not, we must make it 
203	  	  
impossible for the extremists to succeed.  Now, for governments, there are some 
obvious ways we can do this.  We must ban preachers of hate from coming to our 
countries.  We must also proscribe organisations that incite terrorism against people 
at home and abroad.  Governments must also be shrewder in dealing with those that, 
while not violent, are in some cases part of the problem.  We need to think much 
harder about who it’s in the public interest to work with.  Some organisations that 
seek to present themselves as a gateway to the Muslim community are showered 
with public money despite doing little to combat extremism.  As others have 
observed, this is like turning to a right-wing fascist party to fight a violent white 
supremacist movement.  So we should properly judge these organisations: do they 
believe in universal human rights – including for women and people of other faiths?  
Do they believe in equality of all before the law?  Do they believe in democracy and 
the right of people to elect their own government?  Do they encourage integration or 
separation?  These are the sorts of questions we need to ask.  Fail these tests and the 
presumption should be not to engage with organisations – so, no public money, no 
sharing of platforms with ministers at home. 
 
[13] At the same time, we must stop these groups from reaching people in publicly-
funded institutions like universities or even, in the British case, prisons.  Now, some 
say, this is not compatible with free speech and intellectual inquiry.  Well, I say, 
would you take the same view if these were right-wing extremists recruiting on our 
campuses?  Would you advocate inaction if Christian fundamentalists who believed 
that Muslims are the enemy were leading prayer groups in our prisons?  And to 
those who say these non-violent extremists are actually helping to keep young, 
vulnerable men away from violence, I say nonsense. 
 
[14] Would you allow the far right groups a share of public funds if they promise to 
help you lure young white men away from fascist terrorism?  Of course not.  But, at 
root, challenging this ideology means exposing its ideas for what they are, and that 
is completely unjustifiable.  We need to argue that terrorism is wrong in all 
circumstances.  We need to argue that prophecies of a global war of religion pitting 
Muslims against the rest of the world are nonsense. 
 
[15] Now, governments cannot do this alone.  The extremism we face is a distortion 
of Islam, so these arguments, in part, must be made by those within Islam.  So let us 
give voice to those followers of Islam in our own countries – the vast, often unheard 
majority – who despise the extremists and their worldview.  Let us engage groups 
that share our aspirations. 
 
[16] Now, second, we must build stronger societies and stronger identities at home.  
Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more 
active, muscular liberalism.  A passively tolerant society says to its citizens, as long 
as you obey the law we will just leave you alone.  It stands neutral between different 
values. But I believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it believes in 
certain values and actively promotes them.  Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, 
democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality.  It says 
to its citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in 
these things.  Now, each of us in our own countries, I believe, must be unambiguous 
and hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty. 
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[17] There are practical things that we can do as well.  That includes making sure 
that immigrants speak the language of their new home and ensuring that people are 
educated in the elements of a common culture and curriculum.  Back home, we’re 
introducing National Citizen Service: a two-month programme for sixteen-year-olds 
from different backgrounds to live and work together.  I also believe we should 
encourage meaningful and active participation in society, by shifting the balance of 
power away from the state and towards the people.  That way, common purpose can 
be formed as people come together and work together in their neighbourhoods.  It 
will also help build stronger pride in local identity, so people feel free to say, ‘Yes, I 
am a Muslim, I am a Hindu, I am Christian, but I am also a Londonder or a Berliner 
too’. It’s that identity, that feeling of belonging in our countries, that I believe is the 
key to achieving true cohesion. 
 
[18] So, let me end with this. This terrorism is completely indiscriminate and has 
been thrust upon us.  It cannot be ignored or contained; we have to confront it with 
confidence – confront the ideology that drives it by defeating the ideas that warp so 
many young minds at their root, and confront the issues of identity that sustain it by 
standing for a much broader and generous vision of citizenship in our countries.  
Now, none of this will be easy.  We will need stamina, patience and endurance, and 
it won’t happen at all if we act alone.  This ideology crosses not just our continent 
but all continents, and we are all in this together.  At stake are not just lives, it is our 
way of life.  That is why this is a challenge we cannot avoid; it is one we must rise 
to and overcome.  Thank you. 
 
Source: http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-
conference/ (accessed on 15th February 2011) 
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Database: Nexis (FR, DE, UK) 
Database: Factiva (DE) 
Category: Immigration, Citizenship & Displacement 
Keywords: Sarkozy and (Muslims (or) Islam) 
Period: Tuesday, December 09, 2009 – Monday, December 14, 2009      
Time Of Request: Thursday, August 08, 2013  20:19:40 
 
 
 French Newspapers 
 
 
1. Les mots du dèbat;  Dossier. L'islam et la laïcité au centre du dèbat. Repères  La Croix, Lundi 
14 Dècembre 2009, EV…NEMENT, 317 mots 
 
2. ´ Une assimilation rèussie, c'est la clè du mètissage ª;  Dossier. L'islam et la laïcité au centre du 
dèbat;  Pour Henri Guaino, le dèbat sur l'identitè nationale ne peut se rèsumer à l'immigration ou 
à la question religieuse, mais ne pas les èvoquer serait ´ absurde ª  La Croix, Lundi 14 
Dècembre 2009, EV…NEMENT, 1232 mots, ROYER Solenn de; ROUDEN Cèline 
 
3. La mosquèe de Castres profanèe la nuit dernière  Le Parisien, Dimanche 13 Dècembre 2009, A 
LA UNE; RELIGION, 465 mots, R.B. 
 
4. M. Portier : " La laïcité d'intègration joue aussi pour les musulmans "  Le Monde, 13 dècembre 
2009 dimanche, POLITIQUE; Pg. 8, 1344 mots, Propos recueillis par Stèphanie Le Bars 
 
5. Analyse;  Pourquoi la France n'a pas de leçon à donner à la Suisse  Le Monde, 12 dècembre 
2009 samedi, EDITORIAL - ANALYSES; Pg. 2, 913 mots 
 
6. L'ISLAM est-il soluble dans la Rèpublique laÔque ? MÍme si ce n'ètait pas, à l'origine, l'objet du 
dèbat sur l'identitè...  Le Parisien, Jeudi 10 Dècembre 2009, FAIT, 329 mots, Henri Vernet et 
Bèatrice Houchard 
 
7. Le dèbat sur l'identitè tourne au dèbat sur l'islam  Le Monde, 10 dècembre 2009 jeudi, UNE; Pg. 
1, 788 mots, Stèphanie Le Bars 
 
8. M. Sarkozy veut èviter que le FN confisque le dèbat sur l'identitè nationale  Le Monde, 10 
dècembre 2009 jeudi, POLITIQUE; Pg. 13, 654 mots, Abel Mestre, Caroline Monnot et Patrick 
Roger 
 
9. Identitè et unitè nationales  Le Figaro …conomie, Mercredi 9 Dècembre 2009, OPINIONS; Pg. 
17, 407 mots, Du Limbert, Paul-Henri 
 
10. Le nouveau message de Sarkozy : l'islam de France  Le Figaro …conomie, Mercredi 9 
Dècembre 2009, FRANCE; Politique; Pg. 3, 660 mots, Jaigu, Charles 
 
11. Identitè et unitè nationales  Le Figaro, Mercredi 9 Dècembre 2009, OPINIONS; Pg. 17, 407 
mots, Du Limbert, Paul-Henri 
 
12. Identitè nationale: Sarkozy invite chacun : pratiquer son culte avec ‘humble discrètion’  Les 
Echos, Mercredi 9 Dècembre 2009, ARTICLE; Pg. 2, 444 mots, CECILE CORNUDET 
 
13. ´ Une assimilation rèussie, c'est la clè du mètissage ª;  Dossier. L'islam et la laÔcitè au centre 
du dèbat;  Pour Henri Guaino, le dèbat sur l'identitè nationale ne peut se rèsumer à l'immigration 
ou à la question religieuse, mais ne pas les èvoquer serait ´ absurde ª  La Croix, Lundi 14 
Dècembre 2009, EV…NEMENT, 1232 mots, ROYER Solenn de; ROUDEN Cèline 
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14. Les mots du dèbat;  Dossier. L'islam et la laïcité au centre du dèbat. Repères  La Croix, Lundi 
14 Dècembre 2009, EV…NEMENT, 317 mots 
 
15. " Mariages gris " et matins bruns  Le Monde, 9 dècembre 2009 mercredi, D…BATS; Pg. 20, 
1173 mots 
 
16. L'èquitè sociale, prioritè de l'èlectorat ouvrier  Le Monde, 9 dècembre 2009 mercredi, 
POLITIQUE; Pg. 12, 845 mots, Jean-Michel Normand 
 
17. Assemblèe: dèbat sans passion sur la nation  Le Figaro …conomie, Mercredi 9 Dècembre 2009, 
FRANCE; Politique; Pg. 4, 524 mots, Huet, Sophie 
18. Assemblèe: dèbat sans passion sur la nation;  La droite se fèlicite de l'initiative d'…ric Besson, la 
gauche dènonce des arriËre-pensèes èlectorales.  Le Figaro, Mercredi 9 Dècembre 2009, 
FRANCE; Politique; Pg. 4, 524 mots, Huet, Sophie 
 
19. Les ratès de la politique d'immigration choisie  Les Echos, Mardi 8 Dècembre 2009, ARTICLE; 
Pg. 2, 499 mots, MAXIME AMIOT 
 
 
 German Newspapers 
 
 
1. quergeschrieben;  Das Minarettverbot: Ein Bruch  Die Presse, Montag 14. Dezember 2009, 452 
Wˆrter, von Andreas Khol 
 
2. Vier Fragen an Josef Joffe;  Was macht die Welt? Zum Krieg bereit sein, Minarette tolerieren 
und Boni flieflen sehen  Der Tagesspiegel, Montag 14. Dezember 2009, TITEL; S. 1, 458 Wˆrter 
 
3. PRESSESTIMMEN;    Frankfurter Rundschau, Donnerstag 10. Dezember 2009, 
LESERBRIEFE; S. 32, 340 Wˆrter 
 
4. Sarkozys nationale Nabelschau  Die Presse, Donnerstag 10. Dezember 2009, 727 Wˆrter, Von 
unserem Korrespondenten RUDOLF BALMER 
 
5. Selbstzweifel einer Grande Nation;  Wie die Franzosen ¸ber ihre "nationale Identit‰t" diskutieren  
Frankfurter Rundschau, Mittwoch 09. Dezember 2009, POLITIK; S. 8, 654 Wˆrter, Stefan 
Br‰ndle 
 
6. Sarkozy bricht eine Lanze f¸r die Schweizer;  Muslime sollen nicht provozieren - Initiative gegen 
Minarett-Verbot  Stuttgarter Nachrichten, Mittwoch 9. Dezember 2009, ZEITGESCHEHEN; S. 4, 
254 Wˆrter 
 
7. Sarkozy verteidigt die Schweizer  Spiegel Online, 8. Dezember 2009 Dienstag 9:08 AM GMT, 
NACH MINARETT-VERBOT, 639 Wˆrter 
 
8. Multikulti àa Sarkozy Südeutsche Zeitung, 9 December 2009, 246 words 
 
9. Die Watte des Präidenten, Die Zeit, Gero v. Randow   10 December 2009 370 words 
 
10. Frankreich streitet üer seine nationale Identitä - Das republikanische Experiment, Die Welt, 
Sascha Lehnartz,333 10 December 2009, 333 words 
 
 
 British Newspapers 
 
 
1. Equality and public safety invoked in call for ban on 'extremist' burka  The Times (London), 
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December 14, 2009 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 34, 137 words, Charles Bremner 
 
2. Brawl engulfs Sarkozy's grand debate;  Matthew Campbell watches a national exploration of 
'identity' descend into farce in Troyes  The Sunday Times (London), December 13, 2009, 
NEWS; Pg. 31, 942 words, Matthew Campbell 
 
3. MEN WHO PUT WIFE IN BURKA 'NOT WELCOME IN FRANCE'  DAILY MAIL (London), 
December 11, 2009 Friday, 563 words, FROM IAN SPARKS 
 
4. Twitchy Sarko losing some gloss;  Analysis  The Times (London), December 10, 2009 Thursday, 
NEWS; Pg. 43, 263 words, Charles Bremner 
 
5. Sarkozy defends;  Swiss ban on minarets  The Daily Telegraph (London), December 9, 2009 
Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 23, 281  words, Henry Samuel 
 
6. Sarkozy: Muslims should be discreet  The Express, December 9, 2009 Wednesday, NEWS; 4, 
155  words 
 
7. International: Sarkozy defends Swiss over ban on minarets: French president calls for 'discreet' 
form of worship: Statements meant to stir xenophobia - opposition  The Guardian (London) - 
Final Edition, December 9, 2009 Wednesday, GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 18, 
629 words, Ian Traynor, Europe Editor 
 
8. Muslims told 'be discreet'  The Sun (England), December 9, 2009 Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 2, 88 
words 
 
9. 'Humble' Muslims  The Sun (England), December 9, 2009 Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 2, 41 words 
 
10. Sarkozy warns Muslims 'practise faith discreetly'  The Times (London), December 9, 2009 
Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 44, 176 words, Charles Bremner 
 
11. Sarkozy defends Switzerland minaret ban  Guardian Unlimited, December 8, 2009 Tuesday, 645 
words, Ian Traynorguardian.co.uk 
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 French Newspapers 
 
 
1. L'ANALYSE;  Merkel peine ‡ rénover la droite allemande  Le Figaro, Vendredi 22 Octobre 2010, 
OPINIONS; Pg. 15, 508 mots, Saint-Paul, Patrick 
 
2. Les privilèges de l'…glise en Bavière remis en question  Le Figaro …Economie, Jeudi 21 
Octobre 2010, INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 8, 561 mots, Saint-Paul, Patrick 
 
3. Immigration : le président allemand joue la conciliation  Les Echos, Mercredi 20 Octobre 2010, 
BREVE; Pg. 20, 63 mots, LES ECHOS 
 
4. Pourquoi Angela Merkel critique les immigrés  Aujourd'hui en France, Mardi 19 Octobre 2010, 
EDITION ABONN…S - POLITIQUE; ALLEMAGNE, 486 mots, CATHERINE TARDREW 
 
5. Le modèle multiculturel allemand a-t-il Echoué ?;  La question du jour;  Patrick Moreau, 
chercheur sur l'Allemagne au CNRS ‡ Berlin  La Croix, Mardi 19 Octobre 2010, LA QUESTION 
DU JOUR, 362 mots, MAILLARD SÈbastien 
 
6. L'Allemagne brise ‡ son tour le tabou du débat sur l'islam  Le Monde, 19 octobre 2010 mardi, 
EUROPE; Pg. 8, 1235 mots, Marion Van Renterghem 
 
7. " 20 % de l'Electorat européen craint que la diversification culturelle fragilise les nations "  Le 
Monde, 19 octobre 2010 mardi, POLITIQUE; Pg. 8, 630 mots, Propos recueillis par CÈcile 
Prieur 
 
8. Le grand Ècart de Merkel  Aujourd'hui en France, Lundi 18 Octobre 2010, EDITION ABONN…S 
- POLITIQUE; Allemagne, 203 mots 
 
9. En bref  La Tribune, Lundi 18 Octobre 2010, POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE; Pg. 11, 393 mots 
 
10. Merkel revendique les valeurs chrétiennes de l'Allemagne  Le Figaro …conomie, Lundi 18 
Octobre 2010, UNE-FIG; Pg. 1, 93 mots, OberlÈ, Thierry 
 
11. Merkel enterre le modèle d'intégration allemand  Le Figaro …conomie, Lundi 18 Octobre 2010, 
EUROPE; Pg. 9, 641 mots, Brunet, Marion 
 
12. Merkel revendique les valeurs chrétiennes de l'Allemagne   Le Figaro, Lundi 18 Octobre 2010, 
UNE-FIG; Pg. 1, 93 mots, OberlÈ, Thierry 
 
13. Merkel enterre le modèle d'intégration allemand;  Intervenant dans le dÈbat sur l'immigration, la 
chanceliËre a dénoncé samedi l'´Èchec du modèle multiculturelª de son pays.  Le Figaro, Lundi 
18 Octobre 2010, EUROPE; Pg. 9, 641 mots, Brunet, Marion 
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1. Skandinavien: Missgl¸ckte Integration  Handelsblatt, Freitag 22. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT 
UND POLITIK; S. 16, 272 Wˆrter, Steuer, Helmut 
 
2. USA: Parallele zu hispanischen Einwanderern  Handelsblatt, Freitag 22. Oktober 2010, 
WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK; S. 16, 313 Wˆrter, Ziener, Markus 
 
3. Frankreich: Applaus von den Rechtsradikalen  Handelsblatt, Freitag 22. Oktober 2010, 
WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK; S. 17, 290 Wˆrter, Alich, Holger 
 
4. Ver‰rgerung am Bosporus;  Deutschland erschwert t¸rkischen Unternehmern den Handel - Nun 
beginnt sich die T¸rkei von ihrem wichtigsten Handelspartner abzuwenden  Die Welt, Freitag 22. 
Oktober 2010 , WIRTSCHAFT; S. 10, 946 Wˆrter, Freia Peters 
 
5. Was unsere Gesellschaft zusammenh‰lt;  Seid endlich universal: [#x201e]Multikulturalismus" 
und [#x201e]deutsche Leitkultur" sind gleichermaflen Irrwege  Die Welt, Freitag 22. Oktober 
2010 , FEUILLETON; S. 23, 1392 Wˆrter, Richard Herzinger 
 
6. S¸ssmuth st‰rkt Pr‰sident Wulff;  INTEGRATION Die fr¸here Bundestagspr‰sidentin kritisiert 
im taz-Interview die Debatte als "r¸ckw‰rtsgewandt": "Wir sind eine multikulturelle Gesellschaft"  
taz, die tageszeitung, Donnerstag 21. Oktober 2010, SEITE 1; S. 01, 260 Wˆrter 
 
7. Westerwelle in Indien: Wie die Multikulti-Debatte den Minister begleitet  Handelsblatt, Mittwoch 
20. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK; S. 14, 503 Wˆrter, Hauschild, Helmut 
 
8. Bohrende Fragen zur Integration;  ISLAM-DEBATTE Eine Zahnarztpraxis in Berlin-Neukˆlln. 
Mitarbeiter und Patienten - fast alle sind Einwanderer. Was denken sie ¸ber den 
Integrationsstreit, den Sarrazin und Wulff entfachten? Der Arzt, die Prophylaxe-Assistentin, der 
Praktikant und die einzige nichtmigrantische Kollegin antworten  taz, die tageszeitung, Mittwoch 
20. Oktober 2010, TAZZWEI; S. 13, 1224 Wˆrter, DIANA AUST 
 
9. Zuwanderung spaltet die Koalition;  Streit um Punktesystem wird schriller - Innenminister de 
MaiziËre: Jeder plaudert ohne Sachkenntnis daher  Die Welt, Mittwoch 20. Oktober 2010 , 
POLITIK; S. 2, 965 Wˆrter, Freia Peters 
 
10. Willkommene Arbeitskraft;  Br¸derle will Ausl‰ndern Punkte geben, Schavan Berufsabschl¸sse 
schneller anerkennen  Frankfurter Rundschau, Dienstag 19. Oktober 2010, POLITIK; S. 6, 530 
Wˆrter, Olivia Schoeller 
 
11. P¸nktchen f¸r mehr Akzeptanz;  KOMMENTAR VON LUKAS WALLRAFF  taz, die tageszeitung, 
Dienstag 19. Oktober 2010, SEITE 1; S. 01, 398 Wˆrter, LUKAS WALLRAFF 
 
12. "Merkel sucht ein Feindbild";  Gr¸ne K¸nast weist Multikulti-Aussage zur¸ck  Frankfurter 
Rundschau, Montag 18. Oktober 2010, POLITIK; S. 1, 296 Wˆrter, Olivia Schoeller 
 
13. "Kulturelle Abschottung ist falsch"  Handelsblatt, Montag 18. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT UND 
POLITIK; S. 12, 882 Wˆrter, Afh¸ppe, Sven 
 
14. Merkel provoziert Unmut der Liberalen  Handelsblatt, Montag 18. Oktober 2010, TITELSEITE; S. 
1, 246 Wˆrter, saf 
 
15. Zuwanderung: Merkel und Seehofer halten "Multikulti" f¸r gescheitert  Handelsblatt, Montag 18. 
Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK; S. 12, 663 Wˆrter 
 
16. Zur¸ck auf die Schulbank;  Aus Langzeitarbeitslosen lassen sich nur schwer Fachkr‰fte machen 
/ Arbeitsmarktexperten fordern mehr Zuwanderung  Der Tagesspiegel, Montag 18. Oktober 
2010, WIRTSCHAFT; S. 15, 734 Wˆrter, Jahel Mielke 
210	  	  
 
17. Merkel erkl‰rt Multikulti f¸r gestorben;  PARTEIEN Ruf nach qualifizierten Ein-wanderern wird 
lauter  taz, die tageszeitung, Montag 18. Oktober 2010, SEITE 1; S. 01, 206 Wˆrter 
 
18. Merkel erklät Multikulti fü gescheitert,559 words, 18 October 2010, Die Welt 
 
19. Wer zu uns kommt, Torsten Krauel, 295 words, 18 October 2010, Die Welt 
 
20. Die "tükisch-deutsche Achse", Boris Kalnoky, 1,084 words, 19 October 2010, Die Welt 
 
21. „ine Million Verweigerer“ Integrationsunwillige bis Multikulti –as hinter den Kampfbegriffen der 
Parteien steckt, Von Roland Preuß, 525 words, 19 October 2010, Südeutsche Zeitung 
 
22. Zuwanderung spaltet die Koalition, Freia Peters, 802 words, 20 October 2010, Die Welt 
 
23. Der Bundespräident als Integrator; Wulff versucht in Ankara, die irre ausläderpolitische 
Diskussion ins Flussbett der Vernunft zu leiten, Von Heribert Prantl, 437 words, 20 October 
2010, Südeutsche Zeitung 
 
24. Worte der Woche, 201 words, 21 October 2010, DIE ZEIT 
 
25. MEINUNG ZEITGEIST; Einwanderung? Aber ja, Josef Joffe, 476 words, 21 October 2010, DIE 
ZEIT 
 
26. ZUWANDERUNG; Magnet fü Talente von draußn, Vera Sprothen, 1,061 words, 21 October 
2010, DIE ZEIT 
 
27. Was unsere Gesellschaft zusammenhät, Richard Herzinger, 1,109 words, 22 October 2010, Die 
Welt 
 
 
 British Newspapers 
 
 
1. Multiculturalism needs defenders;  International Studies  Independent Extra, October 21, 2010 
Thursday, COMMENT; Pg. 4, 979 words, Adrian Hamilton 
 
2. Europe is sinking rapidly;  LEADER COLUMN  The Express, October 20, 2010 Wednesday, 
LEADER COLUMN; 1, 116  words 
 
3. Europe is sinking rapidly  The Express, October 20, 2010 Wednesday, EDITORIAL; OPINION, 
LEADING ARTICLES; Pg. 12, 270 words 
 
4. Help Turks assimilate, Gul urges Germany  The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, October 20, 
2010 Wednesday, GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 22, 264 words, Kate Connolly, 
Berlin 
 
5. Multicultural mistakes;  THE DAILY TELEGRAPH Established 1855  The Daily Telegraph 
(London), October 19, 2010 Tuesday, EDITORIAL; OPINIONS, LEADING ARTICLES; Pg. 21, 
307 words 
 
6. DON'T START A RACE WAR  Daily Star, October 19, 2010 Tuesday, NEWS; 15, 304 words, by 
EMMA WALL 
 
7. 'Multikulti' has failed in Germany says Merkel  The Daily Telegraph (London), October 18, 2010 
Monday, NEWS; Pg. 20, 289 words, Allan Hall 
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8. MULTICULTURALISM IN GERMANY HAS 'FAILED UTTERLY' SAYS MERKEL  DAILY MAIL 
(London), October 18, 2010 Monday, 582 words, FROM ALLAN HALL IN BERLIN 
 
9. Immigrants must learn German, says Merkel  Daily Post (North Wales), October 18, 2010 
Monday, NEWS; Pg. 14, 147 words 
 
10. Warning for immigrants  Evening Times (Glasgow), October 18, 2010 Monday, FOR; Pg. 10, 63 
words, NO BYLINE 
 
11. Multi-cultural society has failed says Merkel  The Express, October 18, 2010 Monday, NEWS; 
02, 497  words, By Allan Hall and Sarah Westcott 
 
12. Comment: Merkel's own goal: Germany's leader is wrong about multiculturalism, though a 
football match may have rattled her  The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, October 18, 2010 
Monday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 29, 741 words, Philip Oltermann 
 
13. Multiculturalism is a failure, says Merkel: German chancellor's remarks reflect heated debate 
and suggest shift in attitude towards immigration  The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, 
October 18, 2010 Monday, GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 16, 740 words, Kate 
Connolly, Berlin 
 
14. Merkel admits: Multicultural society has failed in Germany  The Herald (Glasgow), October 18, 
2010 Monday, HS - NEWS; Pg. 16, 410 words, sabine siebold potsdam 
 
15. Weak Merkel stokes xenophobia as she fights for political survival  The Independent (London), 
October 18, 2010 Monday, WORLD; Pg. 20, 904 words, Tony Paterson in Berlin 
 
16. Integration has two sides;  Leading Articles Germany  Independent Extra, October 18, 2010 
Monday, COMMENT; Pg. 2, 420 words 
 
17. Germany's new culture struggle  Metro (UK), October 18, 2010 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 16, 181 
words, Aidan Radnedge 
 
18. SPLITTING HERRS;  Merkel: Immigration has polarised Germany  The Sun (England), October 
18, 2010 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 26, 213 words, NICK PARKER 
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Appendix 6: Press Coverage of Cameron’s Speech 	  	  
Database: Nexis (FR, DE, UK) 
Database: Factiva (DE) 
Category: Immigration, Citizenship & Displacement 
Keywords: Cameron and (Muslims (or) Islam) 
Period: Saturday, February 5, 2011 – Saturday, February 12, 2011      
Time Of Request: Thursday, August 08, 2013  20:19:40 	  	  
 French Newspapers 
 
 
1. L'ANALYSE;  Multiculturalisme:Sarkozy tranche  Le Figaro …conomie, Samedi 12 Février 2011, 
OPINIONS; Pg. 17, 670 mots, Waintraub, Judith 
 
2. ´ L'Èchec du multiculturalisme ª  Aujourd'hui en France, Vendredi 11 Février 2011, EDITION 
ABONN…S - FAIT DU JOUR; DIVERSIT…, 191 mots, V. Md. 
 
3. Grande-Bretagne : l'" Ècole libre ", c'est possible  Le Monde, 11 Février 2011 vendredi, 
CONTRE-ENQUETE; Pg. 15, 508 mots, Virginie Malingre (Londres, correspondante) 
 
4. Multiculturalisme: Marine Le Pen embarrasse David Cameron  Les Echos, Vendredi 11 Février 
2011, ARTICLE; Pg. 20, 356 mots, NICOLAS MADELAINE 
 
5. David Cameron dénonce le multiculturalisme et lance le débat en Grande-Bretagne  Le Monde, 
8 Février 2011 mardi, INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 8, 881 mots, Virginie Malingre 
 
6. L'Allemagne prend conscience que 20 % de sa population est issue de l'immigration  Le Monde, 
8 février 2011 mardi, POLITIQUE; Pg. 8, 650 mots, FrÈdÈric LemaÓtre 
 
7. Le Royaume-Uni ouvre ses portes aux riches immigrants  Les Echos, Mardi 8 Février 2011, 
ARTICLE; Pg. 8, 609 mots, NICOLAS MADELAINE 
 
8. Cameron cible l'islamisme  Aujourd'hui en France, Lundi 7 FÈvrier 2011, EDITION ABONN…S - 
POLITIQUE; GRANDE-BRETAGNE, 142 mots 
 
9. David Cameron reconnait l'Échec du multiculturalisme  Le Figaro …conomie, Lundi 7 Février 
2011, INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 8, 597 mots, Vanlerberghe, Cyrille 
 
10. David Cameron dénonce le multiculturalisme  Les Echos, Lundi 7 Février 2011, BREVE; Pg. 16, 
69 mots, CATHERINE CHATIGNOUX 
 
11. Royaume-Uni : pour Cameron, la politique d'intégration a Echoué  Le Parisienne, Samedi 5 
FÈvrier 2011, A LA UNE; INTEGRATION, 627 mots 
 
 
 German Newspapers 
 
 
1. Multikulti-Streit in England  Berliner Zeitung, Montag 7. Februar 2011, POLITIK; S. 4, 503 Wˆrter 
 
2. Ende der falschen Toleranz;  Multikulturalismus ist f¸r den britischen Premier Cameron 
gescheitert  Die Welt, Montag 7. Februar 2011 , FORUM; Kommentar; S. 3, 331 Wˆrter, Thomas 
Kielinger 
213	  	  
 
3. Cameron sieht Multikulti-Ansatz als gescheitert an  Spiegel Online, 5. Februar 2011 Samstag 
3:07 PM GMT+1, BRITISCHER PREMIER, 497 Wˆrter 
 
4. Wüende Bauern im statistischen Vollrausch, Sascha Lehnartz, 744 words, 12 February 2011, 
Die Welt 
 
5. Der Kopfmensch in der Revolte, Richard Herzinger, 902 words, 12 February 2011 - Die Welt 
 
6. Leitmotiv zur Leitkultur; Europa kann seine Werte selbstbewusst verteidigen –uch ohne 
Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Von Stefan Ulrich, 522 words, 12 February 2011 - Südeutsche Zeitung 
7. Herausforderungen f¸r den Westen: M¸nchner Sicherheitskonferenz diskutiert ¸ber ƒgypten, 
Nahost und Afghanistan.;  Protest ja - aber keine Revolution;  Auch nach knapp zwei Wochen 
Unruhen in ƒgypten tut sich der Westen schwer  Die Welt, Montag 7. Februar 2011 , POLITIK; 
S. 4, 1278 Wˆrter, Clemens Wergin 
 
 
 British Newspapers 
 
 
1. Town where one in 10 is a Gurkha family  The Daily Telegraph (London), February 12, 2011 
Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 9, 446 words, Laura Roberts 
 
2. Saturday: Comment: A bill of rights won't free us: People around the world regard voting as 
fundamental - so why the posturing in parliament?  The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, 
February 12, 2011 Saturday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 39, 619 
words, Francesca Klug 
 
3. Le Pen offers support for Cameron speech  The Daily Telegraph (London), February 10, 2011 
Thursday, NEWS; Pg. 17, 218 words, Andy Bloxham 
 
4. French far right praises Cameron stance on multiculturalism  The Guardian (London) - Final 
Edition, February 10, 2011 Thursday, GUARDIAN HOME PAGES; Pg. 15, 237 words, David 
Batty 
 
5. You don't set a thief to catch a terrorist;  The Prime Minister is spot-on: we should promote 
democratic values, not cosy up to those who reject them  The Times (London), February 10, 
2011 Thursday, NEWS; OPINION, COLUMNS; Pg. 25, 1122 words, David Aaronovitch 
 
6. Cameron's confusion on multiculturalism  Guardian Unlimited, February 8, 2011 Tuesday, 821 
words, Andrew Brownguardian.co.uk 
 
7. Comment: This is not a minority problem: Multiculturalism has made progress in Britain - but 
white reticence is still the stumbling block  The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 8, 
2011 Tuesday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 32, 698 words, Tariq 
Modood 
 
8. Comment: This is not a minority problem: A control order for values  The Guardian (London) - 
Final Edition, February 8, 2011 Tuesday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 
32, 329 words, Vikram Dodd 
 
9. Comment: This is not a minority problem: Which is the real Cameron?  The Guardian (London) - 
Final Edition, February 8, 2011 Tuesday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 
32, 338 words, Salma Yaqoob 
 
10. Reading, riting, religion, really?;  David Cameron says multiculturalism has failed. So what's he 
doing promoting faith schools, asks Philip Collins  The Times (London), February 8, 2011 
Tuesday, T2;FEATURES; Pg. 4,5, 1323 words, Philip Collins 
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11. Muscular conservatism could strengthen national identity and counter extremism;  Letters to the 
Editor  The Daily Telegraph (London), February 7, 2011 Monday, LETTERS; Pg. 21, 404 words 
 
12. Miliband silent in multiculturalism row;  News Bulletin  The Daily Telegraph (London), February 
7, 2011 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 2, 119 words 
 
13. Did David Cameron really mean what he said about multiculturalism?  Guardian Unlimited, 
February 7, 2011 Monday, 773 words, Salma Yaqoobguardian.co.uk 
 
14. David Cameron's control order for values  Guardian Unlimited, February 7, 2011 Monday, 1215 
words, Vikram Doddguardian.co.uk 
 
15. Letter: Multiculturalism and Britain's national identity  The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, 
February 7, 2011 Monday, GUARDIAN LEADER PAGES; Pg. 29, 864 words 
 
16. Cameron's crackdown under way as cash withheld from 'suspect' groups: Funding cut to Muslim 
bodies after PM speech Steps to combat rise of radicalism in universities  The Guardian 
(London) - Final Edition, February 7, 2011 Monday, GUARDIAN HOME PAGES; Pg. 4, 782 
words, Patrick Wintour and Jenny Percival 
 
17. Cameron on multiculturalism: Blaming the victims  The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, 
February 7, 2011 Monday, GUARDIAN LEADER PAGES; Pg. 28, 655 words 
 
18. Cameron 'livid' after speech comes under fire Attacks from Muslims leave Cameron under  The 
Independent (London), February 7, 2011 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 10, 495 words, Oliver Wright 
Whitehall Editor 
 
19. It is state multiculturalism that is racist, and David Cameron who is a liberal  telegraph.co.uk, 
February 7, 2011 Monday 2:15 PM GMT, BLOG, 980 words, By Ed West 
 
20. David Cameron on Muslims: time to show that we really are all in this together  telegraph.co.uk, 
February 7, 2011 Monday 1:50 PM GMT, BLOG, 614 words, By George Pitcher 
 
21. Multiculturalism;  Letters to the Editor  The Times (London), February 7, 2011 Monday, 
LETTERS; Pg. 25, 301 words 
 
22. No Place for the Intolerant;  Multiculturalism has left minorities alienated and adrift. Cameron is 
right to insist on muscular liberalism to promote values that all Britons must share  The Times 
(London), February 7, 2011 Monday, EDITORIAL; OPINION, LEADING ARTICLES; Pg. 2, 646 
words 
 
23. Cuts hit counter-extremist group  The Times (London), February 7, 2011 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 6, 
366 words, Roland Watson 
 
24. COMMENT: MULTICULTURALISM: Mr Cameron has a point - but this is a crude caricature  The 
Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 6, 2011 Sunday, OBSERVER NEW COMMENT 
PAGES; Pg. 32, 735 words, Editorial 
 
25. COMMENT: The 'big society' is collapsing under its inherent absurdity: The prime minister still 
thinks his cherished dream has force. It's a pity everyone else is rapidly deserting him  The 
Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 6, 2011 Sunday, OBSERVER NEW COMMENT 
PAGES; Pg. 35, 1208 words, Catherine Bennett 
 
26. Front: Cameron sparks fury with attack on multiculturalism: PM 'has handed PR coup to far right' 
Straw says comments 'ill-judged'  The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 6, 2011 
Sunday, OBSERVER HOME NEWS PAGES; Pg. 1, 821 words, Toby Helm Political Editor 
Matthew Taylor and Rowenna Davis 
 
27. Special report: Coalition divided over Cameron onslaught on multiculturalism  The Guardian 
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(London) - Final Edition, February 6, 2011 Sunday, OBSERVER HOME NEWS PAGES; Pg. 8, 
1378 words, Jamie Doward 
 
28. Special report: MULTICULTURAL BRITAIN - SIX PROMINENT THINKERS GIVE THEIR VIEW  
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 6, 2011 Sunday, OBSERVER HOME NEWS 
PAGES; Pg. 9, 982 words 
 
29. Diversity does not breed terrorists - politics does  The Independent on Sunday, February 6, 
2011, COMMENT; Pg. 42, 576 words, Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 
 
30. Cameron's confusion over identity;  Leading Articles  The Independent on Sunday, February 6, 
2011, COMMENT; Pg. 42, 739 words 
 
31. Labour accuses Cameron of lining up with extremists on multiculturalism;  PM's attack on some 
minorities' failure to integrate draws stinging criticism. Matt Chorley and Brian Brady report  The 
Independent on Sunday, February 6, 2011, NEWS; Pg. 4, 1603 words, Matt Chorley and Brian 
Brady 
 
32. Speech boosts anti-Islamists  The Observer (England), February 6, 2011, OBSERVER HOME 
NEWS PAGES; Pg. 9, 324 words 
 
33. Prime Minister stands firm over criticism of multiculturalism  The Sunday Telegraph (London), 
February 6, 2011, NEWS; Pg. 4, 433 words 
 
34. Miliband ally accuses PM of stoking support for far right  The Sunday Times (London), February 
6, 2011 Sunday, NEWS; Pg. 2, 427 words, Simon McGee 
 
35. FINE WORDS, MR CAMERON, BUT WHAT'S NEXT?  The Sunday Times (London), February 
6, 2011 Sunday, EDITORIAL; OPINION, LEADING ARTICLES; Pg. 20, 584 words 
 
36. Muslims must embrace core British values, says Cameron  The Daily Telegraph (London), 
February 5, 2011 Saturday, NEWS; FRONT PAGE; Pg. 1, 520 words, James Kirkup 
 
37. Cameron: my war on multiculturalism;  No funding for Muslim groups that fail to back women's 
rights  The Independent (London), February 5, 2011 Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 1, 1118 words, Oliver 
Wright and Jerome Taylor 
 
38. How monocultural does the Prime Minister want us to be?;  Analysis  The Independent 
(London), February 5, 2011 Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 4, 501 words, Paul Vallely 
 
39. The Big Society will never be built on the cheap;  Leading Articles  The Independent (London), 
February 5, 2011 Saturday, COMMENT; Pg. 36, 550 words 
 
40. David Cameron versus the Islamists: the Prime Minister throws down the gauntlet to a deadly 
enemy  telegraph.co.uk, February 5, 2011 Saturday 9:27 PM GMT, BLOG, 599 words, By Nile 
Gardiner 
 
41. David Cameron strikes exactly the right note with call for 'muscular liberalism'  telegraph.co.uk, 
February 5, 2011 Saturday 12:49 PM GMT, BLOG, 250 words, By Toby Young 
 
42. Multiculturalism has failed us: it's time for muscular liberalism, says Cameron  The Times 
(London), February 5, 2011 Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 3, 889 words, Roland Watson, Sean O'Neill, 
Steve Bird 
 
43. Sarkozy adds to chorus attacking multiculturalism;  World Bulletin  The Daily Telegraph 
(London), February 11, 2011 Friday, NEWS; Pg. 22, 105 words 
 
44. Has Dave realised Enoch was right?;  ON SATURDAY  The Daily Telegraph (London), February 
12, 2011 Saturday, EDITORIAL; OPINION, COLUMNS; Pg. 22, 122 words, Simon Heffer 
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